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The six-year investigation by West Yorkshire Police to apprehend Peter Sutcliffe, the 
Yorkshire Ripper, in the late 1970s and early 1980s was roundly criticised and led to a public 
inquiry that called for wide-ranging changes to homicide investigation.  With a history 
already marred by corruption and miscarriages of justice, it was a pivotal case, which 
triggered a process of reform that has continued to the present day.  Yet, flawed 
investigations continue, suggesting that the investigation of homicide remains fallible.  
Moreover, the homicide detection rate has declined since the 1960s.  Despite this, homicide 
investigation is a topic that has been subject to minimal academic scrutiny.  This study 
addresses this gap by exploring how and why the investigation of homicide in England and 
Wales has changed since the 1980s and what has been lost and/or gained as a consequence.  
Adopting a qualitative approach, the research is based on in-depth interviews with twenty-
seven former and serving homicide detectives, the analysis of three police murder files from 
the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, and observations of homicide investigation and detective 
training.  Original documentation from the Yorkshire Ripper investigation was also 
examined.   
This research has established that homicide investigation has changed almost beyond all 
recognition across the last four decades.  This is the consequence of four central drivers: a 
growing preoccupation with risk; the changing political economy; reactions to miscarriages 
of justice or problematic cases; and advances in science and technology.  The impact of 
change has been considerable and whilst there have been benefits, today’s more risk averse 
homicide detectives face new challenges that are compounded by cuts to police budgets and 
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
 
In 1981 Peter Sutcliffe, a lorry driver from Yorkshire in England, was arrested for the 
murders of thirteen women and attacks on seven others (Bilton, 2012).  The arrest of the man, 
known as the Yorkshire Ripper, signalled the end of a six-year investigation by West 
Yorkshire Police that had been beset by criticism.  The Byford Inquiry that was established to 
review the investigation identified problems in numerous areas (Byford, 1981).  In particular, 
limitations within the Major Incident Room (Byford, 1981), which had been overwhelmed by 
the volume of information that the inquiry had generated, were identified as leading to missed 
opportunities to apprehend Sutcliffe (Wattis, 2017).  The investigation was also hampered by 
the lack of a computerised system on which to store the masses of information (Byford, 
1981).   
The extensive recommendations that emerged from the Inquiry heralded an important 
moment in major crime investigation, for its changes have “governed all major crime 
investigations since” (Brain 2010, p63).  This was the first time that homicide investigation 
had come under considerable scrutiny and reform, but it would not be the last.  Over the past 
four decades major crime investigation in England and Wales has been subject to almost 
continual change.  However, high-profile miscarriages of justice and cases in which police 
work has been criticised cannot be considered the preserve of the past and continue to occur.   
The Need to Pursue all Lines of Enquiry  
 
Widely regarded as one of the most heinous crimes, homicide attracts a significant amount of 
academic, media and public interest (Brookman et al., 2017a).  Whilst the media are 
undoubtedly interested in all forms of crime, there is a tendency to focus upon those that are 
particularly violent and serious in nature, especially homicide.  Reiner (2007) writes that this 
has been the case for many years. 
As such, the public are equipped with a “degree of knowledge about personal and social 
phenomena of which very few…have ever, or are ever likely to experience” (Innes 1999, 
p272).  Further, homicide is considered to be a ‘signal crime’, which is defined by Innes 
(2013, p52) as an event that will “impact in some way upon a wider audience”.  It is because 
of this, Stelfox (2015) argues, that the public hold high expectations about the way in which 
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the police deal with these crimes, something that will undoubtedly be fuelled by the 
prevalence of documentaries following homicide investigation teams1.  These expectations 
are not always met.  The flawed investigations into the murders of Stephen Lawrence, 
Damilola Taylor, Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman are examples. 
Despite this, homicide investigation and detective work remain relatively neglected by the 
research literature (Brookman and Innes, 2013; Stelfox, 2015).  There are several potential 
explanations for this.  Firstly, the number of homicides perpetrated in England and Wales is 
among the lowest in the world (Brookman et al., 2017b) with the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) reporting that for the year ending March 2016 there were 571 cases of 
homicide recorded (ONS, 2017); thus it might be said that more prevalent crimes warrant 
attention.  Secondly, the detection rate for homicide suggests that the police are successful at 
investigating them; according to Brookman et al (forthcoming) in England and Wales that 
rate has been around 90% since 2000.  This is partially attributable to the fact that the 
majority of homicides in England and Wales can be described as ‘self-solvers’ whereby the 
offender is swiftly identified (Innes, 2003).  However, the detection rate has declined from an 
average of 94% during the 1960s (Brookman et al., forthcoming).  Thirdly, methodological 
challenges might prohibit those who wish to research homicide investigation, which 
Brookman (2015, p236) describes as a “closed world”.   
Whilst there are notable exceptions (Allsop, 2012; Brookman and Innes, 2013; Brookman et 
al., forthcoming; Hobbs, 1988; Stelfox, 2015), these works focus on particular aspects of 
homicide investigation.  Allsop (2012) examined police cold case investigations, Brookman 
and Innes (2013) explored what constitutes success in a homicide investigation and Hobbs 
(1988) looked at detective culture.  Some research has aimed to explore change.  Stelfox 
(2015) writes about the development of homicide investigation to identify where savings 
might be made in light of funding cuts, stressing that an understanding of the public 
expectation in respect of homicide investigations must be maintained.  In his book exploring 
why changes in policing have taken place, Savage (2007) suggests that failings in major 
crime investigations have been responsible for driving change.  These works, however, are 
not empirically grounded.  Moreover, much of the empirical research that has been conducted 
                                                          
1 At the time of writing ITV aired a documentary following Northumbria Police as they investigated a 
murder.  Entitled ‘An Hour To Catch a Killer’ it might be said that this could influence public 
expectations about the realties of investigating homicide and the timescales involved. 
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originates in the US (Brookman, 2015) rather than England and Wales.  In addition, this 
research is often quantitative as opposed to qualitative.   
Evidence of the necessity for such research is easy to find.  In addition to certain cases starkly 
illustrating that major crime investigation remains imperfect, the police service has 
experienced significant budget cuts (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), 
2014) and there are shortages in the number of detectives (HMIC, 2017).  This illustrates the 
importance of including a present day perspective.  
Homicide investigation is in need of closer attention.  Yet, what has not been achieved by the 
existing literature is a qualitative exploration of the changes to homicide investigation in 
England and Wales that begins when major crime investigation was placed under the 
spotlight and continues to the present day.  This would ensure an understanding of the 
consequences of change, and what they might mean for the future of these investigations.  
The Present Research 
 
This research explores the changes that homicide investigation has endured and how they 
have impacted upon investigations and detectives, using a qualitative approach.  Former and 
serving homicide detectives were interviewed to gain insight from those working on the 
ground.  Analysis of homicide case files, including original paperwork from the Yorkshire 
Ripper investigation, and observations of investigations and detective training, further enrich 
the study. 
This work will provide a holistic examination of the recent history of homicide investigation 
in England and Wales, with a contemporary discussion of the issues now facing 
investigations and detectives.  Accordingly, the core research questions are: 
1. In which particular ways have the investigation of homicide in England and Wales 
changed since the 1980s? 
2. Why has the investigation of homicide changed? 




The remainder of the thesis is divided into three parts, set out as follows: 
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Part One: The Research Backdrop 
Chapter Two provides an overview of the key events and changes that have shaped the 
investigation of homicide in England and Wales.  
Chapter Three considers the extensive scientific and technological advances that have taken 
place across the last four decades.  I also discuss the apparent shift from detective work being 
viewed as ‘art’ or ‘craft’ to one of ‘science’. 
In Chapter Four I reflect upon the data collection process, detailing how the interviews and 
observations were conducted, and homicide case files analysed.   
Part Two: The Research Findings 
Chapter Five explores the changes that have shaped the day-to-day running of homicide 
investigations.  It will be shown that investigations have grown increasingly complex and 
today’s detective must manage a myriad of investigative strands.  
Chapter Six considers the growth in legislation, regulation and guidance for homicide 
investigations and investigators.  Here it will become apparent that while such change has 
provided detectives with support, it has led to them becoming risk averse.  
In Chapter Seven the opportunities and challenges that substantial technological and 
scientific change have presented to today’s detective are discussed.  
Chapter Eight, the final findings chapter, considers the changing detective status and culture.  
It will be shown that the modern-day detective bears little resemblance to their predecessor 
and what has been lost and gained as a result is considered.  
Part Three: The Discussion 
In Chapter Nine it will be shown that the investigation of homicide in England and Wales has 
been subject to extensive change and that this has been the result of multiple influences at a 
societal and organisational level.  Four key drivers of change are presented and the changes 
that they have driven discussed. 
Finally, in Chapter Ten I consider the impact of change and demonstrate that change has not 
been wholly beneficial.  I argue that the consequences of change must be carefully reviewed, 
since those that have been implemented since the 1980s, have not solved many of the 
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problems that were identified in the past or led to any significant increase in the detection rate 











































Part One  
The Research Backdrop 
 
In the introduction to this thesis it was established that homicide investigation in England and 
Wales has been subject to continuous reform since the 1980s.  Accordingly, it is the aim of 
Chapters Two and Three in this part to outline the key developments that have shaped these 
investigations to provide the backdrop to the current research.  In Chapter Two a brief history 
of policing and homicide investigation is presented and it will become apparent that the 
extent of change has been considerable.  Here the current explanations for change are also 
discussed.  The intention of Chapter Three is to explore the scientific and technological 
advances that have also played a role in changing homicide investigations.  Developments in 
science and technology have been extensive so they have been assigned their own chapter.  
Despite such extensive change the role that science and technology plays in investigations is 
not fully understood (see, for example, Brady and King, 2017).  It will be demonstrated that 
these changes have been advantageous in the investigation of homicide, but also generated 
new challenges for the modern-day detective.  Finally, in Chapter Four attention turns to the 
present study and the reader will gain insight into how the research was conducted.  The use 
of in-depth qualitative interviews, case file analysis and observations are each discussed in 
detail, before I end with consideration of the ethical issues and the sometimes unpredictable 









Chapter Two  
The Changing Face of Homicide Investigation: History and Explanations of 
Change 
 
Drawing on relevant literature the aim of this chapter is to describe how the police 
investigation of homicide in England and Wales has changed since the 1800s.  I begin by 
tracing the development of policing and criminal investigation, from its early beginnings in 
the 19th Century to the 1970s.  Focus then turns to the 1980s.  This was an important decade 
in policing and homicide investigation.  It signalled the start of significant change, not least 
the increasingly poor relationship between the police and Government, the emphasis on 
efficiency and effectiveness, and the emergence of failings in major crime investigations.  
The chapter continues to trace developments throughout the following years to the present 
day and I end by considering existing explanations of change in policing and, to a lesser 
extent, homicide investigation. 
From The Birth of Criminal Investigation to an Alleged ‘Golden Age’ of Policing and 
the Rise of Scandal 
 
The Police Service was established in 1829 (Emsley, 2008) when locally based systems 
proved inadequate at managing crime and disorder as industrialisation took place, 
communities became more developed and crimes rates rose (Newburn, 2008).  Policing was 
initially focused on crime prevention and maintaining order, not investigation and detection; 
this was due to fears of a continental style of policing (Matassa and Newburn 2007).  As 
Maguire (2008, p432) notes: “detective work’ was widely regarded with suspicion and 
unobtrusive investigation in plain clothes was officially frowned upon”.  Therefore, a 
detective branch based at Scotland Yard was not founded until 1842 (Lock, 1993; Stelfox 
2009).   
The Metropolitan Police were the first to introduce individuals whose expert role it was to 
investigate crime (Innes, 2003).  This was largely in response to its investigations of two 
murders in the 1840s (Morris, 2007).  In an early indication of the role that the media play in 
voicing concerns about policing, these investigations prompted adverse newspaper stories 
leading commissioners to recommend that a detective branch be founded (Morris, 2007).  
This originally consisted of two detective inspectors and six detective sergeants (Innes, 
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2003).  Whilst this small detective department received some positive attention, notably from 
Charles Dickens, controversy arose with the Road Hill House murder in 1860 during which 
Jonathan Whicher2 was criticised for his apparent incompetence (Morris, 2007; Summerscale, 
2009).  The detective department continued its slow development and the number of officers 
stood only at 15, 25 years after its inception (Shpayer-Makov, 2004). 
The introduction of a Criminal Investigation Department (CID) within the Metropolitan 
Police was realised in 1877 (Maguire, 2008) to ensure uniformity (Shpayer-Makov, 2004).  
However, this did not address the concerns that had by this time arisen around the supervision 
of investigations.  According to Morris (2007, p21) this exacerbated the problem by 
establishing the CID as a “firm within the firm”.  Furthermore, from its infancy this arm of 
the police was surrounded by controversy with issues of corruption illustrating the problem of 
how investigations and investigators were supervised (Morris, 2007).  As the Metropolitan 
Police were the only force able to retain a permanent CID (Innes, 2003), others had to call 
upon a detective from Scotland Yard for assistance in investigating serious crimes (Mooney, 
2010).  Innes (2003, p13) notes that consequently detectives developed their status as “expert 
crime-solver[s]”.  This status was hampered by the investigation into the Whitechapel 
murders of Jack the Ripper3 in 1888 (Morris, 2007).  Additionally, they only had a 50% 
success rate between 1919 and 1928 (Rubin, 2011).  As the very notion of investigative work 
was slow to emerge, other forces were slow to develop their own detective branches, but this 
began to change during the late-1800s (Morris, 2007). 
Throughout the course of the next few decades, the pace of developments and change 
remained unhurried.  In 1919, 40 years after the CID was established, a review of policing in 
England and Wales advised against specialist training of detectives, the opinion being that 
practical experience would suffice (Morris, 2007).  The work of the detective continued to be 
one in which there was a lack of agreement about what the role entailed (Stelfox, 2009).  The 
role was seen to be one akin to a craft and the skills were varied and dependent on the 
individual officer and the location of the police force (Stelfox, 2009).  This was until the 
formation of the Hendon police training school and a detective training school in the 1930s 
(Rubin, 2011).   
                                                          
2 Jonathan Whicher was one of the original members of the Detective Branch and led this 
investigation.  
3 Responsible for the brutal murders of five women in London between August and November 1888, 
the identity of Jack the Ripper remains a mystery. 
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This section has shown how and why criminal investigation came to form part of the police 
remit, but that from the start there were concerns and evidence of problems leading to 
change.  This was to prove a sign of things to come.   
The Post-War Period: A ‘Golden Age’ of Policing? 
 
As Britain emerged out of its Second World War in 1945, policing in England and Wales 
embarked on a period of major structural change and reform, a period often considered “a 
golden age of police legitimacy” (Reiner 1992, p761).  During this time, according to 
McLaughlin (2009, p238), “the British police constable was the embodiment of the ideal 
citizen of a civilised modern society”.  This is manifested in the popularity of the television 
programme ‘Dixon of Dock Green’, which ran from 1955 to 1976: “Dixon stood for an ideal 
of policing that has continuing resonance and remains regularly evoked by politicians and 
police chiefs seeking reform” (Reiner 2013, p85).  
Some, however, have questioned whether this was a ‘golden age’.  Loader (1997) gives 
several examples to suggest that it was not, including the rising crime rate of the time, the 
race riots in London’s Notting Hill in the late 1950s, scandals involving senior police 
officers, as well as evidence of deviance detailed in police memoirs.  Williams (2011) 
supports this suggesting that rising crime rates and the belief that young people were out of 
control, troubled society.  Weinberger (1995), through the use of oral history interviews with 
police officers, also concluded that it was not a ‘golden age’ of policing.  She attributed this 
to several issues, such as, high unemployment levels, depression and the difficulties 
associated with rebuilding a country that has just come out of its Second World War 
(Weinberger, 1995).  
It is clear that that the high esteem with which policing during this time was held is not 
conclusive.  Moreover, matters of ‘law and order’ were not a priority during the elections that 
followed the end of the Second World War (Downes and Morgan 2007), which might support 
the notion of ‘a golden age’.  According to Downes and Morgan (2007, p202) this “testifies 
to the strength of the belief that crime, like the weather, is beyond political influence; and that 






The late 1950s onwards saw police legitimacy damaged as the emergence of scandal and 
controversy led to a decline in public confidence.  As Reiner (2010, p78) notes, cases 
including the alleged corruption of a Chief Constable that was not correctly investigated 
meant that the “tacit contract” that had been “delicately drawn” and carefully maintained, 
“began to fray glaringly”.  Throughout this time rising levels of crime were accompanied by 
increased concerns about police accountability (Reiner, 2010).  In 1960 a Royal Commission 
on the Police was established with a remit to examine police pay, accountability, the possible 
establishment of a national police force, the role of police authorities and the relationship 
between the police and the public (Joyce and Wain, 2011).  The recommendations of the 
report prompted further changes to the structure of the police.  A tripartite structure, which 
was implemented as part of the 1964 Police Act saw responsibility for policing shared 
between the Home Secretary, the Chief Constable and police authorities (Mawby and Wright, 
2008).  This move served to lessen the power of the local police authorities (Reiner, 2010).   
Controversy and scandal continued to plague the police force and detectives throughout the 
late 1960s and 1970s.  Matassa and Newburn (2007) write that scandals included an occasion 
whereby detectives were found to be plotting with criminals to cover up serious crimes, 
which was particularly harmful to the organisation, not least because Scotland Yard’s 
investigation was dominated by “obstruction, leaks and disappearing documents” (Reiner 
2000, p12).  The 1970s also saw scandal dog the Drug Squad and Obscene Publications 
Squad as well as the apparent participation of detectives in armed robberies (Reiner, 2000).  
The investigation of major crime was also being called into question.  In 1975 ‘the Black 
Panther’, a prolific armed robber already wanted for murder, kidnapped 17-year-old Lesley 
Whittle to demand a ransom (Brain, 2010).  The investigation, which crossed police borders, 
was poorly managed and police failed to link the kidnapping to the armed robberies.  Lesley 
Whittle was later found dead.  The problems identified within the investigation led to some 
changes to training for cases of kidnapping, but the Labour government refused to hold an 
inquiry into the investigation failings, believing that this was the exclusive preserve of the 
police.  Bilton (2012, pxxvi) cites a Home Office Minister as saying: “the responsibility of 
deciding how an offence should be investigated is for them and them alone”.   
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Policing and Change 
 
The preceding sections have shown that policing and criminal investigations have been 
subject to controversy and adjustment since their establishment, despite an apparent ‘golden 
age’ in the post-war period, and that, police legitimacy sank especially low in the 1970s.  
However, the 1980s became a decade of momentous change.  This was not only a time in 
which flawed homicide investigations prompted a transformation in the ways in which major 
crimes were investigated, but one which also saw broader changes to the landscape of 
criminal justice as ‘New Public Management’ took a firm hold.  Further change was 
generated in the 1990s and beyond by society’s growing preoccupation with risk and efforts 
to manage it.  As Garland (1997) highlighted, this period saw the beginnings of a major and 
continuing change in discourse regarding law and order whereby society as a whole has 
become less confident about managing risk.  
Thatcher, Efficiency and a Privileged Police Force  
 
Towards the end of the 1960s the three major political parties in England and Wales had 
begun to outline in their election manifestos how they would fight the continuing rise in 
recorded crime in England and Wales.  They stopped short, however, of suggesting that rising 
crime rates could be linked to the policies of the governing party (Downes and Morgan, 
2007).  This position changed dramatically when the Conservative government, led by the 
first female Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, came into power in 1979 and placed blame 
for a perceived ‘crisis’ in ‘law and order’ on the outgoing Labour party (Downes and 
Morgan, 2012).  The Conservative’s ‘New Right’ agenda led to a variety of policies aimed at 
tackling ‘law and order’ and they vowed to increase spending on the police and other 
criminal justice agencies (Downes and Morgan, 2007).  McLaughlin et al (2001) explain that 
this was in the belief that spiralling levels of crime could be combatted with increased 
numbers of police officers holding adequate powers and severe sentences handed out by the 
criminal justice system.  Funding of the police increased and they enjoyed a substantial rise in 
salary (Morgan and Newburn, 1997).   
Whilst the government believed that further investment in the police force would see crime 
rates fall, this was not to be.  Recorded crime continued to rise and the only things to fall 
were clear up rates and confidence in the police (Morgan and Newburn, 1997).  Yet, 
commentators have described the police as enjoying a “relatively privileged status” under 
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Thatcher’s government and consequently – despite much rhetoric about the need for 
efficiency – in reality they for many years escaped the move towards a ‘value for money’ 
ideal to which other areas of the public sector were becoming subject (Golding and Savage 
2008, p736).  But why were the police and other criminal justice agencies not seriously 
affected by the drive for increased efficiency, business-like ideals and “’consumer power’” 
(Jones 1993, p188) that featured in other areas of the public sector at this time?  Hough 
(2003) offers two explanations.  Firstly, as the first political party to prioritise issues of ‘law 
and order’ as part of their successful election campaign, the Conservatives could not then be 
seen to carry out significant reform of the police force (Hough, 2003).  McLaughlin and 
Muncie (1994, p115) highlight that policing became “a hallowed no-go area for public 
expenditure cuts”.  Secondly, Hough (2003) suggests that there were other areas with more 
substantial budgets demanding attention.   
The first serious threat to the privileged status of the police lay in the Financial Management 
Initiative (FMI), initially introduced in 1982, which was the “first concerted attempt to 
inculcate the virtues of…the ‘3 E’s’ – ‘Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness’ – within 
public sector organisations” (de Maillard and Savage 2012, p365; James, 2013).  Essentially, 
the Thatcher government remained unconvinced about the ability of the public sector to 
deliver services efficiently and effectively and placed their confidence in the principles of the 
private sector (Newburn, 2008).  Home Office circulars produced in 1983 represented the 
first indication that the police would be affected.  The police were “hostile” in their response 
as they were concerned about the impact on them in terms of employment (Newburn 2008, 
p120).  They were also of the opinion that the government was solely focussed on restricting 
expenditure and that concerns about the standard of policing were not a priority (Morgan and 
Newburn, 1997).  Moreover, the circulars were produced without consultation with the police 
– a clear sign that the positive relationship that they had enjoyed with the Conservatives was 
waning.  Ultimately, the FMI did not have a substantial impact upon the police, although it 
did see the civilianisation of some roles to improve efficiency (de Maillard and Savage, 2012; 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2004).  It should be acknowledged that other 
criminal justice agencies, such as probation, were facing more far-reaching changes.  In 1984 
the Home Secretary published the Statement of National Objectives and Priorities in a sign of 
increased control showing that “any pretence that probation services were locally 
autonomous, able to set their own priorities unfettered by government prescription, was now 
over” (Morgan 2007, p92).   
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Turning to homicide investigation specifically now, it was the investigation into the crimes of 
the Yorkshire Ripper that would see the spotlight shone upon major crime investigation, and 
the beginning of substantial change in this arena.   
The Yorkshire Ripper and The Byford Inquiry 1981 
 
Over a five-year period during the 1970s and 1980s, Peter Sutcliffe, better known as the 
Yorkshire Ripper, murdered thirteen women and attacked seven others before eventually 
being arrested (Bilton, 2012).  The investigation into these crimes was subject to much 
criticism and, in a sharp departure from the Government’s refusal to call an inquiry into the 
Black Panther investigation, resulted in an inquiry led by Sir Lawrence Byford, (Bilton, 
2012)4.  The inquiry found that there were serious deficiencies within the Major Incident 
Room (MIR), which is the “administrative core of the investigation” (Brookman 2005, p241), 
with the management of information, as well as concerns with leadership, which was evident 
in the importance placed on a hoax caller by senior officers (Roycroft, 2008).  In 1979 the 
police received a tape from an individual claiming to be the Yorkshire Ripper.  They believed 
the person was genuine and focused on finding an individual with the same northeast accent 
as the caller, who became known as ‘Wearside Jack’ (Brain, 2010).  Therefore, although 
officers had suspicions about Sutcliffe, he was dismissed as a suspect as he did not have that 
accent (Brain, 2010)5.  It was found that had these, and other issues, not been present, the 
police would have apprehended Sutcliffe far sooner (Mooney, 2010).  Jones (2011, p63) 
states, “by the time Peter Sutcliffe was arrested, he had been interviewed no less than 12 
times”.  The case also exposed that the police had not learnt from the cross-border failings of 
the ‘Black Panther’ investigation.   
The Byford Inquiry was a major milestone for criminal investigations because of its 
“groundbreaking recommendations [which] have governed all major investigations since” 
(Brain 2010, p63).  The importance of this case is reinforced by Bilton (2012, pxxx) who 
writes: “a cynic might say that if there had been no Yorkshire Ripper, it might have been well 
to invent him, as the sole means to force dramatic profoundly necessary changes upon a 
creaking police service”. 
                                                          
4 It is, however, noteworthy that until 2006 only a brief four-page summary of Byford’s main 
conclusions and recommendations were available, including to the police (Bilton, 2012). 
5 In 2006 John Humble admitted sending letters and audio to the Police investigating the Yorkshire 
Ripper case (Yorkshire Ripper Archive).     
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Two particularly influential changes were made following the Inquiry: the introduction of the 
Major Incident Room Standard Administration Procedures (MIRSAP) and the Home Office 
Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES).  The development of HOLMES, a computerised 
system for storing information, will be considered in the next chapter.  Innes (2003, p24) 
explains that MIRSAP “revised the principles for the division of labour between investigators 
in a murder squad and the administrative procedures by which lines of enquiry and their 
resultant information were to be managed”.  First published in 1985 (Mooney, 2010), the 
procedures have been modified over time to reflect changes and advancements to the 
investigation of crime (Innes, 2003).  As Innes (2003, p24) writes: “the development of 
MIRSAP and the introduction of HOLMES have contributed to a move away from the 
individualistic, autocratic orientation of the traditional approach to investigation, towards a 
more ‘modern’, rationalised, and bureaucratic system”.   
Developments that would follow over the next few decades would serve to cement this 
approach.   
The Yorkshire Ripper investigation and the Byford Inquiry had a significant impact upon the 
investigation of homicide.  Crucially, it is the first of several examples that will be presented 
in this chapter of the role that certain cases play in influencing change.  This is well 
documented in the literature.  In his book discussing change in policing Savage (2008) begins 
by describing how system failure or ‘things going wrong’ have led to reform.  Stelfox (2009, 
p33) also considers “concerns over police effectiveness and conduct in criminal 
investigation” a key driver for change, alongside technological advancements and changes to 
the legal framework.  There are several reasons that these cases might prompt change and 
these will be discussed at the end of this chapter.   
However, changes implemented in response to such cases have seemingly not proven to be 
the answer.  As significant as the Byford Inquiry was it did not eradicate problems within the 
police investigation of serious crime and, against a backdrop of rising crime rates and a 
“veritable haemorrhage of public confidence” (Reiner 1992, p763) that would continue into 
the 1990s, a critical piece of legislation was introduced. 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) 
 
Maxwell Confait was murdered in 1972 and three youths were subsequently convicted of the 
crime (Newburn, 2008).  It was later discovered that the convictions had been based upon the 
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false confession of one of the youths (Newburn, 2008).  This prompted concerns around the 
existing legislation, the Judges’ Rules, which were considered vague and difficult to enforce 
(Maguire, 1988).  This was the first time that attention was placed “firmly on the 
investigative and specifically the interview process as a major contributor to miscarriages of 
justice in the UK” (Poyser and Milne 2011, p63).  Consequently, the Fisher Inquiry was 
founded and became a “landmark dossier for documenting system failures throughout the 
conviction process” (Savage and Milne 2007, p619).  However, as other miscarriages of 
justice came to the fore throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure (RCCP) was established (Burrows and Tarling, 1987).  The research 
commissioned by the RCCP brought to light significant concerns in respect of questioning 
techniques, malpractice and the overall behaviour of the police (Poyser and Milne, 2011).  Its 
recommendations formed the basis of PACE, which was established in 1984 (Stelfox, 2009). 
PACE aimed to balance the rights of the suspect with the powers of the police.  It “defined 
police powers, laid down investigative procedures and defined suspects’ and others’ rights” 
(Stelfox 2009, p34).  The legislation was influential for it moved to address the lack of 
guidance in this area of police work and the subsequent “variation in practice and many gaps 
in the legal definitions of what was, and was not, permissible” (Stelfox 2009, p68).  
Crucially, PACE sought to increase the accountability of the police in several respects; 
ensuring that decisions are recorded at the time they are made, making failure to adhere to the 
Act a disciplinary offence and with the introduction of complaints procedures (Newburn and 
Reiner, 2007).   
PACE is supported by Codes of Practice (Stelfox, 2009).  In considering the investigation of 
major crime it is important to consider Code C and the detention, treatment and questioning 
of suspects as, prior to the introduction of PACE, “police cells and interview rooms were 
secretive, dark corners of criminal process that were in practice almost impervious to external 
scrutiny” (Roberts 2007, p113). The custody officer was introduced.  This role is pivotal as 
they are “responsible for overseeing police behaviour and ensuring it complies with its 
related codes of practice” (Newburn 2007, p608).  This means that the safeguards within 
PACE should be enforced as soon as a suspect is booked into the custody suite; with a 
designated officer present to ensure their rights are protected.  Newburn (2007) explains that 
the custody officer must monitor the suspects’ welfare, which involves observing the 
frequency and duration of questioning, access to medical treatment and the provision of food, 
as well as permanent monitoring of those at risk of suicide.  The custody officer should help 
 23 
to prevent miscarriages of justice during the early stages of an investigation.  Indeed, their 
role involves monitoring the duration and frequency of the questioning of a suspect.   
Under PACE all police interviews now require audio, and in some cases visual, recording as 
outlined in codes E and F.  This has helped resolve allegations of ‘verballing’, whereby false 
or incriminating statements were erroneously attributed to suspects (Roberts, 2007).  PACE 
also stipulates that suspects may be held within a police station without charge for up to 36 
hours at the discretion of the police, however, agreement from the Magistrates Court must be 
sought if the police wish to extend this time for up to 96 hours (Sanders and Young, 2007).  
Even so, the police should only hold suspects for as long as is necessary and under Section 
37, the questioning of a suspect is only to proceed until the police have sufficient information 
with which to charge that suspect (Roberts, 2007).  Despite PACE implementing these time 
limits upon detention in custody, some evidence suggests requests to extend periods of 
detention are rarely denied, indicating that the process is not balanced in the manner that 
PACE intended (Sanders and Young, 2007).     
Shortly after its implementation, Maguire (1988) examined its impact upon the detention and 
questioning of suspects in police custody.  He found that the police’s view of PACE in these 
early years were that it was “excessively bureaucratic” and did not allow them to perform 
their role effectively (Maguire 1988, p20).  In particular, Maguire (1988) found that it was 
CID that viewed this new legislation negatively, as they felt that it had proven detrimental to 
their work.  However, whilst there were concerns about how it impacted upon police ability 
to perform their role, the Act’s requirements of having to record information and ensure that 
the suspect has access to legal advice, safeguards the police against accusations of 
misconduct (Maguire, 1988).  This notion of procedures and legislation allowing the police to 
‘cover’ themselves is echoed later in Bullock and Johnson’s (2012) research examining the 
impact that the Human Rights Act 1998 has had upon policing.  Further, Brookman and Innes 
(2013, p9) discuss the notion of ‘procedural success’ and the importance of adhering to the 
processes outlined by PACE to “drop a safety net over the investigation”.   
Unfortunately, post-PACE miscarriages of justice occurred, such as the ‘Cardiff Newsagent 
Three’6, when there were found to be 115 breaches of the legislation during the investigation 
leading to the wrongful conviction of three men (Poyser and Milne, 2011).  The conviction of 
                                                          
6 The ‘Cardiff Newsagent Three’ were Michael O’Brien, Ellis Sherwood and Darren Hall.  They were 
wrongly convicted of the 1987 murder of newsagent Philip Saunders (Naughton, 2013). 
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the ‘Cardiff Three’ for the 1988 murder of Lynette White7 in South Wales was also 
overturned following concerns over the “reliability of the interview and confession evidence” 
despite the ‘safeguards’ (Fraser and Williams 2009a, p5).  A report into the collapse of the 
trial against officers involved in the investigation highlights how the Court of Appeal 
strongly condemned the police interviews, describing the police as bullying the suspect and 
their intimidating approach (Horwell, 2017).  The report notes that the grounds for the appeal 
were based on the interviews being in breach of PACE (Horwell, 2017).  Horwell (2017, p22) 
writes, “what some police interview must have been like before tape recording became 
mandatory under PACE remains cause for speculation and concern”.  
Nevertheless, the implementation of PACE has had a significant impact upon the way in 
which the police investigate crime, including homicide.  Previously the investigation of 
serious crime was “afforded the greatest license” (Maguire and Norris 1992, p62).  The 
establishment of the Act was a major step towards formal accountability and, as Loftus 
(2009, p26) notes, “contemporary police officers work in a substantially different legal 
context than previous generations”.  This is no more evident than in the case of the murders 
of Becky Godden-Edwards in 2002 and Sian O’Callaghan in 2011.  Their bodies were found 
after their murderer, Christopher Halliwell, led the police to them in circumstances in breach 
of PACE (Evans, 2012).   
Halliwell was arrested in 2011 in relation to the disappearance of Sian O’Callaghan and the 
Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) DS Steve Fulcher sanctioned an ‘urgent interview’ that 
was conducted by the arresting officers.  However, when Halliwell did not speak Fulcher 
took the decision to continue the ‘urgent interview’ himself (Rozenberg, 2012).  Fulcher 
questioned Halliwell before he led police to Sian O’Callaghan’s body.  Halliwell then went 
on to lead the police to the body of Becky Godden-Edwards, who he had murdered eight 
years earlier (Peachey, 2012).  The SIO took this course of action believing that Sian was in 
imminent danger and to find her as quickly as possible.  However, Halliwell’s lawyers argued 
that it was “an assault on the integrity of the legal system” (Peachey, 2012).  The judge 
subsequently ruled that the evidence pertaining to Halliwell’s confessions were inadmissible.  
Although the police had sufficient additional evidence in the case of Sian O’Callaghan’s 
murder, this was not so for Becky Godden-Edwards leaving Christopher Halliwell to be 
                                                          
7 Lynette White was murdered in South Wales in 1988.  Five men were wrongly charged of the 
murder, three were wrongly convicted.  Significant concerns were raised about the conduct of the 
investigation (Howell, 2017). 
 25 
charged with one murder (Evans, 2012)8.  This case, although exceptional in its 
circumstances, illustrates the vast shift in the regulation of homicide investigation; Fulcher 
was accused by Halliwell’s Barrister of returning to a 1970s style of policing (Robins, 2012).  
This view has been reiterated by other commentators who draw on the miscarriages of justice 
of the past to argue why PACE should not be disregarded (Rozenberg, 2012).  On the other 
hand, Fulcher received much support for his actions, without which the murder of Becky 
Godden-Edwards would likely not have been uncovered, and he has voiced concerns about 
the constraints of PACE and the implications for investigations (Fulcher, 2017).  Fulcher has 
said that the rights of victims should not fall behind those of an offender and that he would do 
the same again (Fulcher, 2017).          
Conversely, it has been argued that amendments made to PACE since its implementation 
have tipped the balance in favour of the police, providing them with more power: 
Whilst the basic structure has survived, it is now a markedly different creature than 
that which was originally enacted.  PACE itself has been amended on numerous 
occasions, generally giving the police greater investigative powers, and lowering the 
threshold and extending the circumstances in which they can be exercised. (Cape and 
Young 2008, p1). 
Although PACE has in many ways served to regulate policing and criminal investigations, it 
appears that subsequent revisions have been beneficial to those enacting it. 
‘Value for Money’ and the Performance Culture 
 
After suffering a crisis of confidence in her leadership Margaret Thatcher resigned as Prime 
Minister in November 1990 and was succeeded by John Major.  In April 1992 the 
Conservatives went on to win the general election with a small majority.  Following this 
election New Labour, led by Tony Blair, began to build their own reputation as the party to 
tackle ‘law and order’ (Morgan and Newburn, 1997).  Notably, the early 1990s onwards 
would see a substantial move “towards a greater responsiveness to public opinion” (Allen and 
Hough 2007, p565).  Meanwhile, the Conservative government outlined plans for significant 
reform of police forces in England and Wales, which signalled a sharp departure from 
Thatcher’s earlier approach and a move towards the performance management structure that 
the police had, until this point, mostly evaded: 
                                                          
8 In 2016 Christopher Halliwell was convicted of Becky Godden-Edwards’ murder after the discovery 
of new information led to a retrial (Morris, 2016). 
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Whereas the 1980s began with a promise from the newly elected Conservative 
Government that it would spend more on ‘law and order’ while cutting public 
expenditure elsewhere, the 1990s opened with a series of increasingly searching 
government inquiries as to whether the police were providing ‘value for money’. 
(Morgan and Newburn 1997, p4). 
The Sheehy Inquiry 1992 is an example.  The inquiry commenced in May 1992 (Cope et al., 
1997) and its purpose was to examine “the rank structure, remuneration and conditions of 
service of the police service in England and Wales, in Scotland and Northern Ireland” (Home 
Office 1993, p1).  The police response to the recommendations was overwhelmingly negative 
and certain elements proved particularly controversial, including, the lower starting salaries 
for officers, fixed-term appointments and performance related pay (Cope et al., 1997).  The 
police were also concerned about the lack of consultation (Leishman et al., 1995), which was 
demonstrative of the erosion of their “privileged status” (Golding and Savage 2008, p736).  
They felt the proposals would have a detrimental impact upon the “recruitment, retention and 
morale of police officers” (Cope et al., 1997, p450).  The Superintendents’ Association 
argued that the proposals would “remove the vocational aspect of the work, turning it into a 
‘job like any other job’” (Morgan and Newburn 1997, p6).  As a consequence of the 
resistance, in October 1993 the Home Secretary rejected many recommendations, but agreed 
that “some police ranks should be abolished and certain allowances be reviewed and 
negotiated locally” (Cope et al., 1997, p450).  Although this is clearly indicative of how the 
police can be resistant to change, the Sheehy Inquiry was a far more decisive step towards 
performance management, centralisation and the imparting of private sector ideals upon the 
police than had been seen previously (Newburn and Reiner, 2004).  As James (2013, p18) 
notes, the Sheehy Inquiry and other such moves “challenged the power of chief officers and 
sought to engineer radical reform in policing”.   
The early 1990s saw the introduction of performance indicators (PIs), the purpose of which 
was to allow the performance of the police to be measured in order that it could be improved 
(Golding and Savage, 2008).  The first results were released in 1995 and the focus included 
how fast 999 calls were responded to, the cost of policing and rate of detection, however, 
these were subject to criticism as they “paid undue homage to the more ‘quantifiable’ 
dimensions of policing” (Golding and Savage 2008, p738).  As a result of such criticism, the 
Audit Commission added PIs that were more qualitative (Golding and Savage, 2008).   
Golding and Savage (2008) note that drives towards measuring the performance of the police 
and the reforms discussed in this section, brought the police, albeit belatedly, within what 
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became known as the New Public Management (NPM) initiative – a shift in policy that has 
continued and evolved in a variety of guises and names ever since.  Glynn and Murphy 
(1996, p125) describe NPM as “characterised by the adoption of private sector management 
concepts and styles, the introduction of quasi-markets and contracting processes and the 
applications of explicit standards and measures of performance”.   
Some commentators have raised concerns around the very idea that the public sector can be 
run on the standards of the private sector.  In a highly critical article on NPM, Savoie (2006, 
p596) argues that the two are simply incompatible in regards to the way that they operate and 
the way they are perceived.  Savoie (2006) suggests that NPM has been damaging to the 
morale of those working within the public sector as they are told the way in which the private 
sector is run is superior.  Additionally, Lapsley (2009, p12) argues that increased auditing 
that has been a further consequence of the advent of NPM, has led to a “compliance 
mentality” and as a result the police feel it necessary to protect themselves “against future 
scrutiny”.  Lapsley (2009) also notes evidence that suggests the police are more inclined to 
spend their time investigating those crimes that will be more likely to result in a detection in 
order to ‘tick the boxes’.  Heslop (2011) also questions the advent of NPM in policing, 
suggesting that it has led to a ‘McDonaldisation’ of policing.  McDonaldisation was 
introduced by George Ritzer to “characterise the highly controlled, bureaucratic and 
dehumanised nature of contemporary, particularly American, social life (Heslop 2011, p315).  
McDonaldisation comprises four main principles: efficiency, calcuability, predictability and 
control (Ritzer, 2015).  Heslop (2011) explains that these have been of benefit, but that 
unintended consequences, or irrationalities, can arise, which are a threat to the smooth 
running of the organisation.  Heslop (2011, p319) suggests that these unintended 
consequences include “an increase in bureaucracy, a reduction in police discretion and 
deskilling”.  Although Heslop (2011) refers to policing more broadly, there is recent evidence 
of similar consequences in homicide investigations also.  Brookman and Innes (2013) explain 
that the advent of NPM and the drive for accountability has led to the increased importance of 
procedural success during homicide investigations and that along with this change in focus 
came a raft of policy and procedures.  However, it should be noted that this was not only the 
result of NPM, but also inquiries such as Byford (Brookman and Innes, 2013).  They argue 
that the move towards assessing performance has led to those involved in the investigation of 
major crime to have a broader idea of what constitutes a successful investigation as 
‘procedural success’ now comes into play, for instance, an investigation may be considered 
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successful if policies and procedures have been effectively managed (Brookman and Innes, 
2013).   
It is apparent that following the package of reforms implemented by Major’s Conservative 
government, police forces could no longer hold any doubt as to the government’s drive for 
increased centralisation of control, performance management, accountability and the advent 
of private sector principles upon the police force.  Further, it will soon be shown that this 
would not subside under the New Labour government and would in fact be accelerated.  As 
has already been hinted at this has also had an impact upon homicide investigation, as were 
other developments at this time.   
Introducing Models of Interviewing 
 
It is widely documented that the focus upon securing a confession was a primary aim of the 
police interview in the past.  Savage and Milne (2007, p614) describe how this “confession 
culture” led to oppressive questioning.  Furthermore, the literature and research concerning 
miscarriages of justice highlight that flaws within the investigative process, thus including the 
interview stages, are recurrent factors (Walker, 1999).  According to Roberts (2007, pp. 113 – 
114) “prior to the enactment of PACE, police cells and interview rooms were secretive, dark 
corners of criminal process that were in practice almost impervious to external scrutiny”.   
This was to change somewhat with the implementation of PACE, but there were other signs 
of recognition that reform was needed.  Gudjonsson (2007) explains that the first 
interrogation manual designed for use by police services in England and Wales was compiled 
by Walkley (1987) following the establishment of PACE.  However, the manual was 
influenced by those found in the USA and so much of what it prescribed conflicted with 
PACE (Gudjonsson, 2007).  It was not until the early 1990s that there would be any further 
concerted effort to formalise interview training and the interview process.  This was a result 
not only of miscarriages of justice and the implementation of PACE, but also psychological 
research about the impact of oppressive questioning techniques, which the legal system was 
coming to see the importance of (Gudjonsson, 2002).  In 1992 a committee of experts devised 
seven principles for interviews, which were distributed across police forces (Gudjonsson, 
2007).  Additionally, a national training programme regarding investigative interviewing 
followed the introduction of the seven principles, which also saw the production of two 
booklets about investigative interviewing and which accompanied the training programme.  
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The “booklets and the interview model on which they are based, became nationally agreed 
guidelines on interviewing for victims, witnesses and suspects” (Gudjonsson 2007, p470). 
The PEACE model of interviewing was also introduced at this time and is based on 
psychological principles (Gudjonsson and Pearse, 2011).  This “provides a chronology of 
events for the interview process” (Cook and Tattersall 2010, p310) and stands for: planning 
and preparation, engage and explain, account, clarify and challenge, closure and evaluation.  
A shift in terminology was also evident whereby there was a move from the phrase 
‘interrogation’ to ‘investigative interviewing’ (Brookman and Wakefield, 2009; Gudjonsson, 
2007).  Following the introduction of the PEACE framework, a five-tier model of 
interviewing was introduced.  Importantly, tier-three was designed to ensure that those 
involved in the investigation of serious offences, such as murder, have the necessary skills to 
conduct the interviews (Griffiths and Milne, 2006).  Tier-five is the level required of 
interview advisors (Griffiths and Milne, 2006). 
Brookman and Wakefield (2009, p68) note that the “interview process presents the potential 
for police misconduct ranging from duress and threat to torture, examples of which are well 
documented in the misconduct literature”.  Therefore, a careful review of the interview 
process was necessary, particularly in light of miscarriages of justice in relation to homicide 
suspects that had raised concerns about their conduct.  The developments outlined here have 
led to a more professional and standardised approach to interviewing.  Although 
acknowledging a lack of evaluation of PEACE since the 1990s, Clarke et al (2011) found that 
police interviewing of suspects had improved since its implementation.  In particular they 
found that the positive impact of PEACE could be observed when officers were covering 
legal and procedural matters at the start of the interview (Clarke et al., 2011), an interesting 
point in light of concerns around the increasing “compliance mentality” in policing (Lapsley 
2009, p12).  However, they identified that the officers’ ability to be flexible and explore the 
accounts that the suspects had relayed was not as strong and Clarke et al (2011) 
recommended this as an area requiring further research.  The Senior Investigating Officers’ 
Handbook stresses that the interview must remain flexible, the research of Clarke et al (2011) 
would suggest that this is not transpiring in practice.  The impact of this upon homicide 
investigation remains unclear.   
Despite the introduction of PACE and changes to interviewing, problems remained.  The 
racist murder of 18-year-old Stephen Lawrence in 1993 would again bring policing and 
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criminal investigation under the spotlight.  However, it would be several years, and only after 
dedicated campaigning by his family, that the extent of the problem would become known 
and further significant reform of both policing and major crime investigation would begin.  
The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA) 
 
The CPIA was introduced as a result of miscarriages that were caused by failings to disclose 
material that could have aided the case of the defence (Stelfox, 2009) and following the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Hannibal and Mountford, 
2002).  One famous case that illustrates the repercussions of failings in the disclosure of 
evidence is that of Stefan Kiszko.  Kizko had a medical condition that would make it 
impossible for him to have left the semen, which had been found at the scene, but this was 
not disclosed at his trial and he spent 16 years in prison before being freed (Redmayne, 
1997).   
Supported with Codes of Practice, the Act defines criminal investigation and the roles of the 
investigators.  It stipulates that investigators must “maintain records of the investigation, 
pursue all reasonable lines of enquiry, disclose the material they uncover to all parties in the 
trial” (Stelfox 2009, p67).  It also necessitates that a disclosure officer is assigned 
(Redmayne, 1997) to “supervise the collation and disclosure of unused material as part of the 
process of preparing the case file”.  The CPIA established a “new framework for disclosure in 
criminal cases” (Starmer and Woolf 1999, p108) and “provided for the first time a statutory 
framework governing the retention, recording an disclosure of unused material, placing clear 
duties on the police and prosecutors” (Rhodes 2009, p235).   
When the CPIA was first introduced, it required a two-stage process of disclosure: primary 
and secondary.  The primary disclosure stage required the prosecution to either hand over to 
the accused any material that the prosecution believed might undermine their case or they 
were to provide a written statement confirming that there was no such material to disclose 
(Taylor, 2001).  During the secondary stage the defence were required to provide the defence 
case statement, which should outline the nature of the defence and any issues that they might 
have with the prosecution and why (Taylor, 2001).  This would then demand a further review 
of materials that might also require disclosure.  However, Taylor (2001) identified errors with 
the process including, the tendency of the defence to provide vague defence case statements 
making it difficult for investigators to determine what material should be disclosed.  The 
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CPIA was, however, amended under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the primary and 
secondary stages of disclosure were removed with a “single unified, and now objective, test 
for the prosecution duty of disclosure” introduced (Rhodes 2009, p236): 
The requirement to serve a defence case statement remains, but the single unified test 
at the initial disclosure stage removes the risk that the prosecution might withhold 
helpful material on the grounds that the defence had not served a case statement.  
Instead, the prosecution are under a “continuing duty of review”, following the 
service of the defence case statement and throughout the proceedings.  
Detectives must continually review whether there are any materials that require disclosure.  
Material that might require disclosure must meet the disclosure test, which is defined as that 
which “might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the prosecution case or 
assisting the case for the accused” (Crown Prosecution Service, no date). 
Whilst Stelfox (2009, p68) argues that this has been an influential piece of legislation for it 
has placed “the recording of decisions and the retention and disclosure of material at the 
centre of the investigative process”, concerns have been raised about the role of the police in 
the disclosure process.  Taylor (2001, p118) argues that the perspective of the police may 
impact upon the gathering of evidence and arrangement of files and questions whether the 
“culture, training and operational priorities of the police are compatible with disclosure under 
CPIA”.  Taylor (2001) also suggests that the hidden nature of investigation may exacerbate 
these concerns.  Taylor (2001, p123) proffers that the police role in disclosure is at odds with 
their investigative role, arguing that “officers are required to both conduct their investigations 
with all diligence but, at the same time, to take every opportunity to undermine their own 
work by actively seeking out and disclosing information which assists in the defence”.  
Furthermore, the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) annual report for 2016 states 
that over the last 12 months they have “continued to see a steady stream of miscarriages” and 
that the “most frequent cause continues to be failure to disclose to the defence information 
which could have assisted the accused” (CCRC 2016, p7).  The report acknowledged several 
reasons for this, including instances in which information was purposefully withheld and 
those where the significance of the information was not appreciated (CCRC, 2016).  The 
report also includes details of homicide cases that have been referred to the appeal court, for 
which issues around disclosure formed the grounds of appeal.  These cases include two from 
2000 and 2006, showing that there are concerns with relatively recent cases.  This 
demonstrates the need to consider the impact that this legislation has had upon homicide 
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investigation specifically.  On the other hand, a joint report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (HMIC) and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (HMCPSI) 
stated that whilst progress had been made in respect of serious crimes, volume crown court 
cases had received less attention (HMCPSI and HMIC, 2017).  The report identified that 
improved training of the police was needed, as was better communication between the police 
and prosecutors and a “cultural shift” in the way in which disclosure is viewed, specifically 
that it should not just be seen as an “administrative function” (HMCPSI and HMIC 2017, p3).  
Further evidence that disclosure remains in need of close attention lies in the 2017 Mouncher 
Report, which examined why the case against police officers involved in the Lynette White 
murder investigation collapsed, and identified issues with disclosure.  The report 
recommended that minimum standards and accreditation be established for Disclosure 
Officers and that a national training programme is established, which should stress the 
importance of the continuing duty of disclosure (Horwell, 2017). It was also recommended 
that each individual working within the MIR receive a copy of the MIRSAP so that they fully 
understand their disclosure obligations (Horwell, 2017).   
The CPIA has been described as “trying to legislate for an open mind” (Carson 2007, p412) 
in its requirement that investigators pursue all reasonable lines of enquiry, whether these 
point to, or away from, a suspect.  Historically, there have been numerous cases in which 
investigators did not maintain an open mind.  As discussed earlier, during the Yorkshire 
Ripper investigation, investigators focussed their search on a man with a particular accent 
after receiving tapes from an individual claiming to be the Yorkshire Ripper.  The 
investigation into the crimes of Stephen Port in 2014 and 2015 indicate that even today not all 
lines of inquiry are pursued.  Initial investigations into the deaths of Port’s victims failed to 
link them (Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), 2016) and some have 
suggested that institutional homophobia played a part in this (Tatchell, 2016).  Although 
concerns here relate to the police investigations in to the deaths before they were classed as 
homicides, the CPIA applies to all investigations.  Moreover, the consequences of any 
failings during initial investigations upon any subsequent murder inquiry could be significant. 
The introduction of this Act can certainly be seen as further evidence of increased legislation 
to regulate criminal investigations and investigators.  The question of the impact that this has 
had upon homicide investigation and detectives, however, remains.  
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New Labour, the Macpherson Report and Further Legislation 
 
New Labour’s victory at the 1997 general election owed much to its popularised approach to 
‘law and order’ encapsulated in the party’s slogan: ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of 
crime’.  The incoming Prime Minister, Tony Blair, would continue to pursue NPM, or as the 
government came to call it, the ‘modernisation’ of the public services.  Indeed, de Maillard 
and Savage (2012, p638) note that they did so “with even more enthusiasm than their 
predecessors”.  Whilst from the start the government were clearly intent on pursuing public 
sector reform, they stepped it up to a large extent as a result of the ‘crisis of performance’ that 
surrounded policing.  This was heightened following the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 
1993 and the eventual Macpherson Inquiry into the investigation.   
This investigation was, according to Sir William Macpherson, “marred by a combination of 
professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership” (Macpherson 
1999, p317).  Further, the investigation was criticised for “not taking early steps to pursue 
suspects, and for a general lack of imagination, co-ordination, planning and action” 
(Brookman 2005, p264).  Interestingly, Innes (2002) observes that many of the concerns 
raised in the Macpherson report echoed those outlined by Byford some 20 years earlier, 
raising questions about whether lessons were truly learnt.  Foster’s (2008, p95) research 
examining the views of murder detectives on the inquiry, found that at the time of Stephen’s 
murder there was a lack of structure and that as a result “when a homicide occurred detectives 
were drawn from local divisional CID offices on a temporary basis, the quality of staff was 
variable and valuable time was wasted seconding them”.  This suggests that despite the steps 
that were taken following the failings of the Yorkshire Ripper investigation, problems still 
hindered the investigation of murder.  Furthermore, the shortcomings of the HOLMES 
system, which was introduced following the Byford Inquiry, were also apparent. 
The Macpherson report also identified a lack of “formalised, or consistent system for 
documenting actions, investigative decisions or their rationales” and as a result of the 
concerns it is now requisite for records to be kept and the reasoning for certain decisions to 
be recorded (Foster 2008, p96).  The importance of recording decisions by the SIO is 
emphasised in the ‘Senior Investigating Officers’ Handbook’, and an excerpt of the 
Macpherson report criticising this aspect of the Stephen Lawrence investigation can be found 
here (Cook and Tattersall, 2010). 
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Macpherson reported concerns with 28-day homicide reviews.  Implemented in response to 
the failings of the Yorkshire Ripper investigation, reviews are designed to be “valuable to the 
police service in terms of managing and improving investigative performance in relation to 
major crime” (Nicol et al 2004, p12).  They should tackle the problems that were identified 
after the Yorkshire Ripper investigation whereby information was missed on numerous 
occasions.  However, several years later, Macpherson found that far from being a valuable 
resource for the Metropolitan police during the investigation, the Barker review was “lacking 
rigour and more concerned with protecting the organisation’s reputation than contributing to 
the success of the on-going investigation” (Nicol et al 2004, p12).  Macpherson 
recommended that new guidelines for reviews be established.  The importance of reviewing 
investigations has been extended and investigations now feature a debrief, during which the 
investigating team will “evaluate the investigation with a view to identifying good practice 
and areas of learning and, where necessary, provide recommendations for organisational 
improvement” (Brookman and Lloyd-Evans 2015, p18).  These might occur post trial 
whereby the whole investigation will be reviewed or soon after a suspect has been charged 
(Brookman and Lloyd-Evans, 2015). 
The Murder Investigation Manual (MIM) was a further addition designed to guide the police 
investigation of homicide.  Its introduction followed the Macpherson report, but has its roots 
in Byford (1981). The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Homicide Working 
Group first published the MIM in September 1998 and it “provides advice to Senior 
Investigation Officers on the strategies and tactics involved in homicide investigation” 
(Stelfox 2009, p77).  The manual was developed in conjunction with various SIOs alongside 
other criminal justice system professionals; with other members of the police spoken to in 
order to ascertain good practice (Stelfox, 2009).  Brookman (2005, p274) notes that this was 
the first document of its kind and that previously SIOs “drew upon their experience and 
passed this on to less senior investigators”.  The publication of this document was a 
continuation of the move away from an autocratically led system to one of bureaucracy, 
whereby an increasingly professionalised and standardised process of investigation was 
developing (Innes, 2002).   
At this time ‘Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform’ (Home Office, 2001) was 
published and detailed concerns that surrounded policing and exacerbated the evident crisis in 
them.  Concerns were that crime levels were too high, notably in regard to antisocial 
behaviour and violent crime, that fear of crime levels were too high, that there was too much 
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difference in police performance between different police forces and, finally, that public 
confidence in them was falling (Home Office, 2001).  In response the Police Reform Act 
2002 was established.  In moves towards increased accountability Police Standards Units 
were introduced under the Act, which would monitor individual forces and step in when they 
were identified as underperforming (Golding and Savage, 2008).  The role of the HMIC9, 
which was established in 1856 and has responsibility for assessing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of policing (Cowley and Todd, 2006), was also changed under the Police 
Reform Act and it was given responsibility for constructing the ‘Police Performance 
Assessment Framework’ a: 
Comparative performance framework which used HMIC ‘baseline assessments’ of 
police performance across the ‘families’ of forces to judge how well forces were 
performing in the ‘performance areas’ such as tackling crime and serious crime, 
protecting vulnerable people, satisfaction and fairness and resource and efficiency. (de 
Maillard and Savage 2012, p369).   
The IPCC was also introduced under the Act and replaced the Police Complaints Authority 
(PCA), which had been established in 1984 following the Scarman Inquiry into the Brixton 
Riots (Savage, 2007).  However, the PCA did not go as far as Scarman recommended 
(Savage 2007, p32).  Thus, Savage (2008) notes that it was the Stephen Lawrence case that 
would lead to the creation of the IPCC and “push reform all the way”.  Savage (2008, p45) 
argues that whether or not a system failure leads to change depends upon the “balance of 
power and influence holding at that conjuncture”.  This is reminiscent of the aforementioned 
Black Panther case whereby an inquiry was not held, something that changed after the 
Yorkshire Ripper case.  Now, the IPCC is able to conduct its own investigations, unlike the 
PCA, and is generally considered to have more power (Jones, 2008).  Undoubtedly, this is a 
further indication of heightened accountability.   
New Labour introduced the Human Rights Act (HRA) shortly after coming into power.  The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) grants certain rights to individuals, which include: 
the rights to life, the rights to a fair trial and the right to privacy, amongst others (Great 
Britain. Human Rights Act 1998).  The Senior Investigating Officers’ Handbook states that 
the Articles most relevant to the investigation of crime are: the right to life, the right to liberty 
and security, the right to a fair trial and the prohibition of discrimination (Cook and 
Tattersall, 2010).  However, not all of the rights that are granted by the ECHR are absolute 
                                                          
9 In the summer of 2017 the HMIC became responsible for England’s fire and rescue services (Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary Fire and Rescue Service, 2017). 
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and are actually subject to “considerable flexibility of interpretation” (Neyroud 2008, p674).  
Cook and Tattersall (2010) outline the instances in which the Articles may be breached 
during the course of an investigation.  They write that Article 8, the right to respect for 
private and family life, may only be breached if it is “necessary and proportionate for some 
activities to take place”, that principles may only be breached if that is “the only or most 
suitable way to achieve the objective and that other alternatives have been considered” and, 
finally, if a breach is considered to be necessary to the investigation “the activities must be 
proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by carrying them out” (Cook and Tattersall 
2010, pp. 27-28). 
Bullock and Johnson (2012) examined the impact of HRA on policing in England and Wales, 
conducting interviews with 20 warranted officers and civilian staff.  With particular focus on 
Articles 8 to 11, they found that the Act has “failed to embed a culture of human rights 
awareness in policing”, but has made officers “justify and document their rationale for 
breaching human rights in ways that render their actions visible and open to audit and 
inspection” (Bullock and Johnson (2012, pp. 646 – 647).  The officers regarded the Act 
positively and explained that it allowed them the appropriate capacity to perform their role 
and, particularly with the use of covert surveillance, allows them “to target offenders 
lawfully” (Bullock and Johnson 2012, p643).  Contrary to what Bullock and Johnson (2012) 
expected to find, it was not considered by those interviewed to be a hindrance to their day to 
day work, but the officers did believe that bureaucratic procedures and processes sometimes 
delayed them. 
The impact of the HRA upon policing is evident through consideration of the National DNA 
Database (NDNAD) and the storage of other data, which, it has been argued, sits in conflict 
with Article 8 (Williams and Johnson, 2005).  Bramley (2009, p315) notes that the law in 
England and Wales has:  
Progressively widened the range of persons from whom samples can be taken, eased 
the restrictions on who can take them, and allowed for the permanent retention and 
continued use of the samples and DNA profiles to facilitate the identification of repeat 
offenders through speculative searching of the NDNAD.   
In 2003 the Criminal Justice Act was amended to enable the police to obtain a sample from 
any individual who is arrested for a recordable offence, regardless of whether or not they are 
eventually charged (Bramley, 2009).  Carling (2008, p496), writing about the differences 
between the United Kingdom and the United States’ use of DNA in criminal investigations, 
 37 
suggests that the courts in the United Kingdom appear to “value the effectiveness of a large 
database over privacy concerns”.  DNA and the NDNAD will be discussed further in the next 
chapter. 
A related piece of legislation was also implemented following the establishment of the HRA.  
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) is responsible for ordering the 
“interception of communications, intrusive surveillance and the use of covert human 
intelligence sources” (Newburn et al 2007, p670).  Before its introduction, there existed no 
appropriate protections with which to monitor this form of covert policing (Clark, 2007).  
Whilst there were some attempts to provide safeguards through the Data Protection Acts 
1984 and 1998, the Police Act 1997 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (Clark, 2007), it 
was the HRA and the need to satisfy the European Convention on Human Rights that 
ultimately led to the implementation of RIPA (Clark, 2007).  Perhaps most controversially 
RIPA sanctions the interference with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the right to a private and family life, so long as the activities that are to be taken are 
“necessary and proportionate to the ends sought to be achieved” (Clark 2007, p430). 
In times of rapid technological and scientific advancements, RIPA has an important role to 
play in incorporating the technological changes that may be used in investigations (Lewis, 
2008) and it has also been described as ensuring professionalism in the way that intelligence 
is used.  The following quote by Neyroud and Disley (2008, p553) emphasises how RIPA has 
moved to regulate detectives and their use of covert surveillance, arguing that it has: 
Transformed covert investigations from the arcane and unregulated pursuit of a small 
group of detectives to a highly regulated process, subject to detailed formal codes, 
substantial national guidance and oversight and inspection by the Office of the 
Surveillance Commissioners. 
The increased regulation of detective work becomes further apparent. 
The Professionalising Investigation Programme (PIP) 
 
As documented earlier, the emergence of criminal investigation as a key aspect of policing 
was slow.  Similarly, for many years “informal apprenticeship was the rule” (Morris 2007, 
p19).  When CID was introduced it took a long time for the detectives working within them 
to develop experience of investigations due to the irregularity of homicides.  The 
Metropolitan Police were responsible for assisting smaller forces when required (Stelfox, 
2015).  Despite the growth of police forces during the twentieth century and the diminishing 
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need for them to call on others, a lack of formality regarding training remained (Stelfox, 
2015).  Additionally, due to the casual nature of the training that was available, there was no 
method by which to measure the competency of detectives and it relied upon the judgement 
of the individual’s supervisor.  Specifically, learning on the job was the prime way in which 
detectives learnt.  As a consequence of this approach there were “variations of practice both 
between and sometimes even within forces” (Stelfox 2015, p100).  There was also a belief 
that investigative work was similar to that required in other areas of policing and so specialist 
training was not required.    
Therefore, whilst the investigation of homicide in England and Wales was subject to 
significant reform, some of which have been detailed in this chapter, the “selection, training 
and development of SIOs, who had the most responsibility for delivering change on the 
ground, continued pretty much as it always had” (Stelfox 2015, p104).  Maguire and Norris 
(1992, p22) found that the training of detectives was characterised by learning ‘on the job’ 
and they would often only attend training having already spent time in the role and in some 
cases having already developed “dubious habits”.  Further, they found that the focus of 
training was upon learning legislation and it lacked focus on ethical issues and the dangers of 
wrongful convictions (Maguire and Norris, 1992).  The introduction of the Professionalising 
Investigation Programme (PIP) was finally realised in 2005 in a bid to provide a standardised 
approach to training for SIOs and others involved in investigating crime.  The introduction of 
formalised training can also be partly attributed to the growing complexity of investigations 
that has resulted from advances in science, technology and legislation, which would have 
rendered learning from peers alone insufficient.  This is recognised by Rogers (2010).  
Although referring to the training of police officers, Rogers (2010, p269) explains that 
changing “public, society and community expectations” have driven the police to change the 
way that police officers are trained so that it “supports a more professional approach to the 
delivery of its services”.    
According to the College of Policing website (2015a) PIP provides a: 
Structured development programme to embed and maintain investigative skills for 
police officers and police staff.  It aims to deliver the capability to conduct 
professional investigations at all levels within the police service and in other sectors 
of Law Enforcement. 
In an illustration of the move towards the professionalisation of training PIP also provides 
“consistent registration, examination, learning, work-place assessment and accreditation to a 
 39 
national standard at each level” (College of Policing, 2015a).  The College of Policing 
Authorised Professional Practice (2017) describes the levels of training as follows: 
 Level 1 – priority and volume crime investigations 
 Level 2 – serious crime and complex investigations 
 Level 3 – major investigations 
 Level 4 – strategic management of highly complex investigations  
Those intending to act as SIOs in homicide investigations must achieve PIP Level 3 
accreditation.  To obtain this individuals must undertake the Senior Investigating Officer 
Development Programme (SIODP).  This comprises two stages; an initial course followed by 
a Hydra Course.  The initial course is residential, three weeks in duration and follows a case 
study format (College of Policing, 2015b).  According to the College of Policing (2015b) the 
course “explores the practical, legal and managerial issues around a reactive investigation”.  
Once officers have completed this stage they are required to return to the workplace for at 
least three months before they become eligible to attend the Hydra course (College of 
Policing, 2015c).  Again, using case studies, this element lasts for one week and gives 
participants the opportunity to put into practice the skills that were obtained during the initial 
course (College of Policing, 2015c).  Stelfox (2015, p105) writes that PIP 3 has “sought to 
provide Chief Officers with the confidence that SIOs are selected, trained and developed to a 
national standard that ensures they are able to meet these challenging demands”.     
Although introduced in the mid-2000s there has been a lack of evaluation of PIP (James and 
Mills, 2012; Tong, 2009).  However, a study of CID was commissioned as a result of 
concerns about a shortage of trained and experienced detectives and that serious crimes were 
not being effectively investigated and detected (Chatterton, 2008).  The findings of the report 
raised concerns around PIP.  Senior Management Teams (SMTs) were driven by performance 
management and were thus unwilling to invest in professionalisation to the detriment of 
trainee Detective Constables (TDCs) (Chatterton, 2008).  Specifically: 
This report reveals that there is a serious skills and experience deficit in General 
Office CID.  Detectives are simply not being fully trained.  It is vital for Chief 
Officers to facilitate and support the Professionalising Criminal Investigation 
Programme (PIP). (Chatterton 2008, piii). 
The report also highlighted that often individuals from the General Office CID will be the 
first to attend a suspicious death, as opposed to a member of the Major Incident Team.  Thus, 
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potential consequences of the lack of training, and indeed other issues identified within the 
report become apparent, since it is these individuals who will be responsible in “determining 
the ‘correct’ definition to apply to an incident” (Chatterton 2008, p22).   
The introduction of PIP is a further example of the drive towards increased 
professionalisation of detective work and investigations.  James (2013) writes that there has 
been a concerted effort to professionalise what was once viewed as ‘craft’, whereby detective 
work is viewed as being developed through “natural instinct and experience” (Innes 2003, 
p9).  Further, according to James and Mills (2012) the establishment of PIP would indicate a 
shift from detective work being seen as a craft to a science “in the perspective of detective as 
‘scientist’, there is an inherent expectation that many will be able to attain the status of 
detective, as science can be taught to exact principles in the classroom and the workplace” 
(Tong and Bowling 2006, p324). 
Interestingly, however, the literature reveal that detectives prefer to learn from experience as 
opposed to books, suggesting that the perspective of detectives is one in which their work as 
craft or artistry dominates (Innes, 2003). 
As well as a lack of research regarding detective training, there has been a lack of attention 
upon detective skills (Westera et al., 2014).  The work of Smith and Flanagan (2000) is one 
exception.  Through interviews with 40 officers with experience of working in CIDs they 
identified 22 core skills that they grouped into three categories: investigative ability, 
knowledge levels and management skill (Smith and Flanagan 2000, pv).  The importance of 
experience of CID was also revealed as, “SIOs cannot be taught everything in the classroom” 
(Smith and Flanagan 2000, p45).  Whilst the training of detectives has become standardised 
and professionalised, particularly when we consider its origins, it is clear that a more 
thorough evaluation of today’s training, and detective skills more broadly, is needed, a point 
heightened when we consider the complex nature of modern-day homicide investigations.   
Late Modernity and Risk 
 
I mentioned earlier that a growing preoccupation with risk sits at the heart of much change 
that was occurring at this time.  It is therefore necessary to consider this further, as many 
writers, including Garland (2003), Feeley and Simon (1992), Beck (1992) and Kemshall 
(2003), suggest the focus on risk is an important feature of late modernity, or the period from 
the late 1970s onwards.  Kemshall (2003, p7) explains that whilst modernity was 
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characterised by “faith in reason [and] knowledge”, late modernity is characterised by “global 
risks, indeterminate and contingent knowledge about the probability of such risks, and 
uncertainty over future outcomes and impacts”.  Indeed, although the origins of the term are 
said to be contentious and there have been changes in the meanings that are attached to it, 
Stalker (2003) writes that throughout the 19th Century it was gradually associated with 
negative events, which remains today.  This negativity has engendered concerted efforts to 
try and manage risk.    When we consider the developments that have taken place in respect 
of both policing and homicide investigations, which have been outlined throughout this 
chapter, it is possible to see the influence of the growing preoccupation with risk.  In 
particular, it might be considered responsible for the influx of legislation, policies and 
procedures, which have been said to have substantially increased bureaucratic procedures in 
policing.   
This was considered in 2008 when a review of policing was requested by the then Home 
Secretary in response to concerns that policing had become overly bureaucratic.  Led by Sir 
Ronnie Flanagan the review “identified risk aversion as a primary cause of bureaucratic 
processes” (Heaton 2011, p79).  The report identified two triggers that impact upon the way 
in which processes have been designed.  These were, firstly, an internal trigger based on the 
“just in case” approach, which results in processes that are intended to account for the “worst 
case scenario”, and the impact upon those who will be responsible for implementing the new 
processes is not considered (Home Office 2008, p52). Secondly, an external trigger was 
considered to be the “this ‘must never happen again’” response, which leads to the response 
that is outlined above (Home Office 2008, p52).  The Home Office (2008, p52) goes on to 
note that police services are now expected to have “anticipated events and incidents that are 
well beyond their control”.  
The problems that are associated with this are clear since the very nature of the work of the 
police, and detectives, is that it is inherently risky and is such that things might go wrong 
(Savage, 2008).  Indeed, as has been demonstrated in this chapter, there have been several 
examples of miscarriages of justice and other cases in which concerns about the investigation 
have been raised over the years, as well as periods of falling confidence in policing despite 
much change.  Therefore, it is possible to see why the response has been to input processes to 
ensure that mistakes are not repeated in the future, as the Home Office (2008) found.  It is not 
just the police that are on the receiving end of such approaches.  Similar responses can be 
found in respect of deaths of children known to Social Services (Turnell et al 2013, p200).  
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The ‘errors’ of Social Services and responses to them are a useful comparison to the 
investigation of homicide by detectives as, like the police, social workers are “working with 
fallible data” (Munro 2005, p542).  They also face substantial political and media pressures 
and this has also increased as a consequence of notable cases, such as the death of baby 
‘Peter’ in 2007.     
Munro (2010, p1146) draws on the work of Hood et al ((2001) in arguing how efforts to 
reduce risk in child protection is that of implementing additional procedures that set out how 
things should be done.  Munro (2010, p1146) goes on to argue that the purpose of such an 
approach allows “senior management [to] demonstrate how their staff followed all correct 
procedures in working with the case and therefore cannot be blamed”.  The proliferation of 
legislation and guidance for homicide investigations and investigators are examples of similar 
responses.  Munro (2005, p541) highlights that such strategies may be flawed and could 
cause professionals to follow procedures rather than their judgement. 
It has been argued that this is also the case for homicide investigation with its various 
guidelines, with the consequences of such approaches leading to a ‘tick box’ mentality.  This 
might be seen as an example of how systems implemented to manage risk serves to replace 
trust in professionals (Kemshall, 2003).  Examining the role of flair in major crime 
investigation Fox (2014, p13) found that some detectives viewed the MIM, for example, as 
providing a “prescriptive list of activities” that have to be followed.  He also found that 
“several respondents held the view that the existence of national police guidance might create 
a ‘tick box’ mentality or even risk averse mentality amongst police investigators” (Fox 2014, 
p13).  Fox (2014) highlights that this was not the intention of such guidance.  The 
government have acknowledged the notion of ‘tick box’ approaches.  In 2011 the then Home 
Secretary, Theresa May, said “we need to move away from the tick box, cover your back 
culture - where the response is rigidly prescribed according to the type of problem reported. 
And instead we need to adopt a more sensible way of managing risks to the public” (Home 
Office, 2011). 
Although she does not refer to homicide investigation, the work of Fox (2014) indicates that 
this promise has yet to be fulfilled and that major crime investigation is similarly affected.  
Further in 2017 the Police Federation spoke of “grinding” bureaucracy in policing that is 
preventing them performing their jobs effectively (Marsh, 2017).  Based on research 
conducted with detectives in New Zealand and Australia, Westera et al (2016) also found that 
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onerous bureaucracy was hindering investigations.  They attributed the increase in processes 
to the “public desire for accountability” (Westera et al 2016, p204).  It might be that the need 
to manage risk is seen to be greater than the need to deal with growing bureaucracy in 
policing.  
The Current Picture 
 
The 2010 UK General Election, a contest that Downes and Morgan (2012, p186) believe will 
be afforded “historical significance”, saw the formation of a Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat coalition government led by David Cameron and Nick Clegg.  Notably, and in an 
echo of the election campaigns that took place before the 1970s, ‘law and order’ did not 
feature as a major issue (Downes and Morgan 2012, p189), but the following approach was 
formed: 
Out went the Liberal Democrat undertaking to provide more beat police officers.  In 
went the Conservative plan for directly elected police commissioners. Sentencing 
policy and the case for a bill of rights was to be reviewed.  ID cards were immediately 
scrapped.  Civil liberties in various guises was to be restored. 
According to Garside and Ford (2015, p6) the establishment of the Coalition government 
signalled the end of what were the “generous budgets” of New Labour and an emphasis on 
austerity and cuts.  In 2010 a Comprehensive Spending Review that included a 20 per cent 
cut to the police budget between 2011 and 2015 (HMIC, 2014) was implemented.  This was 
to be acted upon “without reducing ‘front-line’ services” and led to “agonised soul-searching 
about what exactly is the core mission that must remain sacrosanct” (Reiner 2013, p162).  
The then Home Secretary, Theresa May, was heckled at the 2012 Police Federation 
conference in response to the announcement.  Eventually, the numbers of police officers fell 
by 20,000 (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2017).   
Broader changes have also taken place.  The coalition government introduced Police and 
Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to replace Police Authorities.  The PCC would be responsible 
for appointing and dismissing Chief Constables, holding them to account, determining 
priorities and the police budget, as well as having the authority to request reports at any time 
from the Chief Constable on policing functions (Raine and Keasley, 2012).  According to 
Raine and Keasley (2012, p123) the government believed that “directly elected PCCs would 
resolve the problem of weak democratic control at police force level, by enhancing 
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accountability and providing a more active and visible form of leadership in police 
governance”.   
The need for increased accountability of policing has dominated many changes that have 
been made to the service over the last 30 years and the introduction of PCCs are a further 
example of this.  Further, in 2013 the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners 
requested a review of ACPO leading to recommendations that a new body be established 
(Parker, 2013).  ACPO was closed down in March 2015 and replaced by the National Police 
Chiefs’ Council (National Police Chiefs’ Council, n.d.).   
Relations between the police and the government appear to have become increasingly 
strained over the last few decades and this has not abated.  After the 2015 General Election 
the Conservatives returned as a majority government with Cameron at the helm.  This 
followed an election during which, according to Rogers (2015), there was little debate on law 
and order despite the drop in numbers of police officers and staff.  Turbulent times were to 
continue and the Prime Minister stepped down in the summer of 2016 after the United 
Kingdom voted to leave the European Union.  Already unpopular with the police, former 
Home Secretary Theresa May is now Prime Minister and concerns around policing and 
investigations continue to surface.   
In a report on police effectiveness the HMIC warned that police budget cuts have led to 
concerning practices in several forces, warning that this could spread to other areas if matters 
are not addressed (HMIC, 2017).  In a foreword for the report, the Inspector of Constabulary 
writes that it “raises a large and deep-red warning flag” and practices such as reclassifying 
emergency calls due to shortages of officers and reclassifying high-risk victims of domestic 
abuse to medium risk are “seemingly the unintended consequences of changes that forces 
have made, often in response to the challenge of austerity” (HMIC 2017, pp. 4 – 5).  The 
report also highlights that there is a shortage of detectives across England and Wales and 
presents several reasons that police services have been unable to meet the demand for 
investigative capacity (HMIC, 2017).  Firstly, it suggests that officers are reluctant to become 
detectives due to the workloads, lack of mentor support for trainees, issues with working 
hours and pay, as well as the “intense scrutiny individuals are under should there be some 
form of investigative failure” (HMIC 2017, p52).  Secondly, it suggests that it takes time to 
replace skills and experience, also noting that police services are struggling to retain those 
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with such experience (HMIC, 2017). Thirdly, it reports that the numbers of civilian 
investigators have reduced, which has increased the pressure on detectives (HMIC, 2017).   
Steps are being taken to address the shortage of detectives, one of which is the introduction of 
direct entry.  The Metropolitan Police Service introduced direct entry for detectives in 2016.  
They stipulated that volunteer officers who had been in the service for 6 months could apply 
to become a detective (Weinfass, 2016).  This was extended in 2017 to allow individuals 
outside of the police service to apply, as long as they held a degree level qualification 
(Weinfass, 2017a).  More recently Thames Valley Police and Suffolk Constabulary have 
followed suit (Weinfass, 2017b).  However, the point made by the HMIC that it takes time to 
replace investigative skills and experience is pertinent.  Whilst the moves toward direct entry 
are being made, a media report in July 2017 stated that the Metropolitan Police were 
struggling with demands following the recent terror attacks and the Grenfell Tower fire 
(Brunt, 2017).  It was reported that retired detectives have been contacted and asked if they 
would return to the police service so that demands might be met (Brunt, 2017). 
Finally, although this chapter has focused upon a number of what might be considered 
particularly influential cases in the reform of homicide investigations in England and Wales, 
it is acknowledged that these are not the only cases that have led to concern and change over 
the years.  There is not the scope to review these fully here, suffice to say there is evidence to 
suggest that many of the changes that have been outlined in this chapter have seemingly not 
fully resolved problems with investigations of homicides in England and Wales.  Lastly, 
recent figures show that the homicide detection rate is approximately 90% (Brookman et al., 
forthcoming) and has not seen a substantial rise over the years.  This also leads us to question 
the efficacy of the changes that have been made. 
Explaining Change 
 
Rogers and Gravelle (2012, p420) write that “policing does not operate in a social, political 
or economic vacuum”.  Consequently, many aspects of policing policy and practice, have 
been, and will likely always be, shaped by numerous influences.  In addition, Matassa and 
Newburn (2007, p43) note, “the factors driving change are varied and complex”.  Therefore, 
the challenge of accounting for change must first be acknowledged before its explanations 
considered.  Specifically, whilst it is possible to identify certain explanations for change, 
much of the literature emphasises that explaining it is a more complicated endeavour than 
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might be anticipated.  Hart (1996, no pagination) writes that “issues as diverse as individual 
psychological phenomena to macro economic and political theory all potentially have their 
place in explaining organisational change”.  Pettigrew (1990, p269) also states “explanations 
of change are bound to be holistic and multi-faceted”.  Pettigrew (1990, p269) advocates an 
appreciation of the complexities of change and taking into account context and time (see also 
Pettigrew et al., 2001):   
Beware of the myth of the singular theory of social or organisational change…For the 
analyst interested in the theory and practice of changing, the task is to identify the 
variety and mixture of causes of change and to explore through time some of the 
conditions and context under which these mixtures occur. 
A driver of change that has already been discussed in this chapter is society’s preoccupation 
with risk.  As shown earlier, this has been widely documented (Beck, 1992; Feeley and 
Simon, 1992; Garland, 2001; Kemshall, 2003) and it has been deemed a key feature of late 
modern society: “Late modernity has transformed risk from a probabilistic, calcuable artefact 
to risk as uncertainty, plagued by indeterminate knowledge and subject to a number of “it 
depends”’ (Kemshall 2003, p8). 
Van Marle and Maruna (2010, p9) write that the move to late modernity disturbed our 
“fundamental psychological need for a sense of predictability and continuity” leading to the 
emergence of ontological insecurity.  This is attributed to changes at this time which caused, 
for example, job insecurity and the “disembedding of social systems” (Garland 2001, p155; 
van Marle and Maruna, 2010).  This generated an overall preoccupation with risk as well as a 
fall in tolerance of deviance and an increase in punitive views (van Marle and Maruna, 2010).  
Crucially, the preoccupation with risk has led to efforts to try and manage it as risk aversion, 
in particular, takes hold.  The impact of this on policing is significant; as Bishop (2015, p79) 
puts it “risk management in policing is at the heart of everything that is carried out”.  In 
addition, discussing criminal investigation specifically, Matassa and Newburn (2007) 
acknowledge the influence of risk in driving change.  This literature review has shown that 
concern with risk has been deemed responsible for an increase in bureaucratic procedures in 
policing (Heaton, 2011).  Furthermore, the emergence of risk preoccupation as part of late 
modernity, which is said to be from the late 1970s onwards (Kemshall, 2003), might explain 
why an inquiry into the 1975 ‘Black Panther’ case was not held, but that the concerns around 
the Yorkshire Ripper investigation led to the Byford Inquiry.   
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Society’s expectations have also changed and this too is said to have influenced policing.  
Bryett (1999) describes several precipitators of change in policing including the changing 
nature of crime itself and changes to society.  Bryett (1999) argues that improved living and 
education standards have increased society’s expectations of those in positions of authority 
and made them more likely to voice concerns.  Garland (2001, p86) makes a similar point 
regarding society’s expectations, but discusses this as a consequence of the growth of the 
electronic mass media, which he says led to “a greater level of transparency and 
accountability in our social and governmental institutions”.  Furthermore, the importance of 
society’s expectations are, according to Stelfox (2015), especially important as he argues that 
we hold particularly high expectations of the police when they are investigating homicide.  
Therefore, it might be said that any instances in which these expectations are not met will be 
more likely to lead to change.  Evidence of this has been presented in the chapter. 
There are influences of change specific to policing that should also be considered.  van Dijk 
et al (2015) present ten drivers of policing change.  Firstly, they explain that there has been a 
“general socio-political move to the right in recent decades, with an accompanying discourse 
around crime, fear of crime, migration, security/safety, organised crime and terrorism” (van 
Dijk et al 2015, p11).  These have been accompanied by more punitive views of crime and 
calls for harsher sentencing.  Secondly, they cite the increase in central control of policing.  
Thirdly, they refer to the advent of NPM, which as we have seen in this chapter commenced 
under Thatcher’s conservative government, but did not abate under New Labour.  van Dijk et 
al (2015) explain that this led to a focus on efficiency and measuring of performance.  Bryett 
(1999) and Savage (2007) also recognise the introduction of NPM upon driving changes in 
policing.  Crucially, the influence of NPM upon homicide investigation has been recognised.  
Brookman and Innes (2013), for example, considered NPM partly responsible for an increase 
in processes and procedures.  A fourth driver of change is the “movement to open up policing 
to people with managerial and other skills through lateral entry and to alter the dominant 
police culture by appointing civilians to high positions” (van Dijk et al 2015, p13).  The 
introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners is cited as an example of this.  The fifth 
driver of change is the shift in view of the public in that they are now considered to be 
customers, which has altered the way in which the police communicate with them, leading to 
an increase in the use of social media to do so (van Dijk et al., 2015).  Sixth, the “global war 
on terror” has resulted in changes in policing (van Dijk et al., 2015, p14).  Relatedly, the 
seventh driver of change is named as the focus upon counter terrorism, which has led to the 
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creation of new components, such as, the National Crime Agency, which also “reinforced the 
tendency to centralisation” (van Dijk et al 2015, p14).  The eighth driver of change, 
technology, is described as having shaped policing considerably (van Dijk et al., 2015).  
Indeed, scientific and technological changes and their impact upon homicide investigations 
will be the subject of the following chapter and is considered by Stelfox (2009) to be a driver 
of change in criminal investigation.  Moreover, technology is considered to be an important 
driver of organisational change in general (Bayerl et al., 2013; Huczynski and Buchanan, 
2007; Sendrea, 2017).  The penultimate driver of change cited by van Dijk et al (2015) refers 
to an increase of police staff.  This has been the consequence of both advances in technology, 
which has prompted the need for specialisation, but also the “need to economise” (van Dijk et 
al 2015, p14).  There is evidence of this having influenced homicide investigation as this 
chapter has shown.  Finally, the growing impact of the media is the tenth driver of change 
offered by van Dijk et al (2015) and which was also acknowledged by Garland (2001). 
Explaining changes to policing will undoubtedly help us to explain why homicide 
investigation has changed.  However, miscarriages of justice and other problematic cases 
have been highlighted as driving changes to homicide investigation in particular.  Stelfox 
(2009, p33) considers “concerns over police effectiveness and conduct in criminal 
investigation” to be one of three drivers of change.  Savage (2007, p11) also cites this a force 
for change in policing, referring to “systems failure”.  To illustrate, the implementation of 
PACE followed a miscarriage of justice in a homicide investigation and the murder of 
Stephen Lawrence led to considerable changes in the investigative process.  Perhaps an 
obvious explanation for such cases driving change is that the seriousness of homicide is such 
that it engenders a strong response from the public, which links to Stelfox (2015) point about 
the status of homicide.  Consequently, flaws in its investigation are deemed unacceptable.  As 
Innes et al (2010, p31) found, “a poor police response [to a homicide] is more likely to have a 
negative impact, than a good response has a positive one”.  Unsurprisingly, then, 
miscarriages of justice and other problematic cases serve to damage the legitimacy of the 
police service and they must find ways in which to repair it (Mawby, 2012).  That being said, 
the government refused to hold an inquiry to examine the issues with the ‘Black Panther’ 
investigation, believing this to be the responsibility of the police (Bilton, 2012).   
Roycroft et al (2007) discuss why certain homicide cases attract the public’s attention and 
lead to reform.  They suggest that enquiries into problematic cases become a: 
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Potentially pivotal point in the development of policing wherein a disposition of 
policing and its organisational routines is in tension with the development of morals, 
values and standards in society more generally.  This tension is relieved by these 
pivotal cases wherein policing is reformed and thus brought up-to-date with wider 
current social norms and mores. (Roycroft et al 2007, p153).   
They propose a model to illustrate what elements come together to prompt this process.  The 
authors firstly refer to foreground triggers, which “support the need for reform”.  Examples 
include the presence of a ‘true victim’, investigative failings and the need to illuminate the 
cause of the investigative failure (Roycroft et al 2007, p154).  According to the authors, for 
the process to gain momentum, the ‘true victim’ will belong to a disadvantaged group about 
whom there are already concerns.  These concerns will revolve around their standing in 
society and how the criminal justice system usually respond to them (Roycroft et al., 2007).  
These are referred to as the background agenda.  Next, the identification of an investigative 
failure will serve to connect with the “sense of disadvantage and stigma attached to this 
group”, which will also reinforce the declining trust of that group and of society (Roycroft et 
al 2007, p155).  The final element of the model is the recognition that failings can be 
“redressed by a particular policy solution” (Roycroft et al 2007, p155).  Finally, the mass 
media will play a significant part in maintaining the impetus, and this is particularly effective 
when they focus upon the foreground triggers and background agendas.  The model is applied 
to the Yorkshire Ripper case by the authors as follows: 
1. There were suitable vulnerable ‘pure’ victims. 
2. They were members of an at risk and disadvantaged group (women). 
3. The failures of the investigation were manifest in that the assailant was only caught 
after an extended period during which time additional victims were killed.  
4. The failure of the police to provide appropriate levels of protective service contributed 
to a climate of fear and declining trust. 
5. This amplified the need to find out why the police were unable to catch the 
perpetrator.  
6. This was further stimulated by the presence of the advocates (victims’ mothers) who 
were provided a politically powerful voice via mass media coverage. 
7. In addition, there was a policy solution being actively promoted from within the 
police service – the better management and cross-referencing of information by 
means of computerisation of police data. 
(Reproduced from Roycroft et al 2007, p156). 
This suggests that change is driven by a multitude of factors including the “external contexts 
and triggers that amplify the public and political visibility of particular police investigations, 
and result in recommendations for procedural and technological change” (Roycroft et al 
2007, p149)    
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At this point it might be useful to describe Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams approach.  In a 
bid to understand how certain issues come to attention and become liable to change over 
others, Kingdon (1984) suggested that change occurs when three separate streams come 
together at the same time during a brief ‘window of opportunity’.  The three streams are the 
problem stream, whereby a problem occurs and comes to the attention of policymakers, the 
policy stream, where there is an available solution to the problem that has been identified 
and, lastly, the politics stream, whereby there must be the political will or motivation to step 
in and turn the proposed solution into policy (Kingdon, 1984).  This links somewhat to the 
work of Roycroft et al (2007) in that it similarly features the idea that for change to occur 
various elements converge and create the appropriate conditions.  
It is not just within policing that failings can lead to change and this has been acknowledged 
in the wider organisational literature.  Weick and Quinn (1999, p362) explain that 
organisational change often follows some form of failing and that the “basic tension that 
underlies many discussions of organisational change is that it would not be necessary if 
people had done their jobs right in the first place”.   
Sendrea (2017) also cites crises as leading to change in organisations.  Although the crises in 
these contexts might refer to the failure to launch new products the commonalities with what 
drives change in policing and other organisations is again evident.  However, again, the 
public hold high expectations of the police in respect of homicide investigation (Stelfox, 
2015) and so it is suggested that both this and the devastating repercussions of failings are 
what set the police firmly apart from other organisations when we consider what drives 
change.   
This section has shown that an array of elements has shaped the changing nature of policing 
in England and Wales.  Finally, such influences of change are not static and so policing will 
likely undergo continuous change: 
The external factors such as legislation, government policy and the expectations of the 
public will all influence the future direction of policing.  Local, national and 
international issues will create an ever increasing need for the police to react and alter 
their strategy to meet these needs.  (Meaklim 2015, p151). 
Conclusion 
 
It is important to emphasise that much of the literature around change to policing does not 
refer to homicide specifically.  For instance, Savage (2008) considers what drives changes to 
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policing as a whole and Matassa and Newburn (2007) refer to criminal investigations 
generally.  Consequently, it is not clear whether existing explanations and drivers can be 
applied to homicide investigation specifically, to help us to fully understand why homicide 
investigation has changed in the ways that have been presented throughout this chapter.    
In this chapter I have made reference to technological developments.  In Chapter Three that 
follows the literature pertaining to technological and scientific advances are discussed in 
detail.  Whilst science and technology have impacted most aspects of policing, and 
organisations in general as we saw above, it is suggested that they have had been particularly 



















Chapter Three  
A Review of the Technological and Scientific Advances in Homicide 
Investigation 
 
In this chapter the literature surrounding the emergence of key technological and scientific 
techniques, principally those relevant to the investigation of homicide, will be considered.  
The pace of scientific and technological change in recent years has been rapid and it is 
because of these extensive developments that this particular aspect of investigations has been 
assigned its own chapter.  
I begin with a brief history of the use of science and technology in criminal investigation, 
before discussing what is perhaps the most well-known forensic tool, DNA.  Next the use of 
the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System is presented.  The uses of passive data sources 
that play a critical role during the modern day investigation will then be deliberated, as will 
the role of social media in the investigation of crime to reflect recent progress.  There are 
conflicting views about how far these developments have changed policing (James, 2003) 
and so I also consider what the literature says about the role of science and technology in the 
and conclude with a discussion on the art, craft and science of detective work.   
The Use of Science and Technology in Criminal Investigation: A Brief History 
 
Whilst the use of technology and science in criminal investigation is largely associated with 
modern day investigations, there is evidence that there was an awareness and appreciation of 
basic techniques dating back to the 18th Century.  However, Cooper and Mason (2009, p286) 
note that it is difficult to assess the early impact of forensic science due to the: “rather 
primitive nature of early performance data”. 
Nevertheless, Pike (1978, p23) notes that “comparisons of bullets with firearms, fibres with 
clothes, marks with instruments” have a long history and provides examples of cases in 
which such basic techniques were successfully adopted.  In one case, police investigating a 
burglary in 1740 matched a broken knife found on a suspect with a piece found at the crime 
scene (Pike, 1978).  Similarly, the photography of crime scenes was employed during the 
investigation into the ‘Jack the Ripper’ murders, which occurred between 1888 and 1891, 
when they were taken by a local photographer, before concerns were raised about security 
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and the police began to perform this role themselves (Pike, 1978).  The ‘Jack the Ripper’ 
investigation also saw an early attempt at forensic pathology when, during one of the 
autopsies, Thomas Bond10 tried to develop a profile of the offender by observing the injuries 
that had been inflicted (Monckton-Smith et al., 2013).  Bond made certain determinations 
about the offender’s occupation; income, habits, motives and appearance based on the 
findings and presented them to the Head of CID (Rossmo, 1999).  Also around this time, 
progress was being made in France with the development of tests to establish the presence of 
semen, ways of identifying cases in which victims had been strangled and methods to detect 
soot and carbon monoxide in the lungs (Monckton-Smith et al., 2013). 
Despite these early moves towards the increased use of forensic science and technology in 
criminal investigation, it appears that developments were slow and techniques remained in 
their infancy (Morris, 2007).  Higgs (2011, p138) goes further and states “despite being at the 
forefront of the introduction of fingerprinting, the development of forensic science in Britain 
took place in a halting and erratic manner”.  However, it is acknowledged that developments 
in science and technology as far back as 1901, including the fingerprinting system and the 
Criminal Records Office, could be seen as early moves towards professionalisation in 
criminal investigations (Matassa and Newburn, 2007).  This was a trend that would continue 
and the role of science and technology in professionalisation would grow alongside its 
capabilities.  Indeed, Manning (1977) would cite science and technology as one of the 
presentation strategies that the police service would come to use to appear professional. 
Progress was made in the 1930s when Lord Trenchard, recently appointed as the 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, was instrumental in introducing the first forensic 
science laboratory at Hendon (Ambage and Clark, 1994).  Although a progressive move it 
was not without controversy.  Initially consisting of six staff, the laboratory’s placement at 
the “elite” Hendon College was “unpopular with rank and file policemen” and was under 
used (Higgs 2011, p138).  However, during the Second World War these obstacles were 
overcome and forensic science service, both at the Metropolitan police and regional 
laboratories, expanded as a result of “the greater prestige of science as a consequence of the 
War, and the advances made in scientific techniques” (Higgs 2011, p139).  These laboratories 
were initially based in Cardiff, Bristol, Nottingham, Preston and Birmingham consisting of 
scientists not employed by the police (Williams, 2008).  The value of such laboratories was 
                                                          
10 Thomas Bond was a surgeon and lecturer in forensic medicine who conducted the autopsy of Mary 
Kelly, believed to be the last of ‘Jack the Ripper’s’ victims.     
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becoming clear and it was the work of scientists at the forensic science laboratory of Scotland 
Yard that led to the technique of linking a suspect to a bloodstain with significant accuracy 
(History by the Yard, 2014).  Continued expansion and developments meant that by the 
1960s England and Wales had nine forensic science laboratories (Fraser, 2007).    
The growing influence of science and technology in the investigation of crime is clear.  The 
police service has undoubtedly capitalised upon developments that have taken place as part of 
modernisation (Senior et al., 2007).  Indeed, Stelfox (2009) considers science and technology 
to be a key driver for change in investigations.  More broadly, Bayerl et al (2013) write that 
technology influences organisations and the police are no exception, as this chapter will 
reveal the many ways in which science and technology have shaped criminal investigations. 
Against this backdrop this I now consider some of the key techniques that feature today. 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) 
 
DNA is perhaps one of the most widely recognised forensic advancements in major crime 
investigations to have emerged since the 1980s. Barclay (2009) discusses how many 
miscarriages of justice of the 1980s were the consequence of investigative teams focusing 
upon suspects who had been personally selected by the SIO, arguing that advances in DNA 
signalled an important shift to being able to correctly identify and eliminate suspects.  DNA 
has since been represented as a tool with an “unrivalled ability to ‘solve’ crime” (McCartney 
2006, p175).  It is often the key component in solving crimes during the criminal 
investigations that are played out on fictional television programmes and in research asking 
32 Senior Investigating Officers: ‘what solves murder’, forensic material was said to 
contribute to solving cases in 32% of investigations (Roycroft, 2007).  Its value in the 
investigations of cold case homicides has also been acknowledged (Allsop, 2017).  The 
importance of DNA in homicide investigations seems clear and yet the role that it plays in 
homicide investigations has received little academic attention (Williams, 2017). 
DNA is the “substance that carries an individual’s genetic information” (Fraser and Williams 
2009b, p628).  Whilst it was James Watson, Francis Crick and Maurice Wilkins who were 
awarded the Nobel Prize for discovering the structure of DNA during the 1950s (Taupin, 
2013), Alec Jeffreys established the technique of DNA fingerprinting during the 1980s (Roux 
and Robertson, 2009).  Through his work on genetics, Jeffreys found and was able to prove 
that there are differences between the blood samples of different persons (Bramley, 2009).  
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The benefits that the ability to create DNA profiles have generated are clear when 
considering that DNA can be obtained from many different sources and in small quantities.  
As Williams and Johnson (2007) note, it may be retrieved from blood left at a crime scene, 
hair that has been shed, from saliva and nasal secretions.  This is a significant advancement of 
the techniques that were available to detectives 30 years ago when they were only able to 
determine blood groups and required a lot of blood in order to carry out such work.  Upon 
making the discovery in September 1984, Jeffreys was soon to realise its potential value in 
immigration cases, paternity disputes and, crucially, criminal investigation.  It was not to be 
long before his discovery was put to the test.  
The Pitchfork Case 
 
In 1983 and 1988, 15 year-olds Lynda Mann and Dawn Ashworth were found raped and 
strangled in Leicestershire.  Whilst a resolution in the case of Lynda Mann’s murder had not 
been reached three years on, despite the significant police investigation, they soon had a 
suspect for Dawn Ashworth’s murder after a seventeen-year-old boy was seen acting 
suspiciously near the scene.  He was arrested and charged (Williams, 2017).  Investigators 
were sure that the same individual was responsible for both murders but were not able to tie 
him to the murder of Lynda Mann.  Leicestershire police decided to contact Alec Jeffreys in 
the hope that DNA profiling would provide the evidence that they needed.  The tests were 
carried out, but proved that whilst the same man was indeed responsible for both murders, it 
was not the seventeen-year-old boy (Cooper and Mason, 2009).  This young man thus 
became the first person to be exonerated through DNA (Aronson, 2005).   
Left with no suspect the police held a mass DNA screening in a bid to find the perpetrator, 
asking men of a particular age group living in the area to voluntarily provide blood and saliva 
samples to be tested for matches (Aronson, 2005).  Despite screening over 4,000 men a match 
was not found leaving the police with few leads, until, in 1987, they were contacted by a 
woman who reported that her work colleague, Ian Kelly, had boasted of cheating the 
screening process (Aronson, 2005).  When interviewed Kelly admitted that he had given 
samples on behalf of a friend, Colin Pitchfork, who had claimed that he did not want to give a 
sample after previously being convicted of flashing (Aronson, 2005).  DNA testing revealed 
that Pitchfork’s profile matched that of the offenders’ and he was arrested, charged and found 
guilty of both murders and sentenced to life imprisonment (Aronson, 2005).   
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Whilst this case was proclaimed by the media and the police for being the “first significant 
success for the use of DNA typing in forensic investigation” Aronson (2005, p130) argues 
that it was in fact the tip off from Kelly’s work colleague that provided the breakthrough.  
Jeffreys himself has described the breakthrough in the case as resulting from both DNA 
science and old-fashioned police work (McKie, 2009).  Whilst the standpoint of Aronson 
(2005) is worthy of consideration, White and Greenwood (1988, p150) write that it: 
is impossible not to speculate that, had not DNA fingerprinting been available, not 
only would Pitchfork have avoided detection (for the police admitted as recently as 
August 1987… that despite 7, 300 statements, 25,000 computer entries, and a £20,000 
reward, they had no leads), but that the original suspect (who spent three months in 
custody until cleared by the DNA fingerprint evidence) might have been wrongly 
convicted.  
Arguably then this case was also the start of the discussions that have subsequently been had 
with regards to the relationship between science and detective work.   
The techniques that were employed in the Pitchfork case have since evolved, but DNA has 
continued to assist police investigations some 30 years since Jeffreys’ discovery.  It is clear 
that this case brought the use of DNA in criminal investigation to the fore and saw it take its 
place as an important part of investigations.  The introduction and expansion of the National 
DNA Database (NDNAD) in England and Wales is also demonstrative of this. 
The National DNA Database (NDNAD) 
 
Proposals for a NDNAD commenced in the early 1990s when the Forensic Science Service 
(FSS) and Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) agreed to join forces and explore the 
possibility of creating such a database (Bramley, 2009).  Introduced in 1995 the NDNAD was 
used in the police investigation of domestic burglary, sexual offences and serious crime and 
its growth was initially slow (Bramley, 2009).  However, this was to change and the database 
soon saw significant expansion.   
Launched in 2000 the DNA Expansion Programme intended to ensure that the DNA of all 
known offenders was stored and would continue to expand until this objective was achieved 
(McCartney, 2006).  With investment standing at £300 million in 2005 the confidence in the 
abilities of DNA was clear (Cooper and Mason, 2009).  Although it has also been suggested 
that the introduction of the NDNAD and its expansion can also be attributed to the New 
Public Management (NPM) agenda, which focuses upon measuring and improving 
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performance, and so understanding this development goes beyond trust in DNA (Lawless, 
2010).  Nevertheless, the database has grown and the NDNAD Strategy Board’s Annual 
Report disclosed that “at 31st March 2016, NDNAD held 5, 860, 642 subject profile records 
and 519, 678 crime scene profile records.  In 2015/16, 292, 311 new subject profiles were 
loaded to NDNAD, together with 36,250 new crime scene profile records (Home Office 
2017, p7). 
Despite the trust in it there are concerns associated with the use of DNA, which should be 
considered since, alongside the government’s investment in the DNA Expansion Programme, 
the Criminal Justice Act (2003) also extended police powers in regards to obtaining DNA 
samples.  The Home Office (2004) states that S.10 of the Criminal Justice Act (2003) 
“replace the existing provisions about the taking of a non-intimate sample on the authority of 
an Inspector with a wider power to take a non-intimate sample from any person in police 
detention in consequence of his arrest for a recordable offence”.   
The caveat to this extension is that a sample may not be taken if one has already been 
obtained as part of the investigation (Home Office, 2004).  Despite this, the extension of 
powers is clear and as a result “anyone who comes under police suspicion is liable to have a 
DNA sample taken, searched against the samples of the NDNAD and retained. The course 
that an investigation takes or whether a prosecution proceeds is of little, if any, significance” 
(McCartney 2006, p177).   
With around 6 million samples of DNA currently being held on the database (Home Office, 
2017) and the extension of police powers associated with its collection, it would seem that 
trust in the process is considerable.  Research examining the impact of DNA upon crime 
reduction, although regarding volume crimes where DNA evidence is increasingly utilised, 
suggests that this trust is well placed.  Bramley (2009, p316) notes “for cases where a DNA 
profile was loaded to the NDNAD, it was shown that the detection rate was significantly 
improved compared with cases where no DNA evidence was available”.      
However, there are concerns surrounding the NDNAD and these often relate to the privacy of 
individuals as their DNA profile does not just identify them, but can hold a considerable 
amount of data about that individual, such as illness, behavioural tendencies or familial issues 
not known to the person themselves (Williams and Johnson, 2005).  Williams and Johnson 
(2005) highlight that police powers in regards to DNA, alongside other forensic techniques 
including fingerprinting, encroach upon the Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 8, the right 
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to respect for private and family life (Great Britain. Human Rights Act 1998).  The issues 
around privacy that have circled the NDNAD are considered in an article by Carling (2008) 
who explores the differences in attitude between the UK and US towards the use of DNA in 
criminal investigation with particular focus upon the use of databases.  Carling (2008) notes 
that use and effectiveness of the US version of the NDNAD, the FBI’s National DNA Index 
System (NDIS), varies between states, which are largely a result of financial issues.  Carling 
(2008) also explores the differences between the US and the UK in regards to who a DNA 
sample can be obtained from, as noted above, in the UK an individual arrested for a 
recordable offence will have their DNA taken and stored.  In the US, however, this is “an 
unsettled legal issue” with Carling (2008, p495) citing a case whereby a court ruled that the 
“privacy interest of the person who has been charged, but not convicted, is not outweighed by 
the state’s interest in taking a DNA sample”.  The scope of the NDNAD has clearly 
broadened since its inception, and yet Williams and Johnson (2005) stress that there is a lack 
of legislation designed to regulate it.  The impact upon detectives during the course of a 
homicide investigation is clear since with a lack of regulation they must carefully negotiate 
these issues of privacy, as governed by the Human Rights Act, whilst trying to move forward 
with the case.  
The Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) 
 
As we saw in Chapter Two, the failings of the Yorkshire Ripper investigation led to the 
Byford Inquiry.  Several recommendations were outlined within the subsequent report and 
included the introduction of HOLMES.  This followed concerns that the police had struggled 
to cope with the volume of information that was incoming using the paper systems that were 
then available.  Indeed, the volume of information in this case was such that the Major 
Incident Room (MIR): 
Heaved under the weight of four tons of paper and there were serious concerns as to 
whether the floor of the five-year-old police station could carry any additional load.  
Structural engineers advised that filing cabinets be placed around the walls instead of 
in the centre of the room.  (Bilton 2012, p436).     
HOLMES was developed to allow the police to electronically store information and for links 
between that information to be identified (Brookman, 2005).  It is widely agreed that 
HOLMES has aided the police investigation of crime in improving “co-ordination and 
management” (Brookman 2005, p267).  Certainly, Brain (2010, p245) writes that it “aided 
the process of investigation, disclosure, and eventual presentation in court” in respect of the 
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investigation into the Cromwell Street murders in the mid-1990s.  However, some concerns 
surround the system.  Innes (2003) found that SIOs use of the system was not always efficient 
and that too much information was often put through HOLMES.  Innes (2003, p100) notes 
that the SIO could have appropriately focussed the investigation without using HOLMES to 
“filter out the irrelevant material”.  The effective use of HOLMES is urged within Cook and 
Tattersall’s (2010, p167) ‘Senior Investigating Officers’ Handbook’, which emphasises that 
HOLMES is to assist an investigation and not run it; “the golden rule is that HOLMES 2 
must not be allowed to dominate or take over an enquiry”.  A further concern regarding 
HOLMES is that police services operate different versions of the system, with some forces 
continuing to use HOLMES 1, despite the development of HOLMES 2 which was introduced 
in response to concerns that the original system was “dated, overly complex and difficult to 
use”11 (Brookman 2005).   
Ultimately, as Maguire and Norris (1992, p61) note, HOLMES is not “immune from 
weaknesses, errors or even malpractice”.  The shortcomings of the system were apparent 
during the Stephen Lawrence investigation.  Innes (1999) writes that during this investigation 
the police found it difficult to assess the value of the masses of information that they received 
and that consequently information was placed onto HOLMES merely in the order in which 
the police received it.  This demonstrates again that despite the recommendations of Byford 
and the subsequent establishment of HOLMES, police investigations at this time continued to 
struggle with the management of information.  This was evident during the inquiry into the 
investigation of the murders of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in Soham in 2002, when 
HOLMES struggled again to “cope with the volume of information generated” (Roycroft 
2008, p52).  
Nevertheless the benefits of HOLMES cannot be denied.  Bilton (2012) assesses that had the 
Ripper investigators had use of HOLMES, Sutcliffe would have been arrested earlier and 
seven lives would have been saved (Brain, 2010).  This is explained in the following quote, 
which also gives some sense of the size of the task that the investigators faced:  
By feeding 53, 000 vehicle owners’ names into the computer, resulting from the tyre 
tracks left at various murder scenes, they could have easily cross-checked the names 
of the 6, 000 Shipley area employees who could have received the new five-pound 
note found in Jean Jordan’s handbag in Manchester.  Sutcliffe’s name would have 
                                                          
11 The Home Office recently halted a procurement exercise for HOLMES 3 with the Official Journal 
of the European Union stating that the “Home Office considers that improved value for money could 
be delivered through alternative sourcing strategies” (Bicknell, 2013). 
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been thrown up and with luck, he would have still been in possession of the car he 
used when he went to Manchester.  The incriminating tyres would have been found.  
(Bilton 2012, pp. 540 – 541). 
Passive Data Sources 
 
The Senior Investigating Officer’s Handbook explains that investigators are able to obtain 
data from a wide variety of sources and advancements in technology have played a large part 
in broadening these possibilities (Cook and Tattersall, 2010).  Passive data sources are 
defined as “information that is obtained from automated/mechanical systems” (Cook and 
Tattersall 2010, p230).  Passive data is relatively new to criminal investigation according to 
Monckton-Smith et al (2013) and, although they provide investigators with lines of enquiry 
that they would not have had before, important considerations arise regarding civil liberties 
and privacy, which must be managed. The numbers of sources that fall into the category of 
passive data is substantial and include: customer information, information obtained from 
computers and financial information.  However, Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) and 
communications data are adopted most frequently during major crime investigations and are 
addressed here (Cook and Tattersall, 2010). 
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 
 
Although the idea of using images in policing emerged as far back as the 1940s, when a 
police superintendent suggested using live television images to monitor the wedding of the 
Queen and Prince Phillip, the widespread use of CCTV that is apparent today was relatively 
slow in its development (Norris et al., 2004).  The employment of CCTV was commonly 
used within the retail sector and up until the 1970s and 1980s was primarily used by the 
police to manage demonstrations and football hooligans (Norris et al., 2004).  It was the 
murder of James Bulger in 1993 and resulting public concern that played a significant role in 
the increase in government funding of CCTV (Norris et al., 2004).  As Norris and McCahill 
(2006, p100) note “the images of the little boy being led from the shopping centre were 
replayed might after night on television and dramatically launched CCTV into the public 
debate surrounding the control of crime”.  However, Fay (1998) references the James Bulger 
case in highlighting that in reality the images of James being led away by his killers were of a 
very poor quality despite the fact that they had been enhanced.  Nevertheless, because of this 
case, the growing public concern that followed it and concerns around the increase in crime 
generally, the Conservative government invested £5 million in the City Challenge 
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Competition, allowing partnerships, who had sourced matched funding to bid for further 
monies (Fay, 1998).  The response to this funding scheme was significant, further 
competitions were held and investment in CCTV grew.  However, Fay (1998) notes that the 
increased funding towards CCTV cameras came at a time when the Conservatives were 
losing public confidence, raising the question of whether the increase in funding was a result 
of its effectiveness or a political move.   
There are now an estimated 5.9 million cameras in operation in the UK (Reeve, 2013).  The 
benefits that such widespread CCTV cameras may bring to an investigation are highlighted 
by Cook and Tattersall (2010) who emphasise that it is cost effective and can move an 
enquiry along quickly.  It can also assist with media appeals and in encouraging witnesses to 
come forward (Cook and Tattersall, 2010).  However, although CCTV systems are a familiar 
feature of modern society and are used regularly in criminal investigation the police 
“processes and procedures for acquiring CCTV evidence are not well developed and lag far 
behind those associated with fingerprints, DNA and other forms of crime scene evidence” 
(Gerrard 2007, p8).   
It is clear that the use of CCTV during a criminal investigation is complex and this can be 
partly attributed to advancements in technology, notably the move from analogue to digital 
recording.  CCTV images were previously recorded using VHS tapes, known as analogue 
CCTV (ACPO, 2011) and as individuals in their own homes used these tapes, it was 
relatively easy for police officers to use them in the course of an investigation (Gerrard, 
2007).    This first-hand knowledge of CCTV technology that comes from the use of tapes 
that officers used at home has arguably been lost in the move to the digital recording of 
CCTV images.  Not only has this led to a more complex system for detectives to use when 
compared to the use of VHS tapes, but it has also raised issues in regards to the retrieval of 
images.  Digital images take up more space to store and whilst they may be condensed to 
make more room, the quality of the images may be compromised, and so if a detective in an 
investigation tells the operator to “keep their images for as long as possible and the CCTV is 
digital, there is a danger that they may alter the compression and present you with pictures 
that are not fit for purpose” (Gerrard 2007, p12). 
Additionally, the cost of storing digital CCTV images is significant and may shorten the 
amount of time that images may be held (Gerrard, 2007).  The issue of the retention of 
images is critical in a major crime investigation and leads to additional pressures given the 
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importance of this tool.  In his research looking at what solves murder cases Roycroft (2007, 
p98) noted that many SIOs commented that when seeking to make full use of CCTV cameras 
it was vital to set parameters for retrieval quickly as “tapes are used on a continuous loop that 
winds back over a 24 hour period”.  The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) 
(2011a, p13) guidance also stresses the importance of securing CCTV imagery as soon as 
possible as “it may lead to the identification of lines of enquiry that will enable more material 
to be secured quickly”. 
Gerrard (2007, p13) notes that when we consider the difficulties associated with retrieving 
CCTV images during investigations today it is apparent that it is “clearly a job for specialist 
staff that have the right equipment and the appropriate level of training”, although in reality it 
is police officers or detectives who are often responsible for conducting this task.  
Furthermore, whilst following the London bombings of July 2005 there was the introduction 
of officers who are trained in the retrieval of digital CCTV images, many SIOs remain 
unaware that this resource available, despite their employment in high profile investigations 
including the hunt for the killer of five women in Ipswich (Gerrard, 2007).                 
The SIO also needs to consider the legislation that governs the use of CCTV images.  The 
NPIA (2011a, p21) stresses that to be able to utilise this resource appropriately “investigators 
should have a clear understanding of relevant legislation”, and that the key pieces of 
legislation are the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, Criminal Procedures and 
Investigations Act 1996, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1986 and Police Reform Act 
2002.  Additionally, the Data Protection Act 1998 covers CCTV recording when information 
relates to a living individual who could be identified (NPIA, 2011a).  As Herdale (2007, p30) 
states, the Data Protection Act “provides the legal framework for managing personal data 
(defined as information about a living individual processed electronically or on a defined 
filing system) in accordance with the ECHR”. 
Although there are difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of CCTV, as it is dependent 
upon a number of dynamics such as where the cameras are situated and the ways in which the 
systems are administered (Fay, 1998), the important role that CCTV plays in criminal 
investigation is becoming increasingly clear.  This is highlighted by Roycroft (2007) who 
found CCTV to be the solving factor in 24% of murders.  Gerrard (2007, p15) too emphasises 
the importance of CCTV above other forms of evidence: “it is probable that CCTV has the 
capacity to provide more evidence in support of criminal investigations than the conventional 
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forms of evidence”.  With this in mind it is clear that the difficulties associated with the 
management of a CCTV strategy provide the SIO with considerations and pressures that 
would not have been a concern for detectives before the 1990s. 
Communications Data 
 
The prevalence of mobile phones today provides investigators with additional opportunities 
for data that would not have been available during the 1980s and 1990s when 
telecommunications data was focussed upon landline telephones (Cook and Tattersall, 2010).  
The proportion of adults in the United Kingdom who owned or used a mobile telephone was 
93% in 2015 (Ofcom, 2015) and this figure has grown significantly since 2000 when 
statistics showed that 36% of individuals owned a mobile telephone (Ofcom, 2011).  The 
benefits of telephone analysis were reflected in the findings of Roycroft’s research, which 
showed this to be the solving factor in 23% of cases (Roycroft, 2007).  According to 
Monckton-Smith et al (2013, p127) the data from mobile phones can be gathered in the 
following three ways: 
 Cell site analysis:  allows the mapping of the approximate location of a mobile 
phone at any particular time by detailing to which mobile phone masts it was 
transmitting signals when calls or text messages were received. 
 Itemised billing: details the dates and times of all calls and text messages made by 
any particular phone. 
 Subscriber information: identifies the details of the person to whom the phone is 
registered. 
The ability of mobile phones to generate a significant amount of data during an investigation 
is undoubtedly beneficial, as the ACPO Murder Investigation Manual (MIM) (2008, p181) 
highlights: 
It is often the case that the only significant time that is known with any degree of 
certainty is the time that the body was discovered.  The search for telephone activity 
will, therefore, begin there and work backwards.  As more material becomes available 
about the circumstances, it will be possible to focus the search more precisely. 
Despite the ability of such data to provide investigators with additional lines of enquiry, 
indeed the telephone itself may provide opportunities for forensic examination with the view 
to finding blood, fingerprints and so on (Cook and Tattersall, 2010), it does also raise 
additional concerns that the SIO will be required to manage and negotiate. 
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Investigators are under pressure to retrieve footage from CCTV cameras before the tapes are 
recorded over and this is also the case for telecommunications data.  The MIM (2008, p181) 
cautions that “telecommunications billing data is generally kept for a fixed period of time” 
and urges SIOs to move quickly to secure evidence.  The SIO must also ensure that the use of 
communications data complies with relevant legislation, notably the Human Rights Act 1998, 
Article 8 of which stipulates that a person has a right to respect for private and family life.  
Whilst, this right is not absolute and may be encroached upon, it must only be done so if the 
actions that must be taken are necessary and proportionate, which are arguably open to 
interpretation. 
Although the widespread use of telecommunications data, notably mobile phones, has the 
potential to provide an investigator with numerous opportunities to identify new lines of 
enquiry, identify the whereabouts of individuals and corroborate the statements of witnesses, 
it brings other pressures.  Pressures include those of a financial nature as the retrieval and 
examination of data can be costly.  This may also be attributed to other passive data sources, 
including the retrieval of data from CCTV.  The MIM (2008, p185) highlights this point and 
the importance of setting and maintaining an appropriate strategy: 
Given the likely high cost of implementing the passive data generator strategy, both in 
terms of the cost imposed by data owners and of enquiry staff time, it is essential that 
the objectives and parameters of searches are kept under constant review to ensure 
that they are as precise as possible. 
Given the importance of retrieving such information swiftly, it is concerning that a recent Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2017, p55) report on police effectiveness 
conveyed that there have been “unacceptable delays in retrieving results from the units that 
examine and retrieve evidence from digital devices”.  Whilst the report does outline how the 
police have tried to address this issue including additional staff, it states, “it is important that 
forces develop sustainable approaches to meet the demand that digital forensic opportunities 
create” (HMIC 2017, p56). 
This is indicative of the fact that whilst advances in science and technology provide 
additional information, its careful management is important in ensuring that the opportunities 
it presents can be fully reaped. 
Relatedly, advancements in technology and the development of social media particularly, 
have further impacted upon the way that homicide is investigated.  With 2.206 billion active 
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users worldwide (Regan, 2015) social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter have 
provided the police with a new tool to use in crime investigation.  It also allows the police to 
communicate with the public and ask for information about crimes.  Further, Bullock (2016, 
p2) writes that it has become a medium through which they seek to “shape the police brand”.  
The usefulness of these sites is such that the NPIA updated its training packages in order to 
incorporate training around how best to use these resources during investigations (NPIA, 
2011b).  Such amendments to the training programs for detectives is indicative of the 
changing society that they are working within and it is likely that further updates to training 
will be required in the future due to the continued rapid developments to technology.   
The role of social media in homicide investigations, however, is an area that has yet to be 
subject to academic consideration, but given the rate at which social media use is growing it 
is ripe for future research. 
The Role of Science and Technology in Homicide Investigations 
 
DNA and other forensic methods are clearly not as infallible as they are portrayed to be.  
Despite this, the role that science and technology plays during homicide investigations has 
been subject to little academic attention.  Williams and Weetman (2013) note that its role in 
volume crime investigations has received more attention.  Further, Brady and King (2017) 
write that our understanding of the role that technology plays in homicide investigations is 
partial.  Williams (2017) also reports that a full understanding of the role that DNA plays in 
homicide investigations has not been achieved.  This section will, therefore, review some of 
the literature that can provide insight into these matters.   
McCartney’s (2006, p184) research, which drew upon statistics and interviews with those 
working with forensics, for example police officers and forensic scientists, found that the 
police can be “blinded by their own science” and believe that when a case has forensic 
evidence it does not require an in-depth investigation failing to see that “just having a DNA 
match won’t prove a case”.  She suggested that appropriate training of police officers 
including constables and senior officers was crucial in ensuring that forensics are used 
effectively.  Ensuring that there is appropriate training for police officers in forensic sciences 
could also move to address the perhaps unrealistic perceptions that some have about the 
reliability of DNA evidence.  Ultimately, the investigation should continue to be thorough in 
order to support the forensic findings with additional evidence from that case.  Although 
 66 
‘every contact leaves a trace’ the presence of a person’s DNA at a crime scene does not 
automatically link them to that offence (McCartney, 2006).   
Allsop (2012) provides an alternative perspective on the relationship between detective work 
and science.  In exploring the reliance on science and detective skills in relation to the 
investigation of cold cases, Allsop (2012) found that the two worked hand in hand and that 
detective skills are necessary in ensuring the efficient use of science and technology.  This is 
reinforced by Brookman et al (Forthcoming) who found that the effective use of science and 
technology was key to solving homicides.  Conversely, their interviewees also suggested that 
with the growth of science and technology other more traditional detective skills have 
diminished, describing how shortcuts were sometimes taken because of advances in this field 
(Brookman et al., forthcoming).  A similar finding arose from the research of Westera et al 
(2016, p203): “some detectives are now relying on the abundance of electronic information 
instead of face-to-face communication, causing these detectives to lose or never develop the 
core skill of talking to people”. 
The concerns outlined here are exacerbated by the relative rarity of homicides and 
particularly the more complex ‘whodunit’ cases (Innes, 2003).  As a result, the opportunity 
for officers to come into contact with forensics in such cases is often minimal resulting in 
them having “little knowledge” (McCartney 2006, p184).  It could be argued that the police 
officers’ knowledge of forensics is, as with members of the public, largely influenced by 
media representations of such methods, leading to the perception that it is the “silver bullet” 
in an investigation (McCartney 2006, p185).  It is again clear that appropriate training is 
necessary in ensuring this evidence is used correctly in an investigation.  However, this in 
itself leads to pressure upon the police service to ensure that training programmes remain up 
to date with the continual advancements in science and technology.  
It also necessary to consider an alternative view, the evidence that suggests that in reality 
forensics, in particular plays a relatively small part in investigations.  This is perhaps 
unsurprising when we consider that the majority of homicides are deemed ‘self-solvers’ 
whereby the offender is identified almost immediately (Innes, 2003).  This is reflected in a 
study conducted in the United States.  Brown and Keppel (2012) explored the impact of 
forensic evidence in solving child abduction murders and discovered that whilst forensic 
evidence was undoubtedly an important solvability factor; it was not as important as others, 
such as the victim-offender relationship.  Similarly, Broduer and Dupont (2016, pp. 13 – 14) 
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found that the use of forensics was a key factor in determining the outcome in less than 3% of 
cases.  Research by Roycroft (2007) into the solving of Category A and Category B 
homicides presents an alternative finding.  Based on interviews with 32 SIOs Roycroft (2007, 
p95) aimed to identify what those SIOs considered to the features that led to a “successful 
investigation”.  Roycroft (2007) found that in the majority of cases examined forensic 
material contributed to the solution in 38% of cases, phone analysis in 25% and CCTV in 
21.7%.  The conflict in the literature is evident. 
One area in which there appears to be little dispute is that advances in science and technology 
generate masses of information that must now be managed.  In his research on detective work 
and homicide investigation Innes (2003, p255) discussed the challenges of managing 
information during homicide investigations, referring to it as “information overload”.  Innes 
(2003, p255) writes that these difficulties may lead to a “systematic overload”, which “may 
result in officers simply working to get the data on the system, rather than maintaining a 
critical eye and carefully assessing its value to the investigation”.  Innes (2003) goes on to 
suggest that this may lead officers to take shortcuts around the system to prevent delays.  
Although Innes (2003) discussed this issue in relation to an SIO setting too many lines of 
enquiry, the extensive developments in science and technology mean that “information 
overload” is a concern that might be applied more broadly.  This is supported by more recent 
research.  Westera et al (2016) explored the factors that might prevent detectives being 
efficient in the future.  Based on semi-structured interviews with 30 detectives in New 
Zealand and Australia they also identified that managing information was a challenge: 
“detectives’ main concerns about analysing the large amounts of technology-generated 
information were that this process was time-consuming and prolonger the investigation and 
added to an already heavy workload” (Westera et al 2016, p202). 
A further issue that Westera et al (2016, p202) uncovered was difficulties in keeping up with 
the rapid pace at which technology evolves: “detectives felt they needed constant training on 
how to identify, access and analyse technology-generated information in order to keep up 
with the rapid advances in technology”. 
This has been established as an issue for investigators in England and Wales.  In a report 
examining police effectiveness in England and Wales, the HMIC (2017, p15) found that the 
police service were struggling to keep up with evolving technology: “in too many cases, 
forces are unable to exploit digital investigative opportunities because they have insufficient 
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capacity or capability to do so.  Digital forensic capability and capacity is not keeping up 
with demand”. 
Although the report does acknowledge the steps that have been taken, it stresses that these are 
not “sustainable” and that a longer-term solution is needed (HMIC 2017, p15). 
Art, Craft, Science and Detective Culture 
 
Although the subject of police culture has received considerable academic attention, there has 
been a lack of study examining the question of whether there exists a detective culture (Innes, 
2003).  The available literature suggests that the role of the detective has been shaped by the 
advances that have taken place in respect of science and technology, hence the placement of 
this discussion here.  However, it must be acknowledged that the many other developments 
that have taken place, which were outlined in Chapter Two, are also influential.   
One exploration of detective culture includes that of Hobbs (1988; 1991).  His findings are 
indicative that a detective culture separate to that of cop culture exists, as the following quote 
alludes: “the quicker new recruits to the CID can purge themselves of what is perceived as 
the plodding, mechanistic, reactive, operational style of the uniform branch, the quicker total 
immersion in detective culture can be achieved” (Hobbs 1991, p599). 
In more recent work Innes (2003, p14) similarly suggests that there is: “implicit evidence to 
suggest that the routines of detective work result in a radicalised and concentrated version of 
police culture being found amongst detective officers”.  Innes (2003, p15) goes on to suggest 
that the culture of the CID is “intensely pragmatic, concerned with getting the job done 
expediently, and underpinned by values which are conservative, machoistic, and action-
orientated”. Further, they demonstrate “suspicion of ‘outsiders’, pessimism about human 
nature, together with a heightened awareness of potential dangers...and a general sense of 
social isolation” (Innes 2003, p15).  This is supported by Maguire and Norris (1992, p20) 
who found that as well as the above characteristics detective culture encompassed “a largely 
individualistic and ‘entrepreneurial’ approach; in which loyalties are fragmented and 
sometimes restricted to just one or two ‘partners’”.    
Maguire and Norris (1992) also note that detectives’ attitudes towards rules differ to those of 
uniformed officers, demonstrating further distinction between them.  Maguire and Norris 
(1992, p21) found that detectives are more confident than uniformed officers in knowing 
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what rules can be disregarded and that they are likely to “sail close to the wind” when it 
comes to rule following.  Maguire and Norris (1992) attribute this to the fact that detectives 
work closely with those who supervise them.  This finding could also be linked to the training 
of detectives, which although now a more formalised process than it was at the time of 
Maguire and Norris’ (1992) research following the introduction of PIP, still incorporates a 
period of mentoring.  This is seen to be “important in relaying and transferring the tacit and 
informal knowledge of detective work, of how to get the job done in ‘the real world’, and the 
recipe knowledge, working rules and attitudes that will facilitate this” (Innes 2003, p17).           
The art, craft and science models were developed in a bid to understand the under-researched 
area of detective work.  Tong and Bowling (2006, p323) describe the models as providing a 
“framework for examining what detectives do and the challenging nature of their work”.  The 
model stems from the work of Reppetto (1978, p5) who examined the role of the American 
detective at a time when they were subject to “a series of sharp attacks”, had their units 
reduced in strength, were coming under closer supervision and aspects of their role were 
being assigned to the patrol forces.  Reppetto (1978, p8) described the detective as an artist as 
an “individual of brilliant insights, a master of interrogation and other skills, who engages in 
an intuitive exercise, which ultimately leads to the solution of a crime”.  Whilst Reppetto 
(1978) concedes that the detective as an artist is the one most commonly portrayed by media 
sources, he notes that there are real-life examples of both American and British detectives 
who could be considered to represent the qualities associated with art.  Conversely, Reppetto 
(1978, p9) describes the detective as a craftsman as being “seen as the master of a set of 
practical techniques”.  Overall, Reppetto (1978) argues that the role of the detective often 
entails a combination of art, craft and science, a view that has been supported by others in 
more recent discussions around detective work.   
In his study of homicide detectives, Innes (2003, p12) found that when investigating murder 
and other major crimes, “effective policing synthesizes art, craft and science”.  Innes (2003) 
found that despite the importance placed upon science and technology, the art and craft 
elements of detective work were evident when they were confronted with particularly 
complex cases, where they would adopt creative and innovative approaches to the 
investigation.  Furthermore, the detectives would use creativity in their negotiation of the 
“procedural constraints of the law” (Innes 2010, p23).    
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However, Innes (2010, p23) acknowledged that detectives are becoming “increasingly shaped 
by the use of scientific methods and technologies”.  This was also noted by Westera et al 
(2014).  This demonstrates the mounting importance of advances in science and technology 
in the police investigation of major crimes, and the mounting importance subsequently placed 
upon the science element of this model.  It has also been said that in recent years the drive to 
professionalise investigations has also seen the emphasis on ‘art’ or ‘craft’ diminished 
(James, 2013).  This is arguably the consequence of both advances in science and technology, 
but other changes such as the increase in legislation that must be understood and enacted.  As 
Tong and Bowling (2006 p323) write, the scientific approach to detective work goes beyond 
being skilled in using those particular tools, but includes “appreciation of the psychology of 
interview technique, and of the social sciences of crime analysis and policing”.  Indeed, given 
the legislation and guidance that detectives must negotiate it is not difficult to see how their 
work might now fit fully into this category.     
It is possible that detective work incorporates all three elements, but the influence of science 
and technology is seemingly becoming more apparent. However, caution is urged since, as 
mentioned earlier, the full impact of science and technology upon homicide investigation is 




The introduction of technology and science into the investigation of crime was rather a stilted 
process and so the detective working before the 1980s had a much smaller tool kit than the 
modern-day detective.  Now, as Stelfox (2009, p35) notes, the developments over the years 
have “[provided] investigators with sources of materials that their predecessors could only 
dream of”.  Yet, whilst this has brought opportunities that the pre-1980s detective did not 
have, investigators must now contend with an array of individuals and a mass of complex 
technology and forensic science, which brings challenges and pressures that would not have 
been a concern of those before them.   
Having reviewed the existing literature on the development of homicide investigation in 
England and Wales, I now turn to the current study and, in the chapter that follows; the 
methods that were adopted are presented. 
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Chapter Four  
Illuminating the World of Homicide Investigation and the Detective 
 
This chapter will detail the research strategy employed during this study and provide the 
reader with an insight into my experiences and the challenges that I faced.  This research was 
unique for its focus was upon the past.  The research aimed to explore in what ways the 
investigation of homicide in England and Wales had changed since the 1980s, why it had 
changed and to explore the impact of change.  There were three methods of data collection; 
qualitative interviews, examination of case files and observations.  Each method will be 
considered in turn.  A discussion of ethical issues will also be presented.  Firstly, the adoption 
of the qualitative approach is briefly considered.  
A Qualitative Approach  
 
This research necessitated a qualitative approach to data collection. Qualitative research aims 
to address the “deeper ‘why’ questions” (Westmarland, 2011, p82) and was therefore 
considered appropriate for this exploration of change.  The selection of this strategy is 
reinforced by Brookman (2015, p236) who notes that the research of homicide has been 
dominated by the quantitative researcher, but the adoption of a qualitative approach provides 
“unrivalled insights into people’s inner thoughts, reflections, actions, and lived experiences” 
something that cannot be achieved with quantitative research.  This was considered a fitting 
approach to a piece of research that was very much seeking to obtain the detectives’ 
perspective on change.  The qualitative approach has also been adopted by researchers such 
as Innes (2003), Brookman (1999) and Hobbs (1988) in their work exploring homicide and 
its investigation, lending further support for its adoption by the present study.   
It is, however, necessary to acknowledge the limitations often associated with the qualitative 
strategy.  Bryman (2016) outlines the main limitations as being those related to its 
subjectivity, replication issues, problems with generalisations and a lack of transparency.  
However, there are steps that can be taken to try and counter these limitations as far as is 
possible and the use of multiple methods or, more specifically, triangulation, is one way in 
which this might be achieved.  Triangulation “entails using more than one method or source 
of data in the study of social phenomena” (Bryman 2016, p386).  One of the benefits of 
triangulation is that it can improve the credibility of the research as well as increase the 
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richness and depth of data required to address the research questions.  Triangulation was 
achieved in this research with the adoption of interviews, analysis of documents and 
observations.  Simply, the use of triangulation allowed me to check or confirm information 
that has been deduced from one source of data with another. 
With the foundations of the research outlined, I will reflect upon each approach to data 
collection in turn.  The use of qualitative interviews served as the primary data collection 
method and will be discussed first. 
Interviews: Capturing the Past and Present  
 
I knew that in order to answer my research questions I would need to speak with detectives 
experienced in homicide investigations.  Homicide investigation has previously been 
described as a “closed world” (Brookman 2015, p236), so it would only be through speaking 
to the detectives who had ‘lived’ in that world that I would acquire the understanding that I 
needed.  This period of data collection commenced in May 2014 with the final interview with 
a detective held in July 2015.  A further interview was conducted in December 2016 with a 
QC as I sought to obtain another perspective.  This will be discussed shortly.    
I conducted twenty-seven semi-structured interviews with former and serving detectives.  I 
interviewed fourteen former and thirteen serving detectives.  Each detective was interviewed 
once.  Although I did not take any specific steps to ensure that the interviewees were 
representative, it was something that I remained mindful of and I would regularly review the 
demographics of those who were interviewed, so that I remained aware of the 
representativeness of the sample. 
As the purpose of the interviews was to ask the detectives to reflect upon their careers and 
consider how the investigation of homicide had changed, they can be considered to feature an 
element of oral history.   Bryman (2008, p696) describes the oral history interview as asking 
participants to “recall events from his or her past and to reflect on them”.  This is akin to the 
‘life history’ approach and indeed these two terms are often used interchangeably.  Atkinson 
(1998) argues that they differ in reach and focus: the oral history focuses on a particular 
aspect of someone’s life, whereas the life history looks at a person’s entire life.  A key 
advantage of the oral history interview is the richness of the data that it can yield: “those who 
propose the use of oral history techniques, are not concerned with creating objective 
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accounts, but rather seek to gather data which reflects the richness of human recollections on 
a particular subject” (Cockcroft 1999, pp. 138 – 139). 
Based on these definitions, the oral history interview was a suitable method for my research; I 
was able to ask the detectives to reflect on their careers and experiences of investigating 
homicide.  With an oral history interview, the interviewer is concerned with particular events 
in history and asks questions accordingly. For example, I asked the former detectives how 
they felt when computerised systems were first introduced for use in homicide investigations 
and how interviews were conducted before the introduction of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act, which aimed to eradicate the bad practices that had surrounded police 
detention, questioning and treatment of suspects in custody. I also interviewed several 
detectives after I had examined three homicide case files and was able to ask the former 
detectives about particular techniques and practices that were detailed in those files.  
Although there was an element of oral history to all of the interviews, the interviews with the 
serving detectives contained a little more focus upon the ‘here and now’.  For instance, I 
asked the serving detectives how technology and science are used in homicide investigations 
today.  
All of the interviews were semi-structured.  According to Bryman (2008) the semi-structured 
interview is one in which the interviewer has a list of questions to ask but the participant has 
some freedom in terms of how they respond.  The interviews did not rigidly follow the list of 
questions, but generally all interviewees were asked similar questions.  To illustrate, all were 
asked to identify what they considered to be a key change in homicide investigation that 
occurred during their career and why.  This allowed me to keep the interview focused on the 
relevant topic but gave the interviewee freedom in how they answered.  Ultimately, all the 
interviews were flexible and the key objective was to obtain the view of the participants.  The 
use of an interview schedule for all interviews ensured that the conversation remained on 
topic and that the questions did not stray too far from the research questions.  
The purpose of the interviews was twofold.  It allowed me to build a detailed picture of how 
the investigation of homicide used to look and what have been the key changes and, 
secondly, to understand how that has shaped the way in which homicide is investigated today.  
This provided me with both an oral history account of the situation over 30 years ago and a 
comprehensive picture of current practice.  With this in mind, this section will now explore 
other issues arising during this stage of the data collection process including; identifying and 
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accessing participants, interviewing former and serving detectives, the difficulties that are 
associated when asking interviewees to look back in time and, finally, asking difficult 
questions.  Firstly, however, the pilot interviews will be briefly discussed. 
Pilot Interviews  
 
Pilot studies are a useful way of exploring ideas and testing interview questions and so it is 
worth noting my experiences of them.  I conducted pilot interviews when I had a broad idea 
of what I wanted to look at, but before I had fully formulated my research questions.  The 
purpose was to explore the ideas that had arisen from the time that I had spent reading to test 
the validity of the questions and the quality of the data.  I devised a pilot interview schedule 
(Appendix One), which consisted of 20 questions.  I conducted three pilot interviews with 
five participants; three participants were former detectives and two participants were serving 
detectives, which reflected the participants that I would be looking for in subsequent 
interviews.  The three former detectives worked at the university, so I emailed them 
explaining that I was in the early stages of my PhD exploring how homicide investigation has 
changed, and would they be interested in participating in a pilot interview.  I adopted the 
same approach with the two serving detectives.  A family member, who at the time worked 
for the police, put me in touch with one detective who then brought his colleague to the 
interview. 
The process was worthwhile and highlighted issues with the data collection method, in 
particular, the importance of audio recording the interviews and the need for me to probe 
more.  As the nature of the topic is quite sensitive I felt that using an audio recorder during 
the interviews might have inhibited the participants from providing full and frank answers, so 
I made handwritten notes.  My previous employment as a Secretary within a local authority 
Social Services department required detailed note taking, both handwritten and typed, and I 
was confident that I could capture an appropriate level of detail and felt that this was 
achieved.  However, I noted in my research diary that whilst the pilot interviews had been 
“relaxed and conversational”, opportunities to probe were sometimes lost.  Additionally, 
although I felt that my notes contained a good level of detail, a degree of context was 
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inevitably lost12.  Brookman (2015, p248) summarises the issues that a researcher has to 
consider when deciding whether or not to record an interview, which reflects my experiences: 
Although, intuitively, a recording device may inhibit a respondent, equally, constant 
or frantic note taking can also be distracting and off-putting to an interviewee and can 
certainly make it more difficult for the interviewer to engage naturally in 
conversation. 
I decided that in future interviews the participants would be asked if the interview could be 
digitally recorded.  This decision proved beneficial during the analysis of the data when I was 
able to view the full interview transcripts.  I would also at times listen back to the recordings 
during the data analysis and found that I was almost taken back to the room in which the 
interview had taken place.  I was sure that this added to my understanding of what the 
interviewees were saying.  Simply, an audio recording of an interview allowed me to re-
capture experiences that sometimes occurred many months earlier.   
To summarise, the pilot interviews were useful in several respects.  They helped me to 
establish the importance of recording the interviews and ensured I was mindful of probing.  
An additional benefit was that it allowed me to simply practice interviewing, something I had 
not done since I was studying for my undergraduate dissertation.  This gave me confidence 
when I conducted the subsequent interviews, which in turn helped with giving a good 
impression to participants, something that can help identify further interviewees.  It is to this 
issue that I now turn. 
Identifying Former and Serving Homicide Detectives   
 
Brookman (2015, p242) writes that there are a number of important factors that play a part in 
obtaining access to conduct research in and around the world of homicide investigations, 
which include: 
A persuasive idea and plan, an appreciation of the ethics and sensitivity required to 
undertake the research, a good track record (if you are not “new” to the field), a little 
luck, and, perhaps most important of all, an introduction by a credible person who can 
vouch for you. 
With the exception of a good track record as I was new to the field, these all played an 
important role in my gaining the access that I needed.   
                                                          
12 I conducted further interviews with three of the individuals that took part in the pilot interviews at a 
later date. These were recorded and the data included in the final sample. 
 76 
Before commencing the research I knew that I wanted to speak to former and serving 
homicide detectives, who were both male and female with a range of experience of homicide 
investigations.  I also wanted to represent England and Wales.  When devising the research I 
believed that one of the biggest challenges would be finding former detectives to interview as 
they could not be identified and contacted through the police service, as might be the case 
with serving detectives.  This, however, was a much easier process than I had anticipated.  
Often researchers adopting a qualitative research strategy employ purposive sampling in 
order to obtain their sample (Bryman, 2008).  A non-probability form of sampling, it is an 
approach in which the researcher will select the sample on the basis that it is relevant to the 
research questions being asked (Bryman, 2008).  
The process of accessing detectives began when one of my supervisors recommended a 
former detective that I could contact and who subsequently agreed to be interviewed.  This 
participant then recommended other potential interviewees and the process ‘snowballed’ from 
there.  Snowball sampling is one form of purposive sampling, which is defined as the 
“selection of participants or sources of data to be used in a study based on referrals from one 
source to another” (Yin 2016, p340) and was the approach adopted here.  I used a similar 
method to identify the serving detectives that I wanted to speak to.  I was mindful that this 
sampling method might be problematic in that, in effect, the interviewees decide whom 
would be useful for me to speak to and so they might hold similar viewpoints, what Morgan 
(2008, no pagination) refers to as a “biased subset”.  An alternative way in which I was able 
to generate participants served to counter this concern.  The first participant that I interviewed 
was a former detective still working within the police service, and he offered to send an email 
to his contacts letting them know about my research and asking if they would be interested in 
taking part.  I wrote a summary of my research intentions that could be forwarded within the 
email, this served almost as a cover letter and included pertinent information such as what 
University I was from, the area I was researching and that I was interested in interviewing 
former and serving detectives (Appendix Two).  This generated further participants as 
detectives, both former and serving, began to contact me to say that they would be interested 
in taking part in my research.  I also sent this overview to a serving Detective Superintendent 
who forwarded it to other detectives in their police service, which also led to other 
participants contacting me.  Additionally, when I interviewed individuals some also agreed to 
forward the overview to their contacts.    
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I consider this approach to have been successful as I achieved the parameters that I had set, 
which allowed me to make generalisations from the data.  I reached a number of police 
services in both England and Wales, ensuring a reasonable geographical representation.  In 
total the interviewees represented seven different police services, four in England and three in 
Wales.  Furthermore, I was able to identify both male and female participants.  Specifically, 
of the twenty-seven participants, I interviewed two female former detectives and three 
serving female detectives.  Given the position of female detectives in the history of major 
crime investigation these numbers were acceptable.  I also interviewed detectives of differing 
experience of homicide investigation, for example, those who had worked as part of Outside 
Enquiry Teams, as Family Liaison Officers and those who had been or were Senior 
Investigating Officers.  Importantly, this helped to develop an insight into different areas of 
homicide investigation, which ensured a more holistic view of how things have changed and 
what the impact of change has been across different levels of the investigative process. 
When adopting an approach to identifying participants is reliant upon this form of sampling, 
the importance of making a good impression during your fieldwork cannot be under-
estimated.  Having worked closely with police officers during previous employment, both 
within Social Services and as part of a local authority Community Safety Team, I knew that it 
was important to remain professional during the period of data collection.  I sent courteous 
emails to interviewees and if a potential participant contacted me with a relatively informal 
email, I was sure to reply formally and address them by their rank.  Furthermore, when 
conducting my fieldwork I dressed smartly, I made sure that I was always on time, polite and 
well prepared.  I was keen to be respectful of the people that had given up their time to speak 
to me, which would in turn generate more participants, and to give the impression that I 
would treat any information that they divulged appropriately.  I interviewed one former 
detective at their home and serving detectives who were busy investigating current cases, 
some interviews were held in the days before Christmas 2014 and so after each interview I 
emailed each participant to thank them again for their time, both to show my appreciation and 
to reiterate the measures that would be taken in respect of confidentiality. 
Interviewing Former and Serving Detectives: In Practice  
 
I conducted twenty-seven interviews with former and serving detectives, both male and 
female and with experience of different elements of the investigative process.  The majority 
of the interviews were held within police stations.  As was noted previously, most of the 
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interviewees were still working for the police in a civilian capacity, so I was able to interview 
them at their place of work.  However, I interviewed one former detective in his home.  Due 
to the fact that some of the interviewees were based some distance away, four were telephone 
interviews.  All interviews were recorded using a digital recorder and distinct interview 
schedules were used for both the former and serving detectives (Appendices Three and Four).     
The British Society of Criminology’s code of ethics stress that informed consent should be 
obtained whenever possible (British Society of Criminology, 2016).  Both when making 
initial contact and at the start of each interview, the participants were told what the research 
was about, what it was for and what would happen to any data collected.  This was reiterated 
during any later contact, for example, when I emailed them afterwards to thank them for their 
time.  Ensuring the anonymity of participants also ensured that there was no likelihood that 
there would be any harm to them, one of Diener and Crandall’s (1978) key ethical 
considerations.  
On average the interviews lasted around 90 minutes, although some were much longer, 
including an interview of nearly three hours that led to me receiving a parking ticket.  The 
clear benefit of such long interviews was that I was able to obtain significant detail and cover 
the pertinent areas of questioning, this was particularly important given that my research 
focus was from the 1980s to the present day.  However, it would be fair to say that I found 
the longest interview to be challenging.  Held with a serving detective I found it quite 
difficult to keep this interview on topic at times.  Whilst undoubtedly much relevant 
information was provided, the interviewee spent a significant period of time discussing the 
then upcoming General Election and their views of the right wing media.  Whilst the 
detective’s views here were relevant, for example, other interviewees were also damning of 
the cuts to the police service that had come from the Conservative Government, too much 
time was spent on such topics and I could have steered the interview more effectively.  
However, the balance between directing the interview so that it remains on topic and 
remaining what Yin (2016, p144) calls “nondirective” can be difficult to achieve.  Arguably 
this was further heightened since I was keen when conducting all of the interviews to not be 
the dominant voice, aiming to “speak in modest amounts” (Yin 2016, p144).  To achieve the 
detectives’ perspectives I needed to allow them to speak freely and I believe the balance was 
achieved in most interviews, but I felt that this particular interview in places went slightly 
awry.  This further reaffirms the importance of audio-recoding the interviews, for it would 
have been difficult to capture this level of detail with handwritten notes.  
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Interestingly and by contrast some of the shorter interviews I felt were particularly fruitful 
despite my initial reservations that this would be the case.  The shorter interviews were those 
conducted by telephone and lasted under an hour.  Although my approach to identifying 
participants meant that I was able to reach those who were or had worked for forces across 
England and Wales, a limitation of this was that I could not conduct them all face-to-face.  
One of the primary advantages of the face-to-face interview is that it can help the interviewer 
in establishing rapport and clearly convey research intentions and assurances around 
anonymity.  I was concerned that this would not be easily achieved through a telephone 
interview.  However, Bryman (2016, p485) notes that “concerns about data quality in the 
telephone mode are not as great as sometimes feared” and this proved to be the case here also 
as the interviews, although briefer, were focused and so were no less fruitful than the others.   
As with the face-to-face interviews the telephone interviews were recorded and I had 
purchased equipment that would allow me to do so.  However, whilst this was, in the main, 
beneficial the line was sometimes poor and so the verbatim transcription of these interviews 
afterwards was occasionally difficult, as some parts could not be heard.  The possibility of 
poor sound quality when recording has been documented within the methods literature 
(Bryman 2016) and so is something that I had anticipated beforehand.  I therefore took 
detailed notes during the interviews.  These notes were more extensive than those taken 
during the face-to-face interviews, as I was not concerned that this might be off-putting for 
the interviewee.  Taking detailed notes during a telephone interview proved particularly 
helpful when the recording of one failed entirely.  The notes that I took ensured that I did not 
lose too much data. 
Asking Interviewees to Look Back 
 
Cockcroft (2005) noted that issue of memory is usually a concern for researchers adopting the 
oral history interview approach, as they are asking participants to look back at particular 
points in their lives sometime after that event.  However, I was quite confident that this was 
not an issue here. Although I was asking the former detectives to look back on their careers, 
some of which began in the 1970s, there was no indication from interviewees that they were 
having difficulty remembering anything; the accounts offered by the detectives were detailed 
and vivid. Furthermore, each of these former detectives had worked within the police service 
for more than 20 years, which may explain their seemingly accurate memory.  Similarly, the 
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commonality in the findings suggests that the memories were as accurate as could be 
expected given the time periods in question.   
 
However, there was also the risk that the former detectives would look back on their 
experiences with ‘rose tinted glasses’ as Weinberger (1995) cautions, for the pressures of the 
time are no longer a burden on them.  In any event whilst it can be seen that asking 
interviewees to reflect upon what was in some cases a period of 35 years these are issues that 
are commonly associated with all forms of interviewing.  More broadly, the “possibility of 
concealment, embellishment, exaggeration, mixed messages, or outright deception cannot be 
overlooked in any conversation (criminal or otherwise)” (Brookman 2015, p241), therefore, a 
researcher can never be certain that participants have not forgotten anything or that their 
perspectives have not been distorted by the passage of time or indeed for any other reason. 
Nevertheless, additional methods were employed to try and counter such concerns and will be 
discussed shortly. 
Asking Difficult Questions 
 
Some of the detectives that I interviewed had worked or were working for a police service 
that had seen several miscarriages of justice; indeed, some of the former detectives had 
worked on these cases.  Furthermore, at the time that I was conducting my research, one case 
that had occurred several decades earlier continued to be featured in the national media.  I 
was mindful of this when conducting these interviews and pursuing related lines of 
questioning.  It was important that I obtained the information that I needed in a way that did 
not make the interviewee nervous or unwilling to divulge information.  Therefore, rather than 
directly ask about particular cases, I asked the former detectives what it was like to work at a 
time when criminal investigation was being regularly criticised, and asked the serving 
detectives whether they felt the impact of legacy cases many years later. 
Despite my concerns that the sensitivity of some topics might lead the interviewees to ‘close 
down’, which may also have proved detrimental to obtaining further contacts, the 
interviewees appeared to be frank and forthcoming about their experiences and perspectives.  
The former detectives spoke candidly of poor investigative practices that took place during 
the 1970s and 1980s, such as listening in on suspects when they were in the cells and how 
they would sometimes be left for a ‘night under the clock’ until the detectives were ready to 
speak to them.  Cockcroft (2005) also found that his interviewees were open when discussing 
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corruption and scandal within the police and believes that this could be attributed to the fact 
that the participants were retired.  
Although several of the retired detectives that I spoke to were still working within the police 
service in a civilian capacity, this explanation could be relevant here given their change in 
position.  An alternative explanation might also be that much of what went on in the past was 
accepted practice and often legal, so there would be no reason to not be forthcoming about 
the reality of investigation at that time.  The serving detectives were equally as forthcoming, 
something that cannot be explained by the above explanations.  It could be argued that the 
police are keen to be seen as open and transparent and were therefore happy to engage in the 
research.  Additionally, the measures that I took to respect their confidentiality, to be 
discussed, perhaps reassured them sufficiently to be able to answer my questions.  It is 
accepted, however, that it is not possible to be fully certain that what I was being told was a 
true reflection of the participants’ views and experiences. 
An Alternative Perspective 
The interviews with the detectives revealed substantial legislative change that had impacted 
upon the trial process.  I believed that it was necessary to interview someone who had 
experience of this.  I mentioned this to a serving detective that I had interviewed and he 
contacted a QC that he knew to see if he would speak to me.  The QC agreed and I was given 
his email address to arrange the interview.  I devised a new interview schedule, which 
reflected the issues that had arisen during the preceding interviews (Appendix Five).  In 
December 2016 I conducted the interview.  The QC agreed to being recorded and it lasted 
two hours.  The information that I gathered proved helpful for it provided an alternative 
outlook on some pertinent issues.  I therefore decided to speak to a few more participants, so 
I contacted this QC again and he gave me the details of two others that might have been 
willing to take part in an interview.   
Due to time pressure I decided to email questions to these potential participants.  The 
questions devised were based upon the data that the first interview had yielded and from the 
other interviews (Appendix Six).  However, although I received a reply from one of the 
individuals to say that he would be happy to help and would respond over the coming weeks, 
I did not receive a response.  This occurred during the latter stages of my research and I had 
limited time to pursue this response, so a decision had to be made about whether to include 
data from an interview with just one QC.  I eventually decided to keep these data within the 
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thesis.  Although the lack of any other interviews meant that caution was needed when 
drawing on the content of this interview, I felt that the information gave at least a small 
indication of how change has influenced homicide trials and how the views of the detectives 
compared to others in the Criminal Justice System.  Moreover, the intention of this research 
was to depict the detectives’ perspectives of change and the inclusion of an alternative 
perspective would have always been supplementary to the other methods of data collection.  
Nevertheless, although the question of how many interviews should be conducted in 
qualitative research is a difficult one to answer (Baker and Edwards, 2012), it is accepted that 
one was not preferable.  Certainly, if I were conducting this research again I would endeavor 
to interview additional QCs. 
Protecting Investigations:  The Censorship of Interview Transcripts 
 
Whilst all participants agreed to being audio recorded, three of the 28 participants, including 
one retired detective now working as a civilian, asked to see the transcripts afterwards to edit 
them if on-going cases or other sensitive information had been discussed.  Although I agreed 
to this there was a risk that the interviewee might remove useful information.  However, the 
information removed mostly concerned discussions around the homicides themselves as 
opposed to the investigative process.  Since the focus of this research was upon the changes 
to investigations over time and the impact on how homicides are investigated, the deletion of 
information pertaining to live cases did not impact upon the overall data collected.  
Regardless, the need to protect investigations clearly takes precedence here and the research 
must take second place to this.   
Although at the start of the data collection process I had anticipated that the course of 
identifying participants and arranging the interviews would not run smoothly, this proved to 
be mostly unfounded, thanks to the willingness of the detectives to participate.  The 
interviews proved not only to be informative and enabled me to gain the data that I required, 
but it was an enjoyable experience even in light of the subject matter.  Nevertheless, the use 
of interviews in research is not without some challenges and so I took additional steps to 
increase the validity and breadth of my data that also served to develop my understanding of 
the manner in which homicide is and was investigated. 
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Examining Police Murder Files:  Getting the Written Perspective 
 
I examined police case files of murder investigations that took place across the time periods 
that I was researching which was essential in gaining an understanding of the past and 
present.  I examined three files: an unsolved homicide from the 1980s13, an unsolved 
homicide from the 1990s and a homicide from the 2000s that had seen the identification and 
conviction of the offender.  
 
Referring to her own experience of PhD research, Brookman (1999) discusses some of the 
problems in using police murder files in research, notably the issue of gaining access to them. 
Brookman (1999) highlights that it is whom you know that plays an important part in 
obtaining access. As I had already conducted many interviews and established numerous 
contacts at this point, I was able to successfully request to look at the case files held by one 
particular major crime team.  It was no doubt helpful that I had interviewed some members of 
this team and so had by this point shown that I was a credible researcher who was exploring a 
topic that was of interest to those that I had interviewed.  The DCI who acted as the 
gatekeeper provided me with case files to view.  Having already interviewed this detective 
they had a good understanding of my research and chose the files accordingly.  They chose a 
file from each of the decades with which my research was concerned.  The detective 
explained that they also chose these files, as they concerned high-profile cases.  Additionally, 
they were less typical homicides as two were unsolved cases and the third was a stranger 
homicide.  Although the case files that were examined were from the same team, the diverse 
and quite unusual nature of the cases sufficiently countered any potential concerns around 
representation.   
 
I had to ensure that the cases would not be identifiable in order to protect those involved as 
well as protecting ongoing investigations, as two of these cases were unsolved at the time.  
The cases were not identified, only the decade in which they occurred was noted, as this was 
important in achieving the research objectives but would not lead to the identification of the 
cases or those involved.  Quite deliberately, when looking through the case files, I did not 
note down any information that might identify the case, such as, particular details about the 
victims’ age or gender.  This was achievable since such detail was not relevant to the research 
                                                          
13 An individual has since been convicted of this murder. 
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but, crucially, it meant that there would be no risk of my including any detail that might lead 
someone to identify the case.  Additionally, I was permitted to examine the files only whilst 
at the major crime team offices and was unable to take them away with me.  It was important 
that I adhered to this in order to ensure the integrity of my research and to protect the 
information that I had been allowed to view.  Having to view the files whilst stationed within 
the Major Crime Investigation Team (MCIT) proved to be of additional benefit as it allowed 
me to obtain more insight into the day-to-day running of the team and to ask questions about 
the case files that I was examining.  Relatedly, the examination of the case files was carried 
out whilst I was still conducting interviews, so the additional value of examining these files 
was that they provided me with additional lines of questioning.  For example, I noticed that 
there was little mention of budget within the case files of the 1980s but that reference to 
budget increased through the 1990s and 2000s case files.  I was then able to ask subsequent 
interviewees about the financing of homicide investigations.   
 
I conducted this part of the research after having held the majority of the interviews and when 
starting my initial analysis, during which I had identified several emerging themes.  I kept 
these themes in mind as I looked through the case files, allowing me to make links between 
what the detectives had said about investigations during the interviews and what was written 
in the case files.  I was also mindful of the fact that the case files that I looked at were 
different in format depending upon what decade they were from so direct comparisons could 
not be made.  For example, as well as other paperwork pertaining to the cases, I had access to 
the policy file for the 1990s and 2000s cases, but what was referred to as a ‘Crime Report’ for 
the 1980s case.  This Crime Report provided a summary of all the actions and decisions take 
during the investigation, whereas the policy files provided more detail as to the decisions that 
were taken on a day-by-day basis.  I had to be cautious about drawing comparisons in terms 
of the content of the files and how they were written.  Despite the different formats each 
yielded much useful information.  Contained within the documents that I analysed were 
reports from various experts, such as behavioural profilers, images depicting the injuries that 
the victim had sustained, statements that had been made to the police and, as mentioned 
above, records of the actions that were taken and the decisions that were made during the 
course of the investigation.   
 
Whilst the use of unsolved cases could be considered problematic, as it was not possible to 
see how the cases were resolved, this proved to be particularly advantageous.  Unsolved cases 
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are regularly reviewed and this was no different for the 1980s and 1990s cases that I looked 
at, with reviews taking place more than two decades after they had occurred.  This therefore 
gave me a present day perspective on those past cases.  This was especially useful in 
understanding the impact of changes in science and technology as, for example, later reports 
discussed the possibility of re-testing various exhibits in light of improvements to DNA 
testing. 
 
The benefits of using documents in research are clear.  They “provide a rich source of data on 
homicide” (Brookman 2015, p237) and have long been an important tool in historical 
research (Noaks and Wincup, 2004); both pertinent to this research.  That is not to say that 
this approach does not also hold some limitations that should be considered.  Brookman 
(2015, p237) urges that caution should be exercised when viewing documents and researchers 
should be mindful of their “socially constructed nature”.  Because of this Brookman (2015, 
p238) suggests that documents should be considered a “resource of and for social research” 
(see also Brookman, 1999).  Specifically, documents can be used to provide information 
about the topic itself or as a means of providing information about those producing the 
document.  In the case of my research, the documents yielded information in both respects.  
The case files provided considerable information about murder investigations, therefore 
becoming a source for social research.  At the same time, these documents contained 
important clues about how detectives justify and rationalise their decisions.  Indeed, the SIO 
policy file is designed so that the top of the page records the date, time and the decision made 
and the bottom half of the page records the rationale.  Moreover, the potential for the later 
scrutiny of such documents was also apparent and it was clear that the detectives were 
mindful of the how they author these documents.  The documents could therefore also be 
considered a resource of social research. 
 
As I noted earlier there were differences between the documents that I viewed; the policy 
files for the 1990s and 2000s cases recorded decisions that were taken on a day-by-day basis, 
whereas the 1980s ‘Crime Report’ was a summary of the whole investigation written after the 
event.  The files were written from quite different standpoints; decisions being made at the 
time and decisions being summarised after the fact.  The importance of remaining conscious 
of the socially constructed nature of documents, as discussed above, was therefore 
imperative.  The use of other research methods is common alongside documentary analysis 
(Bowen, 2009) and also helps to minimise these concerns.  The interviews, in particular, had 
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an important role to play here, as I was able to discuss the content of the ‘Crime Report’ with 
detectives who had worked on this case.  A similar approach was adopted by Cockcroft 
(1999) in his examination of the history of the police; he used documents to obtain the written 
version of events but used interviews to probe the issues further. 
The Yorkshire Ripper Archive 
 
In addition to interviewing retired detectives and examining the homicide case files detailed 
above, I was also fortunate enough to have access to documents relating to the Yorkshire 
Ripper investigation.  These consisted of both original documents from the investigation 
itself, such as transcripts of police interviews with Peter Sutcliffe and post-mortem reports, as 
well as transcripts of interviews held many years later with those who had worked on the 
case.  These files were given to the university’s Centre for Criminology by an author who had 
obtained the documents as part of research for an extensive account of the case that he had 
written and published.  To my knowledge this information has not been used in any other 
research.  These files allowed me to take an in-depth look into the historic investigation of 
homicide, and into the case that is considered to have been a key driver for reform. 
Observations: A Firsthand Look at Investigations Today and a Glimpse into the Past 
 
Whilst this research was focused on homicide investigations past and present, it would clearly 
not be possible for me to observe the past.  However, the observation of present day 
investigations provided invaluable insight and was no less revealing than the other methods 
that were employed.  This section will detail how I gained access to what has been deemed 
the closed world of homicide investigations (Brookman, 2015) and my experiences of this 
phase of the data collection, which totaled four days.  As well as four formal days of 
observations (two spent observing training and two spent at the MCIT), on the day that I was 
due to interview two detectives from the same police service, they kindly took me to visit a 
newly built custody suite to show me how these facilities had improved before we returned 
for the interviews.  I spent a further two days at the MCIT looking through the case files, 
during which time I was able to observe the MCIT and speak informally to its members. 
 
The observations were overt and therefore the individuals that I met were aware of my 
presence and what I was there for.  There are known disadvantages in conducting 
observations in this way.  As Gray (2009) acknowledges, when individuals are being 
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observed there is a risk that they will change their behaviour to some extent.  However, it 
would have been unethical, not to mention very difficult, to conduct such observations 
covertly.  My role therefore was very much that of what Bryman (2016, p437) refers to as the 
“non-participating observer with interaction”, which is defined as follows: “observes 
(sometimes minimally) but does not participate in group’s core activities.  Interaction with 
group members occurs, but often tends to be through interviews, which along with 
documents, tend to be the main source of data”.  The overt nature of the research enabled me 
to take notes relatively freely.  During the periods of observation I made my notes in a 
Filofax, which was small in size and I felt that it would be less conspicuous and less off 
putting to those that I was observing.  This is an important consideration as Rowe (2007, p40) 
in his research of police found that “the way in which [he] completed [his] field notes seemed 
to influence the extent to which officers talked freely”.  I felt that this approach to taking 
notes also showed that I was professional and organised when conducting the research.   
 
Deciding to take notes using a Filofax in an attempt to be less conspicuous also reduced the 
possibility that the research participants would alter their behaviour when being observed, 
often referred to as the Hawthorne effect.  I observed briefings attended by around 20 
individuals who were all taking notes, so I felt less inhibited about also doing so in these 
settings.  Innes (2003) adopted a similar tactic in his ethnographic study of homicide 
detectives, finding that this helped him to blend in with those around him.  Employing 
additional data collection methods also assisted the management of the Hawthorne effect.  
Recounting her experiences of researching homicide detectives in the United States, 
Brookman (2015) explains that once she had conducted interviews with the detectives, there 
was a greater acceptance of her presence within the homicide squad, which she was also 
observing.  I too had interviewed detectives who belonged to the team that I was observing, 
so it is possible that this helped my being there to be perceived favourably and reduce the 
likelihood that the detectives would change their behaviour because I was there.  My position 
as an outsider to the organisation might have also helped counter the influence of researcher 
effect as I was there to learn about these investigations, as opposed to being there as someone 
who had experience of them.  Ultimately, it is difficult to fully eradicate the risk of the 
Hawthorne effect and my position as an outsider to the Police Service, meant that I would not 
have necessarily been aware of any changes in the behaviour of those that were around me.  
Moreover, a television crew who were filming the team for a documentary filmed one of the 
briefings that I attended and so it is quite possible that the behaviour of the detectives 
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changed because of their presence.  Overall, it is hoped that the measures that I took reduced 
the effect of my presence on participants during the periods of observation as far as possible.   
 
As discussed earlier, the informed consent of the interviewees was obtained.  It is important 
to acknowledge here that I held some informal conversations with the individuals that I met 
whilst I was observing the MCIT, so the informed consent of these individuals was not 
formally obtained.  My access had been arranged by the DCI.  This was also the case for 
those who attended the briefing that I observed, although the SIO began the briefing by 
introducing me and explaining why I was there.  In addition, when I spoke to people during 
my visits I was open about why I was there and would explain what my research was about.  
 Senior Investigating Officer Training  
 
The first installment of the observational stage of the data collection saw me attend, in the 
summer of 2014, a training session for those intending to become Senior Investigating 
Officers (SIOs).   I was able to gain access to the training through my supervisor who was 
attending for her own research purposes.  I felt that attending this training would be beneficial 
since much of the literature reveals that historically detectives would learn by shadowing 
others in the absence of formalised training (Innes, 2003).  Indeed, my findings eventually 
revealed that the opportunity to shadow investigations and learn ‘on the job’ is still 
considered important.  Thus, witnessing aspects of modern training procedures provided me 
with useful insights.  
 
It was apparent quite soon that the areas covered on the first day of training that I attended 
were varied and included the detectives taking part in a mock court appearance before a 
former Criminal Prosecution Service (CPS) lawyer to request a warrant for further detention, 
after which they were provided with a de-brief as to their performance.  The CPS lawyer also 
held a general discussion session about appearing in court as a detective, during which he 
talked about the differences in the way in which evidence is given today by detectives 
compared to the past.  This proved to be relevant to my research as it provided me with the 
past and present perspective of the way in which cases are taken through the court and was 
something that I was able to discuss with the detectives and lawyer over lunch.  The 
following week I attended another day of training and this too proved to be highly beneficial 
to my research objectives, as the training covered DNA profiling and the investigation of 
major crime, which included a talk by a retired detective.  Identification procedures were also 
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discussed.  This again provided me with further contacts to interview and raised other areas 
of questioning that I could pursue during subsequent interviews.   
 A Major Crime Investigation Team at Work 
 
As well as observing the training of Senior Investigating Officers I also spent a day with a 
Major Crime Investigation Team (MCIT).  This involved observing several different 
elements of various homicide investigations.  Contact with this team was established after my 
supervisor put me in touch with one of the DCIs who agreed to my visiting the offices, as 
well as agreeing to take part in an interview.     
 
Upon arrival at the offices of the MCIT for the first time I was met by the DCI and I informed 
him during an initial chat over coffee in more detail what my research entailed, before I was 
introduced to some other members of the team.  What struck me most at this stage was the 
office itself.  At the time of my visit I had already conducted several interviews, including 
those with former detectives.  From the way in which they had described the offices in which 
they had worked I was sure that these were a world away from those of the 1980s, where 
there would be reams of paper and index cards and detectives smoking.  These offices 
reminded me of those that I had worked in when employed by a local authority, as they were 
quiet and dominated by computer screens.  As well as being different to those of the 1980s, it 
also occurred to me that the reality of the set-up here was also very different to those 
portrayed by fictional portrayals of homicide investigations, which seem to show detectives 
rushing about, having intense conversations and loud excitement at a breakthrough in the 
case.  The atmosphere here was altogether calmer with everyone clearly busy at work.   
 
One of the detectives that I was introduced to was a female detective who was, amongst other 
cases, working on a cold case investigation from the 1980s.  She showed me the paperwork 
from this investigation.  Although I had spoken to former detectives by this point, this was 
the first time I had seen any exhibits from the past – it was my first real glimpse of past 
investigations.  The sheer volume of paperwork would have been difficult to imagine without 
seeing it firsthand.  There was a tall filing cabinet that was full of index cards, which in the 
absence of computers in the early 1980s was the only way of storing information.  There was 
also a cupboard full of folders that contained statements and other paperwork pertaining to 
the investigation.  That this visit allowed me to view both the past and the present, provided 
additional insight that I had not originally anticipated.  I promptly arranged to interview the 
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female detective and secured access to these case files, as well as those of two other cases, 
which ultimately formed the document analysis stage of the data collection process that was 
discussed above. 
 
I also attended a briefing of a homicide case that was being investigated by the team and the 
DCI gave me an overview of the key details.  Before the briefing commenced I was able to sit 
in and observe what might be described as a pre-briefing, whereby the individuals that were 
the leads for the various strands of the investigation updated the SIO and the deputy SIO as to 
where the investigation stood.  The interviews to this point had revealed that it can be 
difficult for SIOs today to keep on top of the minutiae of investigations today, particularly 
those featuring complex technological evidence as this case did.  Five other individuals as 
well as myself attended this meeting.  As they were discussing an ongoing investigation I felt 
somewhat inhibited about taking notes, as I did not want the detectives to be concerned that I 
was noting down specific detail about the case.  However, I had a few minutes to myself after 
this meeting and before attending the full briefing to note down my observations.  As this was 
immediately after the meeting, I felt that I was able to retain the necessary detail.  
 
I was particularly interested to attend the briefing having been told about them during 
interviews and since there seemed to be significant differences to how they were conducted in 
the past when compared to today.  The former detectives described the briefing as being very 
much directed by the SIO whereas the serving detectives described them as being more of a 
two way process.  The briefing was held in a large meeting room and there was a computer 
and projector at the front.  More than 20 individuals, including civilian investigators who 
were involved in the case, attended.  I sat at the front of the room.  At this stage a man with a 
TV camera entered the room.  The DCI explained to me that they were filming the team for a 
documentary.  This presented me with an ethical dilemma, discussed later in this chapter. 
 
The briefing was structured in two parts.  The first appeared to take the form of a ‘usual’ 
briefing and the SIO started by providing an overview of the case and the investigation before 
inviting other members of the team to provide updates.  The second part of the briefing 
focused upon the complex mobile phone evidence that the team were dealing with.  Although 
aspects of this were a little difficult to follow as I only had quite minimal knowledge of this 
case, it certainly provided me with useful information.  In particular, there were discussions 
around the difficulties being experienced by the team in accessing and retrieving data from 
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some of the newer mobile phones.  This became an important line of questioning during later 
interviews.  Whilst in the meeting prior to the briefing I had felt that I did not want take 
notes, I felt that this would be acceptable in this environment where others were also taking 
notes and the setting was not so intimate.    
 
In summary, the observations enabled me to see in action things that I had been told or had 
read when viewing case files.  My view on the necessity of the observations is encapsulated 
by Yin (2016, p150): “Observing” can be an invaluable way of collecting data because what 
you see with your own eyes and perceive with your own senses is not filtered by what others 
have reported to you or what the author of some document might have seen”. 
 
The observations provided the context necessary to appreciate what the interviewees were 
telling me during the interviews.  It would have been difficult to fully understand the 
challenges faced by detectives investigating homicide today had I not experienced first-hand 
at least some of what this work entailed.   
Analysing the Data 
 
Due to the data collection methods with which it is often associated, qualitative research 
generates a significant amount of data (Bryman, 2008).  This research was no exception and 
the interview data alone provided me with masses of information to analyse.  To give a sense 
of volume, the transcript of one of the shorter interviews ran to 18 pages and 10, 291 words.  
Making sense of the data in this research was a daunting, albeit exciting prospect.   
One of the first difficulties I faced was staying up-to-date with the transcribing of the 
interviews.  Providing tips for interviewers, Parker (1990, p238) emphasises the importance 
of transcribing each interview, noting with particularly apt phrasing that this can be a rather 
long and tedious process: “transcribe every word and pause and um and ah and er of it.  It’s 
murder”.  However, the interviews were often held in quick succession and I soon fell behind 
with this important stage.  Given the importance of each interview informing the next, I 
therefore listened back to each interview and made detailed notes.  This allowed me to begin 
identifying themes at an early stage and it informed the questions asked during subsequent 
interviews14.  All interviews were eventually transcribed verbatim.  To further quicken the 
                                                          
14 I did not repeatedly revise the interview schedule; I made a separate note of other questions and 
prompts. 
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process I purchased software that enabled me to simultaneously listen to the interview and 
repeat it aloud into a headset.  The software would then ‘type’ the interview.  This made the 
transcribing twice as fast and proved to be a worthwhile investment.   
Once I had completed all interviews and made detailed notes of them, I went back through 
the notes and produced initial codes.  After doing so I compiled mind-maps to help me to 
identify links.  I then wrote summaries of what each theme represented and what the data 
seemed to be saying.  This is akin to the process of memo writing.  Memos are “helpful to 
researchers in helping them to crystallise their ideas and not to lose track of their thinking 
about various topics” (Bryman 2008, p547).  These processes were repeated once the 
interviews had been transcribed.  However, before returning to the use of mind-maps and 
memos, the transcripts were read through closely, during which I highlighted key quotes, 
themes and any phrases that were repeated.   
That I had started to analyse the data from an early stage and ensured that it was a continual 
process proved helpful when it came to the analysis of the case files and observation data, 
which took place during the latter stages of the research.  When I examined the case files I 
kept the themes that had already been identified in mind and made notes accordingly.  
Similarly, I was able to pick up on information during the observations that reflected the 
analysis that had already been conducted.  However, that is not to say that I was narrow 
minded and identified only information that supported the analysis that had been completed.  
As the data collection process continued, themes and ideas that had not previously been 
identified came to light.  For example, that the police are lagging behind technological 
developments became apparent during the observations, eventually becoming an important 
finding. 
I also kept a research diary throughout the fieldwork.  After each interview, observation or 
review of case files, I would write up my thoughts and feelings about my experiences.  I 
would also make a note of any emerging themes.  Keeping this diary proved a valuable step.  
I would later return to it and read through it.  Its content proved helpful when writing this 
methods chapter and when it came to the analysis of the data.   
It might be said that the numerous stages of data analysis that I took could have been avoided 
for perhaps a less repetitive approach aided by data analysis software, such as NVivo.  
However, I felt that the approach that I took ensured that I was fully immersed in the data and 
proved helpful in managing the substantial amount of information that I was faced with.  It 
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also meant that bit-by-bit, as the data collection progressed, a detailed picture was forming in 
my mind of what the key issues were.    
Ethical Issues:  The Unpredictable Nature of Research 
 
Ethical issues required careful consideration and this is the case particularly when researching 
sensitive subjects such as this.  The University of South Wales Ethics Committee and the 
faculty Ethics Champion approved the research.  Diener and Crandall (1978) suggest that 
there are four key ethical considerations that researchers must take into account; harm to 
participants, informed consent, invasion of privacy and deception.  These reflect those 
outlined in the ethical guidelines of the British Society of Criminology.  Some ethical issues 
have already been discussed in this chapter.  Here I reflect upon the steps that I took to avoid 
hindering the work of the police service, what I would have done had any participants 
disclosed illegal practices and an ethical dilemma that I was confronted with.  Lastly, I 
consider researcher welfare. 
 
It was essential to ensure that the research was conducted in a way that did not hinder the 
work that was being carried out by the police services involved. This was an important 
consideration for this work due to the sensitivity of homicide investigation and the fact that 
current cases were sometimes referred to during the interviews.  The British Society of 
Criminology (2016, no pagination) urges researchers to “be sympathetic to the constraints on 
organisations participating in research and not inhibit their functioning by imposing any 
unnecessary burdens on them”.  Therefore, as noted earlier, I had to abide by the request of 
the police service that gave me access to the case files to only work on them within their 
offices. Additionally, when the three participants asked to review and edit the interview 
transcripts this was permitted to ensure accordance with the British Society of Criminology’s 
code of ethics.  Similarly, it was vital that any information I held, whether interview 
recordings, transcriptions of interviews or data from homicide files, were stored safely. I 
made sure that I avoided carrying around notes in my bag and would file them away as soon 
as I returned from interviewing. The interview recordings were uploaded to an encrypted 
laptop and the recording deleted from the Dictaphone straightaway.  All interview transcripts 




To protect the identity of the individuals who were interviewed the police services where they 
were or had been employed and cases, anonymity was assured for all who were involved. 
Pseudonyms were assigned to those interviewed.  They were each assigned a number, which 
was prefixed with either FD or SD to show whether they were a former or serving detective.  
Police Services were not named.  Although confidentiality was afforded to all Police Services 
and participants, I had to consider what steps I would take if they disclosed any illegal 
practices.  Given the seriousness of the offence I took the decision that should illegal 
practices be revealed to me this would be something that I would raise with my supervisors to 
consider an appropriate way forward.  Doing so would have allowed me to discuss what I had 
been told with two other individuals with knowledge of criminal investigations, because as 
Rowe (2007) suggests it might not be easy to identify what is considered illegal.  This is a 
difficulty that is compounded by my research spanning the last four decades and a time of 
much change in respect of the regulation of detective work.  Although this approach may 
have jeopardised future access to detectives and Police Services, the potential repercussions 
of not disclosing illegal practices in the investigation of homicide far outweighed this.   
An Ethical Dilemma 
 
Researchers may sometimes be faced with unpredictable situations for which they are unable 
to plan, particularly with observations. For example, as indicated earlier, I attended a briefing 
at the start of which a man walked in with a film camera.  The SIO explained that the major 
crime team was the subject of a television documentary and that over the coming months 
journalists would be following investigations and filming the team’s work.  The SIO then 
continued to introduce me to the room, briefly explained my research and proceeded with the 
briefing.  Afterwards, I spoke with my supervisors about the possible repercussions of my 
being seen in a documentary (that was revealing the identity of this particular force) given my 
undertaking to conceal all forces participating in the research.  We agreed that it would not be 
appropriate for me to be visible in this footage, so I contacted the SIO and stressed that in 
order to maintain the anonymity of the police services and individuals involved in my work 
and to generally protect the integrity of my research, I would need to be ‘blurred out’ of the 






The ethical consideration of harm to the researcher is worth noting here. During the 
observations that I conducted, I viewed crime scene photos and read case files and other 
documents which detail murder cases.  In the main I did not struggle with viewing such 
material, however, I viewed what was referred to as a ‘body graphic’, which was the drawn 
outline of a female victim with multiple knives illustrated showing where the many stab 
wounds had been inflicted.  Interestingly, I found this to be more jarring than seeing 
photographs of homicide victims15.  Thus, this issue is a real consideration for researchers in 
this field because it cannot be known how they will react until they are in those situations.  
Ultimately, I felt that seeing these images was important because it reminded me of the 
reality of what murder is.  This can be all too easy to forget when immersed in a piece of 
work, so it was quite sobering.  Furthermore, as a researcher, I would have found it difficult 
to develop the understanding and gain the insight that was necessary to complete this work if 




As noted in the introduction, homicide investigation has been subject to little academic 
scrutiny.  Much of the research that has been conducted is often quantitative in its approach 
and generally originates from the US (Brookman, 2015). Brookman (2015, p236) explains 
that homicide investigation is considered to be something of a “closed world”, which can 
create difficulties around access and so this presents the qualitative researcher with particular 
challenges.  Therefore, the approach of the present study provides a methodological 
contribution to a field that has been under-researched and dominated by quantitative methods.  
Moreover, the access that I had to the Yorkshire Ripper case files undoubtedly enriched the 
extensive qualitative data that were obtained through the use of in-depth interviews, analysis 
of case files and observations.    
The following four chapters present the findings that were uncovered through the use of these 
methods. 
 
                                                          
15 Ironically, a detective I spoke to at a later date explained that ‘body graphics’ are used in trials to 
avoid, where possible, showing the jury images of a victim’s injuries. 
 96 
Part Two  
The Research Findings 
 
In the four chapters that comprise part two, the research findings are presented.  I began my 
exploration by asking the detectives at the beginning of each interview to identify what they 
considered to be the most significant change that occurred in respect of homicide 
investigation during their career.  However, they often cited more than one.  This 
demonstrated that these investigations have been subject to widespread change over the past 
four decades, and so it was simply not possible for the detectives to choose just one important 
development.    
Table One depicts the responses that I received to this question.  The first column represents 
the four categories of change into which each cited change was categorised.  Column two 
presents the number of interviewees that mentioned a particular change as their first 
instinctive response when that initial question was asked.  The third column represents the 
number of interviewees that cited this change in total; this is designed to illustrate that the 
interviewees often mentioned multiple changes.  Importantly, this column also shows that 
changes in respect of science and technology were most commonly mentioned, establishing 
the significance that they attached to these developments.   
Table One: Detectives’ Perspectives of Key Changes during their Career 
Change Total number of 
interviewees citing 
as the main 
change16 
Total number of 
interviewees citing 








Investigative Practice 4 8 
Detective Status and 
Culture 
4 6 
In the chapters that follow, the data in respect of each of these areas of change are explored.  
The explanations for these changes are discussed, as are the many ways in which they were 
                                                          
16 This column denotes the total number of interviewees that cited this change as their first instinctive 
response to the question. The total here equals 27, the number of detectives that were interviewed. 
17 This column denotes the total number of interviewees that cited this change at any time during the 
interview.  This number is inclusive of those that cited it as their first choice. 
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reported to have influenced homicide investigation in England and Wales.  I begin by 
considering the data regarding changes to investigative practice, for example, those changes 





















Chapter Five  
‘It can be easy now to forget that you’ve got to find the actual murderer’: 
The Day-to-Day Running of Homicide Investigations  
 
At a talk I attended during fieldwork, a serving Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) likened the 
investigation of homicide to throwing a 1,000-piece jigsaw up in the air, before having to 
assemble all the pieces.  This chapter aims to look at some of those pieces to explore how the 
day-to-day running of homicide investigations has changed.  
Firstly, we consider the changes to the way in which teams are brought together to investigate 
homicide, followed by the growing employment of police staff.  The use of the police 
interview will then be explored, with particular focus on the move from obtaining confessions 
to structured models of interviewing.  Next the findings regarding budget and homicide 
investigations are presented.  The chapter will then contemplate the increasingly complex 
nature of investigations and how the SIO is more reliant upon their team and outside experts.  
Finally, the importance that is now placed upon learning from past and present investigations 
to improve practices will be discussed.   
A Well-Oiled Machine? 
 
The data reveal that one of the prominent developments is the way in which homicide 
investigation teams are brought together.  This was a significant change because it had 
remained stagnant for a considerable period of time, with a detective from Scotland Yard 
assisting other police forces.  However, Innes (2003) explains that this model was reliant on 
the individual lead investigator and was vulnerable to issues such as tunnel vision.  The case 
of the Yorkshire Ripper and the resultant inquiry was instrumental in changing the way in 
which investigations were run.  A former detective who joined the police service in 1972, FD 
1 explained that the approach to bringing teams together to investigate a murder was, in the 
past, rather ad hoc: 
“There was no bespoke investigation squad, it was all a question of who is on duty at 
the time who can come across to work on it” (FD 1) 
The picture today is very different, but it should first be noted that there existed differences in 
how the police forces represented in this research brought together investigation teams.  For 
example, one had a team solely dedicated to major crime investigation, whereas another 
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metropolitan force had several groups tasked with investigating major incidents, including 
murder, to cover the large area.  Despite differences between them the majority of police 
services in England and Wales will retain a core major incident team responsible for 
investigating homicide.  SD 8 explained that such a team is permanently established in his 
police force: 
“You’ve got the team that takes the main responsibility for running the investigation, 
which is your Major Crime Investigation Team, so you’ve got your incident room staff 
set-up and they include SIOs, HOLMES staff, they’re all based in the major crime 
department. Then you’ve got your outside enquiry team and they come from the BCUs 
across the force” (SD 8)  
Several interviewees described homicide teams today as being like a “well-oiled machine” 
and believed that the system on the whole works well.  In particular they often commented on 
the speed with which the major incident room could be established: 
“If a murder happens at 3 o’clock today, by 4 o’clock it’d be up and running, the 
roles would be allocated, the HOLMES would be set up, the SIO would be appointed” 
(SD 8) 
Similarly, SD 16, whose police service has had an established team to investigate homicide 
since the mid-2000s, explained that it has ensured that those involved have a sound 
understanding of the HOLMES system, know how to maximise evidence and what 
“snippets” of information may be “golden”.   
However, one of the main problems in running homicide investigations today is the need to 
draft in investigators to work as part of the Outside Enquiry Team.  For those teams that 
retain only a core major incident team, there remains the need to draw on assistance from 
officers on the Basic Command Units (BCU).  SD 8 explained how having to negotiate for 
staff with the BCU can take time as they too are under pressure with limited resources, 
making it difficult for them to release officers for what might be an extended period of time: 
“The delay is always getting the teams from across the force to come in and actually 
do the work outside and there’s always a rub because BCU management have targets 
they have to hit, they have an awful lot of pressure because of a lack of resources, so 
there’s always a difficult discussion … but when you have a large scale investigation, 
an incident breaks, then it’s critical that the force gets it right” (SD 8) 
The following comment demonstrates how this will play out: 
“I’m a Detective Super within the specialist crime department and I come to [names 
place] to pick up a murder that’s happening in [names place] and the Super in 
[names place] doesn’t want to lose his or her resources and I’ll say “I need eight” 
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and they’ll say “Can you go with six?” and I’ll say “no, I can’t I’m asking for eight 
because…” it’s difficult.  It’s always agreed in the end but there’s an equal amount of 
pressure on the SIO to release resources back to their day job” (SD 8)  
Whilst the Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures (2005) states that 
BCU commanders must release to the SIO the required resources, this is in reality often a 
case of negotiation, followed by the additional pressure of having to release officers back as 
soon as possible.  SD 25 gave an example of a homicide on which he had recently worked, 
where negotiating for officers to work on the investigation proved challenging.  He attributed 
this to reductions in budget: 
“My baby homicide took me two days fighting tooth and nail to get a DS and four.  I 
know of a murder this weekend where all they’ve got from division is a DS and 
two…you’re on the phone two days fighting for them.  It’s horrendous and that will 
have a knock on somewhere that will ultimately mean a mistake is made because with 
less you get less, all these buzz words, do more with less, great, but with less you get 
less” (SD 25) 
SD 25 also commented that this would not have occurred when he first joined the police 
service in 1995, and recounted a time earlier in his career when he was called to work on a 
murder investigation, but attended the briefing late because he was dealing with another case: 
“I walk in and it’s twenty past two and the briefing is underway, and I won’t name the 
DCI that did the briefing because he actually is a nice fella, but I had a seismic 
bollocking off him afterwards.  He said “don’t you ever, ever walk into one of my 
briefings like that, I phoned up at ten o’clock and said I wanted four and gave four 
hours’ notice and I said the briefing’s starting at two and you walk in at twenty past 
and I won’t be repeating the briefing to you, speak to one of your colleagues” and I 
thought I’m not even going to waste my breath telling him how hard I tried to get in 
because it’d result in a huge bollocking. That was then and now I’m having two-week 
battles to get staff here” (SD 25) 
These difficulties will arguably be heightened when we consider that because of financial 
pressures, this police service will be cutting back to a very core team and the need to draft in 
officers will again be required: 
“Interestingly with all the financial pressures we have got at the moment, we are 
heading back towards pre - 2007 where we will have a very core support and we’ll 
have to draft officers in from elsewhere” (SD 16) 
This is also being experienced in larger city police force areas.  SD 26 explained that because 
of austerity they had lost eight DSs and sixteen DCs in the last year.  Whilst he did not feel 
that this had a significant impact upon investigations generally, he explained that it leaves no 
contingency if others are sick.  SD 26 also described how despite having a dedicated Major 
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Investigation Team for “big jobs” they would sometimes need to draft officers from 
divisions.  He supported the view that this could be difficult and attributed it to austerity.  
Additionally FD 2 suggested that dedicated teams are being reduced due to other crimes 
requiring attention, as well as the fluctuating homicide rate and money: 
“It’s difficult; a lot of it is driven by money. The problem is when I was Head of 
Major Crime we were averaging anything between 15 and 25 murders a year, it’s 
gone down now and I was only speaking to them last week, and they’re averaging less 
than 10 sometimes so to have a designated team of standby it’s just you can’t afford 
it. So the team is now being shrunk.  It’s obviously demand driven, money driven. Lots 
of other things are going on in the world. I mean homicide is important but if you look 
at what else is going on, all the cybercrime, fraud is massive and online sex abuse and 
public protection is massive, vulnerable adults and sexual assaults of children is 
enormous. So can you really afford to have dedicated staff just for murders, well ok 
they are important, but the murder rate is dropping anyway?” (FD 2) 
The establishment of major crime teams that contain a core staff with officers drafted from 
BCUs to work on the Outside Enquiry Teams has been advantageous in several respects and 
an improvement on the ad hoc nature of establishing teams in the past.  We have seen, 
however, that negotiating for officers to assist with these investigations is difficult.  Teams 
are also being reduced in size, which was attributed to several factors.  When we consider the 
benefits of these teams their reduction in size arguably gives cause for concern and raises 
questions around the impact that this might have on the running of homicide investigation in 
the future.   
There was some disparity in how homicide teams are put together and one police service 
represented within this research had established a Major Crime Investigation Team (MCIT) 
that had sole responsibility for running these investigations, including homicides.  They did 
not have to draft officers in from outside that team.  SD 13, who was from this police service, 
explained how drafting in officers had been problematic.  He explained that because of the 
challenges faced by those departments, the officers that would be sent to assist with a 
homicide investigation would sometimes be those who were simply available, rather than 
those with the necessary skills:   
“It wasn’t always the best staff that were sent on the murder enquiry” (SD 13). 
SD 13 explained that when a major incident occurs teams are up and running in 30 minutes as 
opposed to three days.  Although the establishment of the MCIT means that SD 13 is no 
longer required to negotiate to secure officers to work on investigations, he explained that 
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other considerations would still need to be made when deciding which individuals working 
within the MCIT would be chosen to work on a case, such as leave or court commitments.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that to be able to establish a team quickly and without the need to 
negotiate with others or the pressure to release officers back quickly is an improvement to the 
situation being faced by other police services.  However, it was also said that this model 
limits the opportunities for others to gain experience of major crime investigations: 
“I think the other problem is with the loss of experience is with the way that major 
crime teams are set-up, so now that we don’t draw from districts we haven’t got 
people getting major crime experience out on districts anymore, so unless they get 
posted here as a proper posting, they’re not picking up that experience, so I think that 
is potentially a problem” (SD 13)  
It has been demonstrated in this section that the ad-hoc approach to drawing investigative 
teams together has been replaced by a system that sees major incident rooms established in 
less than an hour.  However, it is also evident that differences remain across the police 
service with some witnessing the establishment of dedicated teams and others continuing to 
face the significant challenge of drafting officers in.  
A Question of Experience: Civilian Investigators 
 
The interviewees told of an increase in the number of civilian staff employed to work on 
major crime investigations.  As an example, one serving detective noted that only 23% of the 
staff that made up the MCIT in this force were detectives and the rest of the team were 
civilian staff.  When asked why there has been a move towards the use of civilian staff in the 
investigation of homicide, many remarked that it is a change aimed at saving money:   
“In our force we’ve had to lose £40 million in four years and we’ll have to lose I think 
£40 million in the next 4 years, and staff costs are the greatest costs, so police officer 
numbers have reduced dramatically” (SD 22) 
The civilians employed to work within major crime investigation come from a variety of 
backgrounds, with different experiences and skill sets, and are cheaper to employ.  SD 22 
described the civilian staff within their MCIT as a “complete and utter mixed bag”.  SD 13 
who worked for the same police service reiterated this: 
“Some were ex-police officers, but not all, some had come straight in from university, 
some from other investigative type roles, like insurance investigators, it’s pretty much 
50/50 in terms of investigators that we would put on outside action teams, we’ve 
probably got 28 DCs and a similar number of what we call Major Crime Investigation 
Officers” (SD 13) 
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In considering the implications of civilians working on homicide investigation, one 
interviewee was critical of their use in running HOLMES.  FD 12 was a retired detective now 
working as a HOLMES document reader/receiver.  He suggested that there might be 
problems in the future when the retired detectives, who often return to the police service as 
civilian staff, have gone and it is only those without a police investigative background 
working on HOLMES.  FD 12 felt strongly that experience of detective work is an important 
part of being able to efficiently run the system: 
“There is no investigative background…I think to do those roles, they’re not an 
administrative role, they are first and foremost investigators as part of the 
investigation team and the danger is that they will be purely civilianised” (FD 12)  
SD 13 also spoke of the difficulties that can be associated with civilians working within 
Major Incident Rooms (MIR) such as occasions whereby alibis were not followed up.  
However, SD 13 also remarked that there are enough experienced individuals working within 
that team, including former police officers, that any problems should be swiftly identified.  
SD 22, who works for the same police service as SD 13, where civilians make up a 
significant percentage of their team, gave another example of such issues: 
“To me that’s where we’ve lost that basic policing investigative skill and a lot of our 
police staff do, for example, roles like the Exhibits Officer, which a lot of people 
presume is a case of just cataloguing the exhibits, but it’s not, you need to interpret 
them. And a great example, the murder on Christmas Day, we didn’t know when he 
had died and in the exhibits there was a receipt for a burger bar from the 16th 
December so 10 days earlier or something, and they didn’t even consider it, they just 
logged it, probably put a photocopy into the MIR for somebody else to review later. 
Now, as it transpires the victim was actually murdered on the 17th so suddenly that 
became very significant but, by the time we realised that, the CCTV from the burger 
bar had gone, so my question was “well why didn’t you, when you looked at that 
consider…because not even around the murderer, but a potential witness, getting the 
CCTV so we could at least have a line of enquiry from the witness?” “Oh I don’t 
know”.  So you have to try and instil investigative detective skills in somebody who 
hasn’t had that basic upbringing from shoplifters to car thefts to burglars to assaults 
to kidnap or whatever other crimes” (SD 22) 
Those who seemed most critical of the use of civilians in homicide investigations were often 
former officers themselves, some of whom were now working as police staff.  They placed 
much importance on investigative experience and were concerned those without such 
experience working on investigations.  
Conversely, one serving detective argued that whether or not an individual held a warrant 
card made no difference to their abilities, as it was what they could bring to the investigation 
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that was more important.  They argued that no one is born a detective and that everyone has 
to learn and gain experience in this line of work, which can be achieved by civilians.  When 
asked how someone learns to be a detective, they responded that it was down to training and 
experience, notably exposure to cases: 
“It matters not whether you are a cop or a civilian, it’s the training and how you get 
there that’s important” (SD 15) 
Furthermore, one serving detective argued that there are important traits required of 
investigators that might be possessed by any individual.  Indeed, when others were asked 
what skills were required to be an effective detective, the traits mostly cited were being 
resilient or dogged.   
This section has illustrated that participants described some concerns around the increasing 
employment of civilian staff in the investigation of homicide.  Notably, none of the 
interviewees reported the presence of civilians in investigations that they worked on in the 
1970s, 1980s or 1990s and there was no reference to them in the homicide case files that were 
reviewed.  When speaking informally to one detective between interviews about the future of 
homicide investigation, they suggested that it would see increased numbers of civilian staff.  
If the concerns of those interviewed are correct, the mounting employment of civilian staff 
raises questions for the future efficiency of homicide investigations.  These issues become 
increasingly important when we consider that exposure to investigations as part of training is 
becoming increasingly difficult, a topic to which I return in Chapter Eight. 
From Securing Confessions to Models of Interviewing 
 
Although the interview will be touched upon elsewhere, for example, during discussions 
around the introduction of the PACE in Chapter Six, this section will consider the way in 
which the police interview has changed, with particular focus upon the move away from 
securing confessions.  
Many former detectives told of how before the introduction of PACE, suspect interviews 
were unstructured, not subject to any real scrutiny and that the focus was very much upon 
obtaining a confession, something that the literature also reveals: 
 “In the old days you’d always go for a confession if you could” (FD 10) 
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SD 15 acknowledged that this would be the approach of his predecessors and highlighted that 
it sometimes saw the poor treatment of suspects as they tried to secure that all important 
confession: 
“I would say that the interview of a suspect has moved away from the goal of securing 
a confession, which is what it always was when they oppressed and they poorly 
treated in order to gain a confession that was the goal of an interview years ago” (SD 
15) 
As well as the goal being to secure a confession, prior to the establishment of PACE 
interviews were not recorded.  One interviewee described how reliance was placed on taking 
notes: 
“When I first started it was contemporaneous recording, you’d go in, you would 
interview them and write down afterwards what was said” (FD 4) 
The comments of FD 12 further illustrate the contrast between the way in which interviews 
were conducted historically and the way that they are used today, indicating that today’s 
approach is more structured: 
“If you arrest someone it’s not a question anymore of “I’ve dealt with him in the past, 
I’ll give him four or five fags and I’ll get him to…” They’ve got to be a lot smarter 
now and say “right, for everyone that comes in we’ll do an interview strategy, we’ll 
know the areas of questioning we want to go into, we’ll know when to introduce 
certain witnesses”” (FD 12) 
As was discussed above and in Chapter Two, PACE saw the introduction of the recorded 
interview, which removed what were inevitable arguments around what was or was not said: 
“So you are going from “well I did say, I didn’t say, yes you did” to “let’s play the 
tape, here is the audio, here is the video, here’s what happened in the interview 
room” so that’s changed out of all recognition” (FD 4) 
However, it took sometime before a formal approach to interviewing was established.  As 
outlined in Chapter Two, it was in 1992 that seven principles of interviewing were developed, 
which coincided with a training programme on investigative interviewing (Gudjonsson, 
2007).  It is also noteworthy that the early 1990s saw a shift in the terminology around 
interviewing with the phrase ‘interrogation’ replaced with ‘investigative interviewing’ 
(Brookman and Wakefield, 2009).  SD 15 summarised the way in which interviews are now 
conducted: 
“I think we’re probably now far more professional in the way that our interviewers 
are trained; we have different categories of interviewing as somebody progresses in 
their experience and skill in interviewing.  The tier two, tier three, tier five interview 
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advisor levels. So it’s probably a much more professionalised and scientific approach 
to the way in which we interview now as to years ago when you just said a hundred 
times to somebody “you did it didn’t you? You did it didn’t you?” until they said they 
did it” (SD 15) 
Those that discussed the interview agreed that its professionalisation and structured approach 
has improved the way in which the interview is conducted: 
“I think the professionalisation of it is a good thing overall and I think that the 
benefits of having a model far outweigh the place we were in before where what made 
a good interviewer had a bit of mystique around it, so I think that’s a good thing” (SD 
15) 
On the other hand SD 13 suggested that one weakness of a structured approach to 
interviewing was that some officers could be fearful of going outside of the model: 
“I think the training ought to be geared towards that kind of understanding that the 
model is just a tool and doesn’t need to be followed in such a slavish way, but the 
interviewer needs to have a clear understanding about what they are trying to achieve 
from the interview” (SD 13) 
SD 13 suggested that it was both a lack of experience and a fear of getting it wrong that can 
leave individuals reluctant to step outside the model.  This interviewee talks of a fear of 
getting it wrong, a theme that was to remerge when other legislation and regulation was 
discussed: 
“We have models of interview to follow and I think with less experienced staff they’re 
more reluctant to move away from the model and if all you’re doing is being a slave 
to the model you’ll miss some obvious things that are coming up in that interview 
because you’re focused on applying the model and you don’t feel confident enough to 
go outside and just allow the interview to go where the interviewee is taking it…it’s a 
fear of getting it wrong and just a lack of understanding really of what the model is 
actually there for. The model is there to just give you a very basic structure and 
hopefully make sure you don’t miss anything. But, really and truly, interviewers have 
to be skilled enough to listen to what they’re being told and react to that at that time” 
(SD 13) 
A QC proffered a similar viewpoint.  He felt that interviewers were nervous of stepping away 
from the interview plan and explained that this was a response to past criticism of police 
interviewing.  This participant went on to describe that because of interview models, the 
interview has become overly long and complicated by “getting bogged down in the detail” 
and that by the time the transcripts are prepared for court and “cut down to what is digestible, 
those subtle points are lost”.  The advantages of changes to interviewing, however, were 
acknowledged and the QC described how whereas in the 1990s much of his defence work 
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centred upon trying to get interviews excluded because of the way in which they were 
conducted, this is no longer an issue.          
The way in which the interview is conducted has changed significantly.  It has moved from 
an un-taped, unstructured approach with the central aim being to achieve a confession, to a 
far more structured process, a change that is reflected in the shift in terminology from 
‘interrogation’ to ‘investigative interviewing’.  It has, however, been established that there 
are some concerns about the tendency of some individuals to rigidly follow the interview 
model.  This is seemingly the case despite the introduction of tier-three specialist interviewers 
for major crime enquiries, which were discussed in Chapter Two.  
‘Getting it wrong is so much more costly’: Budget and Homicide Investigation 
 
The police service has faced significant funding cuts (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary, 2014).  The impact on homicide investigations was a line of questioning 
pursued in this research.  The view was that this was an area that had also seen significant 
change:  
“Murder investigations were without budget basically, they just came in and did what 
they had to do, lots of detectives paid a lot of money, there wasn't much constraint on 
what they did” (FD 5) 
However, today budget is subject to more scrutiny than the above quote suggests was the case 
during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s: 
“There’s huge scrutiny on the budget, certainly with our last Chief Constable, for 
every murder enquiry, he would visit the MIR and speak to the SIO within about two 
or three days of the job breaking and that would be on the top of his list, about the 
budget” (SD 13) 
Although SD 13 described there being scrutiny of the budget, he also explained that the level 
of scrutiny would often depend on the stage the investigation had reached.  For example, he 
explained that if they did not have anyone in custody then the Chief Constable would ask 
questions about the lines of enquiry being pursued and whether the investigation was being 
progressed in such a way that it would lead to suspects being identified.  However, budget 
would be the main concern if someone were in custody. 
Clearly, advances in science and technology have increased the importance of decisions 
around budget, as will be discussed in Chapter Eight.  Sending exhibits for testing is costly 
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and, in a further reflection of the attention that is given to budget management, SD 15 
explained how such decisions would require authorisation: 
“It wouldn’t be a prudent use of public money, whether we had lots of money or not, 
we try and be efficient is the bottom line. I know we have got a forensic budgets 
manager in headquarters so we come up with our forensic submission and it goes 
through to headquarters and is authorised or not and I suppose if towards the end of 
the financial year money is getting tight he may start bouncing some requests and 
probably because it’s homicide we may get yes where other people may get no.  There 
is a lot of focus on achieving the best we can with the least amount of public money 
being spent” (SD 15) 
The remarks of SD 15 indicate that whilst budget is undoubtedly an important consideration 
for homicide investigators today, the nature of the offence is such that it is unlikely that 
requests to test exhibits would be refused.  However, there is a balance to be achieved in 
providing a gold star service whilst remaining mindful of cost: 
“As an SIO we’ve still got to be accountable and when you talk about finances that’s 
staffing as well. You’ve got to remember that we’ve got to do more for less, there’s 
been massive financial cuts, so when I’m asking for staff from divisions now they 
haven’t got much give, of course you’ve got forensic costs, we scrutinise and we say 
“what do we need, what do we need to achieve”, that’s the question I ask: “why are 
we doing it?” Perhaps in the past and still now to some extent, some people still do 
everything.  It costs an absolute fortune, thousands, just to get a basic something 
done” (SD 21) 
SD 20 suggested that the seriousness of homicide remains such that investigations are not 
suffering despite budgetary concerns: 
“I’ve been lucky enough to know that when we’ve had a murder and we dealt with a 
really nasty murder last year of [names victim] who was killed by [names offender], I 
can honestly say this force did absolutely everything it could in that case and I 
couldn’t quibble or question anything despite the financial pressures that are around.  
When [names victim of homicide that occurred in another force area] was murdered, 
I’m sure that the SIOs of that case would probably say a very similar thing, because 
when those big high profile ones take place I think that police forces generally get it 
right and senior police officers generally say “what is it you need? You can have 
what you want.” So I can’t quibble on that” (SD 20) 
Furthermore, FD 9 indicated that the reason that police services will ensure that homicide 
investigations do not suffer as a consequence of budget is the fear of repercussions if 
problems with the running of an investigation are identified, which can reverberate for years 
after the offence occurred: 
“In some senses getting it wrong is so much more costly and we’ve seen that here 
with the [names case] and everything else now and I’m sure that’s one you’ve read a 
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lot about because it’s been one that has dominated the history of [names place] major 
crime investigation for years and years and years” (FD 9) 
Whereas homicide investigations before the 1990s were rarely restricted by budget, today’s 
climate is such that scrutiny of the budget is something that today’s investigators must 
contend with.  This is particularly important given the costs associated with the scientific and 
technological testing of evidence.  However, those interviewed seemed confident that today’s 
homicide investigations would not suffer because of financing and some attributed this to the 
seriousness of the offence and the ramifications of any failings.   
‘I don’t think you can do it all’: The SIO, Their Team and The Role of Experts 
 
One of the clearest findings to emerge was that homicide investigations are more complex 
than in the past.  This is unsurprising when we consider the scientific and technological 
advances that have been made, but the other changes presented in the forthcoming chapters 
have also added to the complexity of investigating homicide today.  FD 2, who now advises 
SIOs, summarised the myriad of matters that must be considered: 
“You can be on a murder it’s quite easy now, to in a high profile murder forget the 
fact that you’ve got to actually find the murderer because you’re dealing with so 
many different aspects. You’re dealing with resourcing, money, media, politics, 
getting your policy book absolutely right because that’s open to scrutiny, every 
decision you make it’s got to be you know, disclosure is massive, so every decision 
you make is going to be scrutinised, your staff, the selection of your staff, who you’ll 
use to do what. If you’re going to send somebody to interview a child witness, they’ve 
got to be sending the right person, if you’re going to interview suspects they’ve got to 
be trained, you should have interview coordinators to coordinate it, you’ve got to 
have family liaison officers. So to try and coordinate all these different things is 
difficult. People just think: “oh you’re just investigating a murder”, but it’s not, it’s 
massive” (FD 2) 
FD 2 went on to describe a case that on the face of it might be considered straightforward.  
Indeed the literature would describe this case as a ‘self-solver’ (Innes, 2003), which is 
considered to be more typical than the ‘whodunnit’.  However, these remarks illustrate that 
there might be no such thing as a straightforward homicide investigation: 
“In my experience, I don’t think that I’ve ever dealt with one that’s easy – ever, even 
though on the face of it they look it” (FD 2)  
With the above comments in mind the next section will consider the necessity for today’s 
SIOs to rely more heavily on their team and outside expertise. 
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It is important to note that this section refers to the increasing possibility that detectives 
investigating homicide will have to rely on others in their team and outside experts, as the 
data suggest that this is not solely a feature of modern-day investigations.  Specifically, not 
only has teamwork always been an important component of investigative work, but the 
analysis of the case files indicates that outside expertise was also commonly used in the mid-
1980s.  The homicide case file for a 1980s murder contains the report of a Consultant 
Forensic Psychiatrist providing a profile of the offender.  Although the Forensic Psychiatrist 
themself admits that the work is quite speculative, a 2013 review of the case describes the 
report as providing a “plausible profile of the offender” (1980s Homicide Case File), 
supporting the continued relevance of this expertise to the investigation.  
The data obtained from the 1990s homicide case file also supports the theme of increased use 
of outside expertise.  The victim in this case went missing in the 1990s and their body was 
not discovered until the early 2000s.  An unsolved homicide at the time of writing, the 
investigation that took place during the 2000s mentions drawing on anatomical experts, 
behavioural analysts, clinical psychologists and geographical profiling “to assist SIO 
investigative strategy and hypothesis and ensure national expertise is utilised to help 
progress enquiry” (1990s Homicide Case File). 
SD 8 described the use of an expert as helpful during investigations and stressed the 
importance of being receptive to the advice of others: 
“I see them honestly as gifts, but the challenge is in being open-minded enough to 
think of all the possibilities and to take the advice from people.  That’s massive for me 
because these people can really help you” (SD 8) 
He then provided an example of a time that he drew upon expert assistance, highlighting that 
a key advantage of employing such help is that it can introduce them to new techniques: 
“We used a technique called ‘acid black’, which is an acid that you pour over a floor 
or surface and if there’s been blood there, and if you wash it away protein is always 
left, which I didn’t know, ‘acid black’ will show up the pattern of that protein.  So in 
the [names victim] murder the suspect then had washed the kitchen floor with bleach 
and it was absolutely gleaming in there, so when we pour this ‘acid black’ over it we 
exposed where [names victim] had been dragged across the floor.  I wouldn’t have 
known that if I hadn’t listened to people and given it a try.  I genuinely get excited by 
the prospect of an expert helping me because I’ve got a huge job to do, I can’t do it by 
myself, so I don’t see it as anything but positive” (SD 8) 
Similarly, SD 13 talked about POLKA, the Police Online Knowledge Area, which is an 
online resource that allows police officers to “ask questions, share insights, discuss ideas and 
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suggest new ways of working” (College of Policing, 2015a).  SD 13 explained that this was 
of use to him during one particular investigation whereby establishing whether the victim’s 
cause of death was related to the violent assault they had endured several days before was 
proving complicated.  This is a further example of the important role played by experts 
during investigations: 
“Basically he’s covered in injuries which are clearly consistent with being assaulted, 
one of ears was partially cut off so he’s obviously got loads and loads of assault type 
injuries, then the cause of death was actually renal failure brought on by dehydration. 
None of the injuries that he suffered would have actually caused his death. So we’re 
in the situation where he has been very seriously assaulted, but we can’t charge 
murder at the moment because we can’t make that link.  The pathologist 
recommended that we get a psychiatric opinion, so that’s where it then came in handy 
to go right around the country because what we found was there was a job in [names 
location] where a ship had come in, sailor had gone ashore, he got beaten up by a 
gang, he got back to his ship and then he died. There was no connection between the 
assault injuries and his death, but this particular psychiatrist came up with an 
opinion that basically he’d been frightened to death.  So we’ve instructed the same 
psychiatrist to look at all of our circumstances. I’ve already had a meeting with 
prosecuting counsel and CPS and if the psychiatrist does make that link then we will 
change the indictment to murder” (SD 13) 
SD 15 also spoke of the importance of being able to draw on the help of experts.  SD 15 
explained that the National Crime Agency (NCA) could assist in putting them in touch with 
advisors and other SIOs: 
“If you need an ‘ologist’ in whatever, the most bizarre subject you can think of 
because it’s relevant to your case, you’d go to the NCA and they’d research their 
databases to see if there’s an SIO around the country who’s come across the same 
issue and out you in touch with them.  There’s a lot of resources available for 
consulting with other SIOs and learning from other people’s experiences” (SD 15) 
The interviewees explained that today’s SIOs must rely on others to oversee aspects of the 
investigation and feed it to them illustrating how the wider team, as well as expertise from 
outside, plays an increasingly vital role in the investigations.  The remarks of SD 13 illustrate 
the differences in what the SIO of the past would have to deal with compared to today and 
why they must now rely upon those around them: 
“If you go back say 20 years or so, the SIO wouldn’t have to worry at all about 
CCTV, telephones or telephony, social media or any of that stuff and it would all, I 
say all, it would still be a massive amount of information that the SIO would have to 
concentrate on, what accounts were being given, certainly some forensic evidence the 
SIO would have to be on top of but again that would have been a lot less in its scope 
and complexity. Whereas now, I can’t keep on top of all the minutiae of telephony, I 
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have to be totally reliant on the analysts telling me what they’re finding and what the 
interpretation is” (SD 13)   
SD 13 gave an example that illustrates the volume of CCTV footage that can be gathered 
during an investigation and that consequently it is not possible for them to be involved in the 
viewing of large amounts of material: 
“You need to be reliant on the teams going out to trawl the CCTV to make sure 
they’ve done a thorough job, the SIO can take a walk through an area, but sometimes 
you’ll have multiple areas that you need to trawl for CCTV, then you need to have the 
absolute faith that the methods they’ve used to actually to grab the CCTV off the 
systems has been appropriate and then once it all comes in here the SIO will have to 
set parameters around what’s being viewed. I mean [names case], which was the 
CCTV area that I led on, we’d actually, if you laid it all end to end we had 11 years of 
CCTV material, so you can’t view all of that so you have to come up with parameters 
around what you are and are not going to view and that’s an SIO decision, but once 
people are viewing you have to have faith in them that they are viewing properly and 
that they’re picking up all the details, there’s no way the SIO can go and check that” 
(SD 13) 
SD 21 also explained the importance of putting trust in others, as it is not possible for the SIO 
to do everything.  He highlighted the difficulties with this, explaining that not all actions are 
completed correctly and will sometimes need to be repeated.  Additionally, SD 21 outlined 
the additional day-to-day requirements of their position that will need to be managed 
alongside the homicide investigation itself: 
“I don’t think you can do it all, you’ve got to rely on your team otherwise why have 
them? So you’ve got your Office Manager who oversees the HOLMES and you’ve got 
a HOLMES manager, so the office manager makes sure everything is running 
smoothly in that office, you’ve got a HOLMES manager to make sure the typing and 
everything is being done, forensic manager. I mean you are giving them direction and 
they provide you with a strategy that you will read but to go into the minutiae of each 
one and some SIOs will do, but to me if I went into that minutiae, and you’ve got to 
remember I haven’t just got this job, it’s managing a department, managing sickness, 
compliance you’ve still got to do all those things so it’s not just ‘I’ll do this murder 
and work through it and sit and wait for the next one’ so you need to rely on sergeants 
and DCs to do their bit” (SD 21) 
SD 16 explained that it was important that they make use of advisors for various strands of 
the investigation.  He explained that this was important since if they were to become involved 
in what he referred to as something “evidential”, such as the arrest of the suspect and 
subsequent interviews, this would mean that they would be unable to oversee the other 
strands of the investigation.   
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To summarise, the data presented above indicate that although the use of outside expertise 
was evident in the past, as was revealed by the case files, the interviewees reported an 
increasing need for the SIO to put their trust in other members of the team and take advantage 
of outside expertise such is the complexity of modern-day investigations.  A point reinforced 
by the remark of one detective that it can be easy to forget that they need to catch a murderer.  
It is no longer feasible for one detective to hold and manage all the information.  Linked to 
this, they spoke particularly of how valuable it was to learn from other SIOs.  The notion of 
learning was also discussed in the context of learning from investigations, with the former 
and serving detectives speaking of learning from past homicide investigations that had been 
critiqued and from more recent investigations through reviews and debriefs.  It is to this that I 
now turn. 
Learning from Past and Present Homicide Investigations  
 
A further finding to emerge was that learning has become an important part of investigations, 
which would not have been the mind-set in the past: 
“I think going back to my early days as an SIO there was sometimes this ‘well what 
do they know better than me?’ and there were elements of that amongst certain 
investigators” (FD 9)   
The interviewees felt that the influential cases of the Yorkshire Ripper and the murder of 
Stephen Lawrence identified what was, and was not, working effectively in homicide 
investigations, presenting opportunities to learn from the mistakes that had been made and 
identified in subsequent inquiries.  They also spoke of the importance of learning from each 
investigation that is conducted. 
The interviewees spoke positively of the opportunity to learn from, and improve upon, the 
deficient practices that had been brought to light in the past and this is reflected in the 
literature.  Roycroft (2008, p51) examined the themes that have emerged from 40 years of 
reviews and public inquiries into murder investigations and stresses the importance of 
learning from past inquiries in order to develop and improve practices:    
Past inquiries can help inform present or future investigative strategies by providing 
best practice and highlighting potential pitfalls.  There is a need to retain 
organisational learning from past inquiries to assist future generations of 
investigators. 
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One former detective explained how the Murder Investigation Manual, which was updated 
following the Macpherson Inquiry, alongside learning from past mistakes can help ensure 
that errors are not repeated: 
“The manual was making sure that the stopgap is that things weren’t being forgotten 
and that you are actually applying all the good practice that has been developed over 
the years and all the learning from the likes of Stephen Lawrence and other enquiries 
that had gone wrong and then making sure that we didn’t repeat the mistakes of the 
past” (FD 9) 
It also appeared that whilst such cases brought opportunities to learn and improve practices in 
investigations generally, they also bring the chance to learn how to manage investigations 
that are less typical and not so regularly experienced by investigators:  
“I think it’s still the case that sort of 95% of murders are committed by people close 
to them actually helps you with most murder enquiries, the problem is when you get 
involved in something like a psychopath or somebody that crosses boundaries, then 
you have something like the Ripper Inquiry and the Byford Report and Stephen 
Lawrence, it takes those big events to actually realise, to make you look at “actually, 
we’re not doing things all that well”, it’s ok if things are simple” (FD 6) 
Furthermore, one detective spoke of the Stephen Lawrence case and the reaction to the 
publication of the Macpherson Report, demonstrating the significant impact that it had 
nationally and outside of the Metropolitan Police Service (MET) that investigated the murder: 
“Macpherson was all about the MET the Stephen Lawrence enquiry and the MET 
were branded as ‘institutionally racist’ and I can remember at the time that came out 
it was a massive thing for police forces throughout the country and, as a result, there 
was training that was introduced in relation to dealing with homophobic, racist and 
how you deal with minority ethnic groups, and so there was a big training programme 
that was embarked upon, because it was up and down the country, it was major” (FD 
3) 
According to this interviewee, the changes that followed the Macpherson Inquiry improved 
the way in which their police service dealt with ethnic minority groups: 
“I think we’ve become better with the way that we deal with ethnic minority groups, 
we’ve got Family Liaison Officers, the use of interpreters, the use of our partners, 
IAGs – Independent Advisory Groups – and things like that.  I think we do engage 
with a lot more other people now to helps us do things in the right way” (FD 3) 
The interviewees explained how learning from the past has led to the increased 
professionalisation of what the police do.  One interviewee cited an understanding of the 
‘golden hour’ principles that emerged as a result of the Lawrence case and the introduction of 
the HOLMES system in the 1980s, as examples of professionalisation.  SD 8 explained that 
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before the police service became more professionalised, investigations would be very much 
reliant upon the “investigative flair of the SIO”, whereas professionalisation has provided a 
structure that was not in place previously: 
“Because of those horrendous things which have happened over the years we have 
got structure, a blueprint now of how to investigate properly and we’ve got training 
that allows us to apply those skills and it has professionalised the police service and 
it’s made what we do far, far more structured and we do things far more intelligently 
than we used to” (SD 8) 
As well as learning from high-profile cases of the past, FD 9 explained that recent cases also 
provide opportunities for learning and in assisting them in the investigation of subsequent 
cases: 
“I think if we use the [names case] as a case in point, looking at it from a gold 
perspective, there were two cases that sprung to my mind when I realised what we 
were dealing with; the Soham murders and the case in Bristol, Jo Yeates, because of 
the media and the learning that had come out of those two for me were critical for us 
in [names force] in making sure that we put the right kind of systems and people in 
place, had the right expertise and if you remember, going back to the Soham murder, 
they were criticised in the beginning because they didn’t ask, they tried to cope with it 
all themselves and my position was if we need anything from anywhere let’s just get it 
here and do it, but of course we were in a slightly different position there where in 
those early days we were looking for a girl who was possibly missing rather than a 
murdered child, so the expectation was a lot greater that we would put the resources 
in right up front, so we had all the search experts, we had every force in the country 
involved in it to kind of make sure that we absolutely did everything that we possibly 
could so that there was no stone left unturned that could have meant the difference in 
finding her dead or finding her alive” (FD 9)  
SD 13 also explained how they have improved the management of media in investigations by 
learning from their own previous experiences.  This example also suggests that the impact of 
high-profile investigations of the past remain at the forefront of the modern-day investigators’ 
mind: 
“We’ve learnt from that, from minute one of a murder enquiry we’ll make an 
assessment of what is going to be the media interest in this, so the case we had in 
March which was the stabbing of a 19 year old black lad and it came at the time that 
the latest news came out about Stephen Lawrence, so the media do work in themes, so 
you had Stephen Lawrence and then a 19 year old lad stabbed in [names location], so 
we thought that this was going to be a huge media story, it wasn’t as it happened, but 
straightway from minute one we’re starting to plan for that in addition  to working 
out what we’re going to have to do for that investigation” (SD 13) 
Two former detectives who were still working within major crime talked about the domestic 
homicide review.  They explained that these would also provide opportunities to reflect upon 
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and improve practices, as well as learning how homicides might be prevented in the first 
place, although it is noteworthy that FD 3 explains that similar problems reoccur, raising the 
question of whether lessons are learnt:  
“I’ve done five domestic homicide reviews in the last 18 months. The same themes 
always really there, it’s around how officers deal with incidents. What you're looking 
at is the previous incident or calls to, all police contact with the victim or perpetrator, 
so you analyse that evidence in detail and see how the police dealt with it, should the 
case have been referred to MARAC or MAPPA, should the perpetrator have been 
arrested, what support was offered, other agencies involved?” (FD 3) 
FD 2 spoke of the benefits of the domestic homicide review: 
“It brings a great depth of understanding and perhaps intervention because you can 
see things…which are going to happen, built upon, and more so with domestic 
homicide, you can see this picture spiralling out of control and something is going to 
happen and it suddenly bang it blows up… We want to prevent rather than just 
waiting for it to happen and that’s only done by people sharing the right information 
at the right time” (FD 1) 
It is interesting to note here that the homicide review provides another opportunity for 
learning, although some detectives remarked that is something that detectives might be 
nervous about and see it as a source of scrutiny.  Introduced in 1998 the 28 - day homicide 
review aims to: 
“identify and develop investigative opportunities that will progress an investigation, 
to act as a form of quality assurance in relation to both the content and process of an 
investigation, and to identify, develop and disseminate good investigative process” 
(Nicol et al., 2004, p4). 
However, this process was not referred to in any particular depth by the interviewees and it 
was not cited as being a major development in the investigation of homicide, which would 
suggest that the introduction of the 28 - day review had not had any discernible impact upon 
the majority of those interviewed.   
One interviewee mentioned that debriefs are an important feature of investigations today, 
providing further opportunities for continuous learning and improvement: 
“The good thing now about it is that every enquiry has a debrief so you take the 
learning from that and you apply that next time around as well” (FD 9)  
The importance of debrief is evident in the literature.  Brookman and Lloyd-Evans (2015) 
found that whilst there is opportunity to improve the way in which the best practice that 
emanates from the debrief is disseminated, their value is clear.  Through the analysis of 102 
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debriefs Brookman and Lloyd-Evans (2015) were able to identify both good practice and 
challenges, the reflection upon which allows investigators to take steps to improve 
performance in the identified areas, before they reach the point that the investigation fails to 
such an extent that a public inquiry is called.  The value that the interviewees placed upon 
learning from past mistakes and from current investigations further suggests that the sharing 
of good practice identified by debriefs should be widened, as highlighted by Brookman and 
Lloyd-Evans (2015).   
The data considered in this section suggest that there has been a shift in the approach to 
investigation.  Whereas investigators historically had a mind-set of ‘we know best’ it would 
appear that today’s investigators are more willing to reflect on investigations and learn from 
them.  The interviewees could see that many of the changes that occurred as a result of the 
Byford and Macpherson inquiries were necessary and of benefit to the way in which 
homicides are investigated today. 
Perspective and Change 
 
Whilst the interviewees agreed that the opportunity to change in response to problems 
identified as a result of particular cases can be beneficial, many stressed that change should 
be proportionate and that we should not: “change for change’s sake”.  The cases that are 
reviewed, and subject to public inquiries, are often those that are “driven by a variety of 
sources from political pressure to media campaigns” (Roycroft 2008, p45).  The difficulty 
then is the pressure to be seen to change and make improvements. 
SD 20 drew on the case of 10 year olds Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman who were 
murdered by school caretaker Ian Huntley in August 2002 (Wate and Birch, 2008).  The 
concerns around the police investigation into this case resulted in a public inquiry.  The 
recommendations saw the implementation of the Police National Database (PND).  A report 
was also commissioned to scrutinise the investigation by Cambridgeshire Constabulary with 
“an emphasis on identifying lessons for the police service as a whole” (Flanagan 2004, p3).  
Resonating with findings from inquiries including Macpherson, Flanagan (2004) found that 
the SIO had not received appropriate training, there was a lack of momentum during the 
initial stages of the investigation, and there was poor coordination overall.  Whilst accepting 
that this case needed to be examined, SD 20 suggested that a less emotive response is 
sometimes needed: 
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“The Ian Huntley case, which sparked a massive review of how intelligence is passed 
between forces, the Bichard Report, again some of that was stuff that you probably 
couldn’t control and some of it was stuff that would need a more, a less emotive 
reflection is probably the best way of expressing it” (SD 20) 
FD 9 explained that perspective was crucial in making recommendations for change, both in 
respect of reviews and public inquiries, and that it is important to know what the fundamental 
issues are: 
“It’s getting that right perspective on what really needs to change or learning what 
needs to be passed on, but actually means we don’t rewrite the Murder Manual or you 
don’t chuck everything up in the air and start again” (FD 9) 
Nevertheless, there are certain problematic cases that will take such a place on political, 
media and public agendas that there will be calls for inquiries and change.  With the 
likelihood of human error, despite the changes that have already been implemented, problems 
in investigations are unlikely to go away completely; the police have continued over the years 
to make serious errors in homicide investigations.  The impact of such cases on public 
confidence in policing is also significant; indeed Innes (2003) refers to such cases as ‘causes 
celebres’.  SD 24 acknowledged that there was a need to stamp out certain practices that 
featured in major investigation in the past.  Whilst SD 24 felt that the consequence of this has 
been that police officers can now be scared of talking to people, they recognised the impact 
that particular cases have on public confidence and that change can be a response to this.  
This provides some indication as to the complexities of responding to certain high-profile 
cases: 
“You can’t just stop and chat to somebody, you’ve got to put a stop report in that 
you’ve actually chatted to them and it just gets ridiculous really.  But I understand a 
lot of trust in the police has gone because of the cases” (SD 24) 
As well as learning from past cases, the interviewees often spoke of the pressure that comes 
from the fact that the police continue to be judged on cases that took place decades ago.  FD 7 
commented on the fact that the police continue to be criticised for such cases: 
“Our critics are now beating us up about Hillsborough, which was April 1989, 
Stephen Lawrence, which was in 1993, and they are still bringing it up because of 
how bad it was” (FD 7) 
Indeed, at the time the fieldwork was being conducted, a heavily criticised murder 
investigation that took place during the 1980s was continuing to make headlines and was 
referenced by some of those that were interviewed.  An additional point to make here is that 
several detectives remarked on the tendency for historic investigations to be judged on the 
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standards of modern-day investigations.  Sir Lawrence Byford, who led the inquiry following 
the Yorkshire Ripper investigation, in an interview held in the 1990s, made a similar point: 
“It was clearly because they were prisoners of their time and it had never happened 
before.  It’s not that they are wicked, stupid men, it’s just that they had never dealt 
with that before” (Yorkshire Ripper Archive) 
Another individual who worked on the Yorkshire Ripper investigation, also stressed the 
importance of perspective when looking back upon past investigations:  
“One must realise that looking at a problem after it’s been solved, when you’ve got 
the picture on the jigsaw puzzle box lid, are quite different from looking at it 
beforehand, when things are not all that clear” (Yorkshire Ripper Archive) 
It will be challenging, given the difficulties that surround the way in which particular high-
profile cases are responded to, to ensure the perspective and proportionality that the 
interviewees stressed was needed.  Ultimately, achieving a balance between being seen to 
address problems in investigations of particular cases, the nature of cases being such that they 
have led to public, media, political pressure and calls for inquiries, whilst taking into account 
the impact that change can have upon investigators and investigations, as set out in this 
chapter, will likely be difficult to fully achieve. 
Conclusion 
 
The picture that emerges from the data presented in this chapter is one of increasingly 
complex investigations compared to those of the past.  This can be attributed to several 
factors, but the growing prevalence of science and technology is undeniably influential.  As a 
consequence today’s SIO must now, more than previously it would seem, place their trust in 
other members of their team and be aware of and willing to draw on outside expertise.  It has 
also been shown that more recent developments have raised concern among many of the 
participants, in particular investigative teams being reduced in size and the lack of police 
investigative background of some of these team members. 
However, caution should be urged.  That many former detectives were critical of civilian 
investigators raises the question of whether it is because of the way in which they perceived 
their positions as detectives.  These detectives had worked at a time when there was a great 
deal of kudos attached to being a detective working on the most serious of crimes as we will 
see in Chapter Eight.  It is quite possible that this could go some way to explaining their 
opinions of police staff.  It should also be remembered that many of the former detectives 
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were still working for the police service as civilians and so their perceptions might also be 
based on those experiences.  Additionally, some SIOs worked for police services with a high 
number of civilians working on homicide investigations, yet raised concerns around their 
levels of experience, which would suggest that these certainly are pertinent issues that require 
further consideration.  
This chapter also reveals what we will see is a recurring theme, the impact of austerity on 
modern-day investigations.  Although the interviewees stressed that investigations would not 
suffer significantly as a consequence of budget restrictions, its prevalence in the data, that 
which is presented here and elsewhere, is telling of the importance of it and of concerns 
around cuts.  One area in which this was discussed related to the difficulties that BCUs have 
in releasing officers to work on homicide investigations and the negotiation for staff that 
follows.  Some detectives attributed this to the cuts that the police service has experienced.  
This raises the question of whether there is in fact a risk that investigations have been or will 
be compromised as a consequence of cuts to the Police Service. 
Now that I have documented the way in which the day-to-day running of homicide 
investigations have changed, the following chapters will look closely at particular elements of 












‘It wasn’t leeway it was carte blanche.  They were nigh on out of control’: 
Regulating Investigations and Investigators 
 
Due to the serious nature of homicide, its investigation is subject to a level of regulation and 
scrutiny that is not seen with other offences.  This regulation and scrutiny has increased since 
the 1980s as a result of growing concern around criminal investigations and miscarriages of 
justice, amid what Maguire (2008, p444) termed a “growing crisis in legitimacy”.  
With particular focus on the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984, the Criminal 
Procedures and Investigations Act (CPIA) 1996, the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 and the 
Murder Investigation Manual (MIM) this chapter will provide an overview of relevant 
legislation, regulation and guidance since the 1980s and consider the impact each 
development has had upon homicide investigation.  We will see that each presents its own 
unique benefits and challenges to those investigating homicide, but the central theme is the 
widespread belief that the increased legislation, regulation and guidance for those 
investigating homicide has led to increasingly onerous bureaucracy in investigations and risk 
averse detectives. 
From the Judges’ Rules to PACE: A Necessary Change 
 
Many of the twenty-seven detectives interviewed had enjoyed careers that spanned several 
decades.  Due to the breadth of their experience a number of them provided insight into the 
world of homicide investigation before the introduction of PACE, a time when the work of 
detectives was much more hidden and not overseen in the manner that it is today, a time that 
is described by Gozna and Horvath (2009, p117) as being “free from external monitoring”.  It 
is this picture of the past, as described by the interviewees, that will first be presented before 
we move on to consider the impact of PACE. 
The views of the former detectives support the concerns that the preceding Judges’ Rules 
were nebulous: 
“Judges’ Rules meant to some degree that you had a lot more, almost freelance the 
way that you could do our own investigation” (FD 1) 
One serving detective described the Judges’ Rules as allowing more than a little leeway: 
“It wasn’t leeway, it was carte blanche.  They were nigh on out of control” (SD 25) 
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It would be incorrect to say that detectives paid no regard to the law, or that detectives and 
detective work were not governed in any way; as the quotes above illustrate, the Judges’ 
Rules were in place.  However, it is clear from the data that they were not regulated or 
required to abide by legislation to the extent of a detective today.  This was evident within the 
homicide case file from the 1980s as there was no mention of any legislation, regulation or 
guidance.  This is partly because this case was unsolved at the time that the fieldwork was 
conducted, but it is also a reflection of the limited regulation of investigations at this time.  
Differences between the regulation of past and present investigations can also be seen when 
we consider some of the practices of the time, which are far removed from the way in which 
detectives are now permitted to conduct investigations.  The way in which suspects were 
dealt with in custody is a prime example.  The former detectives told of how suspects could 
be kept in custody for long periods of time without being arrested and before being spoken to, 
the detectives used the phrase “helping us with our enquiries” (FD 6) to describe such 
practices.   
As well as a lack of guidance on how long suspects could be retained in custody, it was 
acceptable to listen in on them when they were being held in the cells.  This was the response 
of one former detective who was asked about what practices were commonplace in the past 
that would be unacceptable today: 
“It used to be deemed, years ago, when a person was charged, that you would put 
them in a cell and you’d listen to his conversation in his cell that was good practice.  
Now, of course, it would be deemed to be not fair and therefore couldn’t be used” 
(FD 1)   
Interviews were not recorded; detectives relied upon notes that were often written up some 
time after the interview was conducted.  This is particularly noteworthy when we consider the 
criticism that was commonly levelled at the police around the questioning of suspects and 
how confessions were obtained.  This comment from a former detective whose career in the 
police service began in 1972 shows how notes were taken: 
“They were summaries. If I spoke to you and we had a conversation for three hours, I 
would maybe put a report in spanning four pages, but does that cover all that you 
said? No, and often key things were omitted” (FD 1) 
Although the practices outlined above were legal before the implementation of PACE, they 
were still open to attack by the defence.   The defence would suggest that the confession was 
obtained under duress and question the interviewers’ ability to remember what was said 
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during the interview.  This former detective notes that because interviews are now recorded, 
the defence can no longer challenge what was and was not said, illustrating the clear 
differences between investigations of the past and those conducted today: 
“They’d get booked in with the station sergeant and be taken upstairs and they’d be 
interviewed, no tape recorder. You could spend hours interviewing somebody and the 
whole aim was to get them to confess and at the end of it you’d take a statement under 
caution and they’d sign it. That was open to attack; they’d say, “I made the statement 
under duress”. You would make your notes after you’d come straight out of the 
interview and make your notes and the first thing the Barrister would say is “well, 
how can you possibly remember that?” So they’d always attack the interviews.  They 
can’t do that now” (FD 2) 
Investigations before PACE were also very different for solicitors.  Now a QC, this 
participant was a solicitor before PACE was introduced.  He explained that defence solicitors 
they were not privy to much information and you were seemingly at the mercy of the officers: 
“You were advising entirely on the basis of what a police officer might choose or not 
to tell you and you couldn’t rely on it, you had nothing in writing and you had very 
little comeback even if you were being misled” (QC) 
It is clear that homicide investigations were lightly regulated prior to the introduction of the 
PACE and, other subsequent pieces of legislation, and that these investigations were of a very 
different standard to those conducted today: 
“I think some of the investigations perhaps wouldn’t stand the rigour of today” (FD 
1) 
This is reflected in the scepticism that the introduction of PACE was met with according to 
those interviewed: 
“We had a guy arrested for murder and we had introduced PACE as a trial six 
months before, so all the systems were in place that were being used just to make sure 
we got it right when it went live.  And then a particular DS brought a guy in on 
suspicion of murder and the first thing he said to the Sergeant behind the desk was 
“get rid of all of that PACE stuff and get the charge sheet out”. He wasn’t 
comfortable with it this particular SIO and he wanted to deal with the system that he 
was comfortable with because it was an important case and he wanted it done that 
way” (FD 4) 
Given the extent of change that PACE brought, such doubt is unsurprising.  This example is 
arguably indicative of the very reason that the mood at this time was that detectives needed to 
be controlled, a view evident in the literature and supported by those interviewed.  
Specifically, although the detectives were not entirely damning of past investigative practices 
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and claimed that much of what went on was legal, they could all see that major change had 
been necessary to achieve tighter control of detective work.  The instances of miscarriages of 
justice that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s and the criticism that policing faced as a 
result was one of the reasons that change was considered to be necessary: 
“Policing couldn’t face a next generation of being criticised in terms of how 
investigations were run.  They have got to be transparent and they have got to be 
auditable and they have got to be thorough” (FD 1) 
It is also important to note that detectives were not necessarily hiding practices from others, 
as much of what was described by the interviewees was common practice across the Criminal 
Justice System:  
“It wasn’t that the police were doing it in isolation or darkness, the solicitors knew it 
was going on, the courts knew, Judges’ Rules; it was the way it was” (SD 25) 
The changes that came about as a result of PACE brought new pressures and increased the 
workload of those who deal with suspects while they are in custody.  However, the benefits 
were acknowledged: 
“Time constraints that you’ve got dealing with people in custody, availability of 
Solicitors is sometimes an issue, the police officer just wants to get on and deal with 
the prisoner, but if you’re waiting around for Solicitors, particularly if a Solicitor is 
dealing with two clients in custody they can’t be in two places at once.  That can be 
problematic, but the benefits outweigh the problems” (FD 3) 
PACE was also considered by the interviewees to be the start of increased professionalisation 
of investigations: 
“I think any investigation became more professional when PACE was introduced. I 
think there’s no doubt it’s made everybody more professional in the way they 
investigated any offence, whether it is a minor theft, a house burglary or a murder 
inquiry.  Everybody has to attempt to gain evidence before making an arrest and you 
just can’t go out and arrest somebody just because you feel it’s that person 
responsible. So, yes I think to me that was a time when things kind of changed as far 
as detection is concerned” (FD 17)  
To summarise, it has been demonstrated that change was needed and the manner in which 
investigations were conducted historically could not continue.  The introduction of PACE 
brought “detective discretion under scrutiny and control” (Morris 2007, p31) and was just one 
example of a move towards increased professionalisation and standardisation of 
investigations through the introduction of legislation, regulation and guidance.  Ultimately, it 
can be seen that its introduction was a pivotal moment in the history of homicide 
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investigation.  It is therefore useful to consider the detectives’ views of a specific case.  For 
this purpose I drew on a homicide investigation, which saw the Senior Investigating Officer 
(SIO) breach this legislation.  This case illustrates the impact of increased legislation upon 
the role of individual ‘initiative’ and ‘experience’ whilst ‘adhering to the rules’. 
Breaking the Rules 
SIO Steve Fulcher of Wiltshire Constabulary was investigating the 2011 disappearance of 
Sian O’Callaghan and suspected Christopher Halliwell of being involved.  Fulcher took the 
decision to interview Halliwell at the scene, rather than follow PACE and interview him with 
a Solicitor present and following caution.  During this ‘urgent interview’ Halliwell confessed 
to murdering Sian O’Callaghan and also confessed to the murder of Becky Godden-Edwards 
in 2002, taking the detective to the graves of the victims.  As a result of Fulcher’s failure to 
adhere to PACE, Halliwell was only convicted of the murder of Sian O’Callaghan, receiving 
a life sentence with a minimum term of 25 years (Johnston, 2012).  The judge in the case 
described Fulcher as returning to a 1970s style of policing18.   
The interviewees were asked for their thoughts on Fulcher’s actions and, whilst they accepted 
that he might have acted in this way for the right reasons, they felt strongly that his actions 
were unacceptable:  
“I can probably see morally why he did it because “oh once the Solicitor gets to him 
he won’t tell us everything” and I can understand that and I can commend what he 
did for the family of the second murder victim to find the body, if he hadn’t done what 
he did perhaps the family would never have got closure and I can really see the 
human side of it, but being straight that’s not his job and for me, as painful as it is, 
it’s his responsibility” (SD 8) 
This view was reiterated by former detectives, which I had not anticipated.  Since they had 
worked at a time of much lower level regulation and scrutiny, one might expect them to 
exhibit a more sympathetic view of Fulcher’s position, but this did not seem to be the case.  
One explanation for this might be that many of the former detectives that were interviewed 
continued to work within the police service as civilians and might therefore have a more 
balanced perspective of investigations today: 
“He took no account of PACE, flouted PACE, it’s a basic, basic error.  He cocked up 
really” (FD 2) 
                                                          
18 I came across this case when it was in the news and I was interested in both the detective’s actions 
and the Judges’ comments.   
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Although the actions of Fulcher, who was suspended but able to keep his job, meant that 
Halliwell’s confession to the murder of Becky Godden-Edwards was ruled inadmissible and 
the charge dismissed19, her mother came out in support of the SIO calling for reforms to 
PACE.  Some media coverage of this case also suggested that flexibility in the legislation was 
needed (Johnston, 2012).  This view, however, was not supported by those interviewed: 
“You can’t go back.  The law has been put into tablets of stone for a reason and you 
can’t get a time machine and go back.  So, I’m sorry, you can’t support what he did.  
It’s effectively quashed potentially the conviction of that man for murder, so that isn’t 
justice for anyone” (FD 1) 
The circumstances in this case are rare, but it does indicate that there are consequences when 
detectives follow initiative as opposed to adhere to statutory requirements.  FD 2 spoke of the 
difficulty in achieving a balance between following the rules and drawing on initiative and 
experience: 
“You can be an SIO and make a real cock up on the job and it’ll haunt you for the 
rest of your life in terms of your reputation, civil proceedings, so you’ve got to get it 
right.  Steve Fulcher is a good example.  He tried to use flair, initiative and creativity 
and it bit him on the backside and he’s suffering for it, his reputation has been 
damaged. However, if you don’t have an element of creativity and flair, how are you 
going to solve some of those really difficult murders?” (FD 2) 
The emerging issue appears to be that the relationship between the regulation of homicide 
investigations and the role of a detective’s individual ‘flair’ and experience is a delicate one.  
This is an issue that extends beyond PACE and applies to the application of any legislation or 
guidance during an investigation.  This balance was also apparent as the detectives spoke of 
how they would sometimes push the boundaries during investigations and that this was 
sometimes necessary in order to make progress.  This is illustrated in the remarks below from 
a former detective who now acts as an advisor to SIOs.  It is important to note, however, that 
this interviewee was clear that pushing the boundaries did not mean breaking the rules: 
“I would never advocate breaking the rules ever. What I may advocate is pushing the 
boundaries a bit and my attitude is nothing ventured, nothing gained. So you can 
follow it exactly as you should and there’s loads of cases like it and you make no 
progress, now some SIOs are paranoid about pushing the boundaries a bit because of 
the outcome but what I’ll say is well what’s the alternative if you’re not going to 
detect it? So you could push the boundary, end up detecting it and then worry about 
pushing the boundary then, as long as you’ve not done anything dishonest” (FD 2) 
  
                                                          
19 Christopher Halliwell was retried and subsequently convicted in 2016. 
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FD 2 went on to give an example of what pushing the boundaries entailed: 
“A good example is a case I’ve been involved in recently where you’ve got a murder 
and you’ve got some suspects, but you can’t connect them evidentially but you suspect 
they might be involved but you can’t prove it that’s all. So you may consider other 
techniques, some covert type of technique of trying to identify what they’re saying and 
what they’re doing.  Now to go down that route you have to take account of 
RIPA…It’s a minefield.  So if you deploy covert tactics it’s got be authorised by an 
authorising officer in force, certain tactics have got to be authorised by chief officers 
and if you fall foul of it you fall foul of the surveillance commissioners. So you can 
push down that route, you could look at it and say “oh I don’t think we can justify 
employing a covert tactic on those suspects because I don’t think RIPA caters for it, 
it’s a bit grey, so we we’re not going to do it”, so “I’ll say well ok there you are you’ll 
never resolve it then, so why not push it, test it and you never know what result you 
may get?” (FD 2) 
This suggests a clear difference between the actions of Steve Fulcher, which were a breach of 
legislation, and pushing the boundaries.  SD 16, for example, explained that guidance can be 
‘breached’ but described the law as “sacrosanct” (SD 16).  FD 12 also explains how 
investigators must learn to work within the legislation, with an emphasis upon not breaking 
the law: 
“When I say police officers will adapt, it’s not finding ways around things because 
that smacks of “well you’ll flout the law and try and find loopholes”, it means they’ll 
adapt by working within the restrictions of the legislation, within the limits of the 
legislation” (FD 12)  
Although the interviewees were clear that pushing the boundaries might be necessary, but 
that disregarding legislation was unacceptable, it might be argued that it could become 
difficult to identify where the line is drawn between pushing the boundaries and breaking the 
law.  The tension between the use of a detectives’ initiative and experience and adhering to 
the rules is further heightened when we consider the view of several serving detectives that 
they are increasingly risk averse.  Many interviewees felt this was a result of high-profile 
cases in which mistakes had been made and which have led to the increased legislation and 
regulation of homicide investigations, alongside ever increasing scrutiny.  This will be 
returned to later in this chapter.  
Regulating Disclosure: The Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA) 
 
The Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act (CPIA), was introduced as a result of 
miscarriages of justice that were caused by police and prosecutors failing to disclose material 
that could have aided the defence (Stelfox, 2009).  One case that illustrates the devastating 
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repercussions of failings in the disclosure of evidence was that of Stefan Kiszko.  Kiszko 
served 16 years in prison for a crime that he did not commit as crucial medical evidence was 
not disclosed during his trial (Redmayne, 1997).  The CPIA also stipulated that a thorough 
investigation must be conducted during which all lines of inquiry must be explored.  
However, the focus here will be on disclosure for that is where the majority of discussions 
around the impact of the CPIA focused.   
Disclosure: A New Battleground 
Those interviewed could appreciate why the introduction of this legislation was required.  
This interviewee explained how beforehand they did not have the understanding of the 
importance of disclosing evidence: 
“We had this situation pre-1996 where the CPIA was required because we weren’t 
disclosing and we didn’t understand it, I dare say there were a few instances where 
things may have been a bit fast and loose, in the majority of cases we didn’t get it and 
we weren’t legally and suitably trained to understand it, so the CPIA became 
necessary that’s a given” (SD 25) 
It is not just the police that appreciated the value of this legislation.  One QC explained that 
before the CPIA was introduced the defence were very much dependent upon the police when 
seeking information from them: 
“Before the CPIA, certainly as a defence lawyer, I was completely ignorant of how 
the police dealt with documentation.  You didn’t get schedules of anything, they gave 
you what they felt like giving you, they gave it to you late. You were made to feel like 
they were doing you a favour” (QC) 
However, the data also reveal that the CPIA has presented investigators with significant 
challenges when ensuring such legislation is adhered to.  In particular, one detective felt that 
the original intentions of the legislation were not being met and that it has placed 
investigators and the prosecution under considerable pressure: 
“Legislators have got to get a hold of this issue and say “do you know what? When 
our forefathers in parliament wrote this legislation for CPIA, they didn’t envisage 
what it turned into as being what they intended”.  That sounds really bad, they didn’t 
intend for it to become what it has become, they intended for it to become an equal 
and fair and open transmission of information, and it’s not two-way, all the 
expectation is on the prosecution and the defence can run rings around us, and they 
do, they cause a lot of problems at trials” (SD 25) 
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The issues with the CPIA that were discussed by the interviewees related primarily to the 
rules around disclosure and it was clear that this was an area of concern for them, one serving 
detective going so far as to say: 
“Disclosure is killing us” (SD 25) 
SD 26 explained that there is an expectation upon the police to provide all the information 
and stated that in the coming years the public will wonder why the police were doing what 
the defence should have done.  FD 27 believed that errors will be likely to occur because of 
these pressures but did acknowledge that the implementation of this legislation had also been 
of benefit: 
“In one respect it was a good thing in terms of allowing the defence to have access to 
relevant pieces of information, which might assist the defence or undermine the 
prosecution, but in other respects has been the bane of investigators in as much as it 
puts so much pressure on the investigation team to get everything absolutely ship-
shape, I’s dotted and t’s crossed within too short time constraints imposed by the 
Judicial system.  And consequently you're under pressure to do so much work in so 
little time, mistakes inevitably happen because we’re all human, which can sometimes 
be interpreted as failure to disclose information or almost corrupt practices” (FD 27) 
One serving detective described disclosure as a “new battleground” and explained how it is 
an area that the defence will look to in order to challenge the prosecution’s case: 
“I think disclosure’s a new battleground…I would say that unless you’ve got a 70+% 
chance of conviction in most cases the CPS won’t look to charge, so if the evidence 
has got to be very good then the defence will start rooting around in disclosure” (SD 
20) 
This was reiterated by SD 21 who explained that with the introduction of PACE ensuring that 
interviews are recorded, the defence would now focus upon other aspects of the investigative 
process.  SD 21 explained that the defence would focus upon disclosure of material such as 
minutes of meetings and email records, an option that would not have been available before 
the 1980s: 
“All that is covered now whereas now it tends to be disclosure and are you minuting 
meetings, we carry these books which record, if there’s an incident you have one of 
these whereas years ago you’d have your own, the Detective’s Bluebook, a hardback 
book that’s all that you’d take everywhere with you just to scribble and it’ll be 
“what’s in that book, have you disclosed it” and emails, they’re recovering email 
chains and you think “are they relevant?” but that’s where they’re targeting now. Of 
course going back they never had those” (SD 21) 
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The concerns surrounding the amount of pressure placed on investigators in ensuring the 
requirements of the CPIA are met are outlined by SD 15: 
“On day one of the trial they [the defence] may have not given their defence case 
statement, so we don’t know for definite what their defence is going to be and then at 
the start of a trial they’ll give us a defence case statement, which then places an 
obligation on us to review everything again, so it places a massive burden back on us 
against very tight deadlines, then they will ask for blanket disclosure of material, they 
will just come up and ask for sometimes thousands of items and then claim they’ve 
only just had this material” (SD 15) 
So far we have seen that whilst the introduction of the CPIA was considered to be an 
important and necessary piece of legislation, it has added to the workload of investigators and 
as a consequence the detectives suggested that there is a risk that mistakes will be made.  We 
have also seen that it is their belief that the police sometimes receive the defence case 
statement too late in the process.  Given such concerns it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
police feel that they should hand over everything.  This is an interesting point in light of 
accusations against the police of withholding information, which was a factor that led to the 
introduction of the CPIA, and when we consider that some saw the introduction of the CPIA 
as a response to “complaints by the police that prosecution disclosure had become too 
generous” (Owusu-Bempah 2013, p184).  SD 25 explained this issue:  
“So this whole police thing, about going from one extreme to the other and lesser 
experienced officers will be inclined to turn over everything, in fact experienced 
officers will be inclined to turn over everything because if you think the risk is losing 
your case, why not turn it over?” (SD 25) 
This perspective was also held by SD 15: 
“Historically in [names force] we have given them that material and said “well it’s 
better for you to have too much than too little, we need to be giving you everything 
you ask for” and it allows them to create a bespoke defence; they will then look 
through the unused material and try and find something they can use as a defence 
rather than the other way around” (SD 15)  
This interviewee further explained that a homicide trial had collapsed because of issues 
around disclosure.  SD 15 described how during this recent trial they had “adopted that give 
them everything they ask for as the root of least resistance” approach, but that this ultimately 
led to the collapse of the trial: 
“It was turned back on us and allowed them to (a) construct a defence and (b) claim 
that we haven’t been meeting our disclosure obligations, when in fact we had tried to 
help them” (SD 15) 
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SD 15 explained that during the second trial they were “more robust” in the treatment of 
disclosure requirements as a result of what had happened previously.  Notably, the QC 
remarked that the police were mistrusting of the defence and also explained that this is not 
helped by there being defence teams that will ask for information that they do not need.  This 
might also explain occurrences in which the police disclose perhaps more information than 
they need to.   
It is important to reiterate that all of those interviewed who made reference to this legislation 
believed its implementation to be valuable and some felt that because of its introduction the 
likelihood of miscarriages of justice occurring as a consequence of issues around disclosure is 
diminished: 
“I think it is a big improvement.  We won’t have, well touch wood, the miscarriages of 
justice” (FD 27) 
Nevertheless, the issues raised here suggest that the CPIA has raised new challenges for those 
investigating, and those prosecuting, homicide cases. 
A Question of Rights: The HRA 1998 and RIPA 2000 
 
The European Convention of Human Rights grants certain rights to individuals, which 
include the rights to life, the rights to a fair trial and the rights to privacy, among others 
(Great Britain. Human Rights Act 1998).  The Senior Investigating Officers’ Handbook states 
that the Articles most relevant to the investigation of crime are the right to life, the right to 
liberty and security, the right to a fair trial and the prohibition of discrimination (Cook and 
Tattersall, 2010).  However, not all of the rights granted are absolute and are in fact subject to 
“considerable flexibility of interpretation” (Neyroud 2008, p674). 
One interviewee commented that the introduction of the HRA was a positive development in 
ensuring that the rights of victims are also taken into account: 
“I am a fan of it; I tend to think of it positively.  People think of it as a charter for the 
criminals, I look at it as a charter for the victims because their rights will always 
overcome” (FD 5) 
Although the HRA was considered by several interviewees to have been an important 
development in homicide investigations, it was not discussed at length during the interviews, 
observations or mentioned extensively within the homicide case files.  Reference to the HRA 
was found within the homicide case file from the 2000s.  The SIO referred to the Act when 
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outlining the arrest strategy for a suspect and when documenting their concerns around the 
media intrusion of a suspect.  This suggests that whilst it was broadly considered to be an 
important introduction, it has not impacted upon investigations in the way that PACE and the 
CPIA have.  However, the HRA was often discussed alongside the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), which is understandable given that RIPA is 
responsible for regulating policing tactics such as covert surveillance of individuals.   
The interviewees spoke of how the introduction of RIPA changed the way in which 
informants were used during investigations.  FD 11 spoke of trust in detectives as opposed to 
regulation: 
“In the old days, 50 quid to a criminal is like £1,000 to anybody else and if they can 
get 50 quid for giving us a simple bit of information they would be very tempted with 
that, in fact, they were probably less likely to commit crime so that was the incentive 
there and as long as it’s done properly and ethically and you could cover yourself and 
do all those things correctly you were given that trust” (FD 11) 
The contrast with how surveillance was conducted in the past was also evident within the 
1990s homicide case file.  Within this file there was reference to the surveillance team who 
were to watch a suspect to see “where he goes and who he speaks to” (1990s Homicide Case 
File).  This was at a time before both the HRA and RIPA had been introduced, so there was 
no reference to this legislation.  This is suggestive of the fact that such processes were 
conducted in a far simpler, less bureaucratic manner. 
Although FD 11 explained that the use of informants in the past needed to be ethical, the 
introduction of legislation to regulate such techniques suggests that these practices were seen 
to require further control.  Whereas historically a detective would have their own informant 
who they would be in contact with on an informal basis, the Murder Investigation Manual 
(ACPO 2006, p280) outlines today’s regulated approach to the use of informants, now 
referred to as Covert Human Intelligence Sources, or CHIS: “The Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 and the underpinning Codes of Practice require agencies to protect the true 
identity of any CHIS, and to consider their security and welfare”. 
This shows how the implementation of such legislation has added to the decisions that 
detectives must make during the course of a homicide investigation and to their workload.   
According to one detective, legislative changes can make capitalising on such resources 
increasingly complicated.  This quote is also indicative of how increased legislation has 
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increased the bureaucracy in policing as SD 13 talks of the paperwork that must be completed 
in order to examine a mobile phone: 
“What it does do is it constantly adds extra pressures.  RIPA came in because we had 
the Human Rights Act come in and we were doing stuff that impacted on people’s 
privacy and on their liberties, but it wasn’t catered for in law.  But then of course the 
knock on effect of that is it just adds to the burden of things that we are trying to 
achieve, and sometimes they are quite simple things, but because it falls within the 
definition covered by the surveillance authority, I have to move people away from 
other investigative activity to just do paperwork.  Now, over the years since RIPA has 
been in we’ve got used to doing that and we just accept that it has to be done, but just 
taking a mobile phone out of someone’s property in custody needs a massive level of 
authority just to have a quick look at it” (SD 13) 
This chapter has so far considered the detectives’ views of the legislation that those 
investigating homicide must adhere to and the perceived difficulties that are encountered as a 
result.  However, it is not just legislation that has played a role in the increased 
professionalisation and standardisation of investigations.  Guidance documents are another 
tool that have been used to achieve this.  The document most mentioned during the interviews 
was the Murder Investigation Manual. 
The Role of Guidance: The Murder Investigation Manual 
 
Introduced in 1998 the Murder Investigation Manual (MIM) provided investigators with a 
framework within which to conduct their investigations and is described by Bryant (2009, 
p20) as “one of the first major attempts in the UK to produce a comprehensive theory of 
investigation”.  Designed for use in conjunction with the Major Incident Room Standardised 
Administration Procedures (MIRSAP), the MIM provides “guidelines for the conduct of the 
investigation outside the Major Incident Room” (Neyroud and Disley 2007, p552).  Most 
recently published in 2006, the MIM covers a variety of considerations for investigators 
including: the role of the Senior Investigating Officer; house-to-house enquiries; forensic 
strategy; multi-agency working, amongst many other considerations (Newburn et al., 2007).  
Designed to be an “idealised ‘template’ for best action” (Bryant 2009, p15) many of the 
interviewees doubted how useful this document was, raising questions around the way in 
which guidance designed to aid investigators is compiled and used.   
 An Essential Toolkit? 
FD 9 was one interviewee who considered the establishment of the MIM to be a key change 
in the investigation of homicide in England and Wales, describing it as an “essential toolkit” 
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that signalled the start of increased professionalisation of investigations.  FD 9 also noted 
how the murder of Stephen Lawrence and the concerns that were raised as a result of the 
investigation occurred at the time that this document was being written and so these concerns 
were addressed in it: 
“I think that was the start of the real professionalisation of investigations albeit there 
were processes and procedures in place before, I think this was the start really of how 
we need to do our business for the future…and then a lot of the Stephen Lawrence 
case was dovetailed into it” (FD 9) 
Other interviewees commented on how this document had been useful to them during the 
early stages of their career when they first became an SIO, although less so later: 
“It is a really useful, well written document that I read before I became an SIO and it 
was interesting and I read it on holiday, but the first day back I went straight into a 
murder enquiry, my first one, so I got my knowledge and knew where to look.  Now, 
having done all the work of the murder manual, I don’t think I’ve opened it now for 
six years if I’m honest” (SD 15) 
SD 8 spoke of how they read the manual in its entirety at the start of their career as an SIO 
and was considered odd for doing so, which is perhaps indicative of the perception of this 
document amongst many of the interviewees: 
“Well, I’m probably one of the very few people, if not the only person, that’s actually 
read the manual from cover to cover.  That’s one of the things that I committed to 
when I took over the role [of SIO] because it was that important to me” (SD 8) 
Interestingly, the finding that the MIM was considered to have been a fairly informative tool 
for the new SIO contrasts somewhat with the literature on criminal investigations.  Bryant 
(2009, p21) claims that “it is intended for practising, or even experienced, investigators, 
rather than trainees”, which raises the question of why those interviewed did not believe it to 
be a particularly valuable resource. 
Whilst conceding that the MIM was useful as it demystified a lot of the process, SD 8 felt 
that it did not cover some important aspects of homicide investigation: 
“The two most important jobs for the SIO is writing the policy i.e. what have you 
done and why have you done it – vitally important, number one job. And, secondly, 
the writing of the strategies around your decision-making and there are no examples 
of either of those in the murder manual” (SD 8) 
Although, as noted above, SD 8 was considered unusual for having read it in full, others did 
not deny having read the MIM but did, as alluded to by SD 15, question its relevance: 
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“It is probably more of a guide that I will look at from time to time, but I certainly 
wouldn’t follow it slavishly, definitely not and actually I don’t find it a particularly 
useful guide anyway.  If I’m struggling with something the manual is not a place to go 
to give me any answers” (SD 13) 
On the other hand, one former detective was particularly critical of the document: 
“Some of the manuals are 'Janet and John’ and most detectives will just put it in the 
cabinet” (FD 7)  
The serving detectives were not as critical of the MIM, indicating a difference in views of a 
former detective whose career began in the early 1970s when there were no such guidelines 
and those investigating homicide today.   
SD 15 noted that other documents that were introduced in a bid to regulate the way in which 
homicide investigations are run are no longer relied upon when a murder comes in as 
investigators have a thorough understanding of what needs to be done.  Here, SD 15 refers to 
the use of MIRSAP, the guidelines which set out the way in which the Major Incident Room 
(MIR) should be established and run: 
“Same with MIRSAP, we just get on with it and the structure is usually very similar 
from one job to another, there may be lines of enquiry that may be much bigger in one 
investigation than another, but the MIR will set up with all the key roles in it: the 
reader, receiver, allocator” (SD 15) 
Overall, the consensus was that the MIM was useful to new SIOs and provided a reference 
point to some, although it should be noted that Cook and Tattersall’s Senior Investigating 
Officers’ Handbook was said to be more helpful.  One serving detective explained that during 
the investigation of a cold case homicide, they wanted to refresh their memory regarding key 
points ahead of a meeting. They turned to Cook and Tattersall’s (2010) handbook as opposed 
to the MIM describing it as “really well explained and just a handy book to go to”.  
Ultimately, the MIM was considered to merely provide guidelines for those investigating 
homicide: 
“Nothing is black and white, so although the murder manual is guidelines or 
considerations, it’s something to put in your toolkit with everything else” (SD 24) 
Despite the fact that the SIOs questioned how beneficial the document is, it is important to 
acknowledge that the defence will have access to it and, according to one detective, they will 
ask why certain procedures were not followed:  “If you go to Crown Court they might 
pick you up on it” (SD 8).  The importance of showing reference and adherence to the MIM 
and explaining why certain decisions were made was reflected in the homicide case file from 
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the 2000s that was examined.  In explaining the decisions that were taken around the 
Community Impact Assessment it states “compliance with good practice/murder manual” 
(2000s Homicide Case File).  Additionally, the same case file notes that the set-up of the MIR 
“reflects MIRSAP recommendations” (2000s Homicide Case File).  On the one hand, this 
suggests that a degree of importance is attached to such guidance despite the issues that have 
been discussed here; on the other, this is a further indication that the police are becoming 
increasingly risk averse as regulation increases and feel it is necessary to try and ‘cover’ 
themselves in this way, even though the MIM is a guidance document and not enshrined in 
law.  This will be explored in more detail at the end of this chapter.  
It should also be noted that the interviewees acknowledged that there were other advantages 
to the MIM.  One interviewee explained that its introduction ensured that there is consistency 
in the way in which different police forces approach homicide investigations.  Drawing on 
the case of the Yorkshire Ripper whereby several police forces were involved, FD 5 
suggested that some of the issues faced during the investigation might have been overcome 
had the MIM been in existence at the time: 
“If you look at the Ripper enquiry, if they had been working to the manual there 
would have been some continuity between the different forces involved…the manual 
gives a good framework to work in.  I think it was needed at the time” (FD 5) 
Also referring to the MIM, SD 23 suggested that it encourages a more strategic approach to 
investigations, which they considered to be an improvement upon the approach of 
investigators in the past: 
“Having the MIM as a national strategic document as opposed to a load of old 
Sherlock Holmes type of characters, I think that made a difference.  There was very 
much that old “let’s just keep plodding on until we get there” whereas we started to 
take more of a strategic approach to investigation once the manual was put in place, 
it put some meat on the bones around where we were going” (SD 23) 
In a sign of continuing change in the way in which homicides are regulated, the detectives 
acknowledged that the MIM has not been updated in some time and is being replaced with 
guidance placed on the online resource Authorised Professional Practice (APP): 
“The last publication [of the murder manual] was in 2006 and my understanding is 
that they’re not going to publish a new version, but what they’re going to do is put all 
guidance on Authorised Professional Practice, which covers everything right across 
policing. It’s written by the College of Policing and it’s on their website and it’s open 
source…my understanding is that once everything goes in there about major 
investigation, the murder manual will be obsolete” (SD 13) 
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Introduced in early 2014 the APP provides guidance on all areas from armed policing, civil 
emergencies, covert policing to investigations (College of Policing, 2016).  The APP appears 
to take into account some of the concerns raised by the interviewees that have been discussed 
in this chapter.  It aims to reduce the number of manuals and “ensure that content is 
searchable and all identified APP areas complement and are consistent with each other” 
(College of Policing, 2014).  In its relative infancy at the time of the data collection, the 
introduction of this resource was not widely explored, so it remains to be seen whether this 
new way of regulating homicide investigations will be an improvement upon documents like 
the MIM and will likely require consideration in the future.   
Bureaucracy, Risk Aversion and Human Error 
 
This chapter has presented the key findings in respect of how changes to the regulation of 
detective work have impacted upon the investigation of homicide and upon detectives 
themselves.  An overarching theme became apparent in considering these data.  The 
increased legislation, regulation and guidance for use in homicide investigation has led to 
investigations becoming increasingly bureaucratic and to investigators becoming increasingly 
risk averse.   
The data suggest that increased legislation, regulation and guidance has led to a feeling that 
the police do too much when investigating homicide in order to ‘cover’ themselves, and due 
to the fear of the high-profile repercussions of making a mistake.  FD 9 summarises this issue 
explaining that the scrutiny and judgement that the police are subject to means that decisions 
and actions that are taken must be documented, but that this bureaucracy has added to the 
volume of work that detectives must manage: 
“I think the bureaucracy can sometimes get in the way and the volume of stuff, but I 
suppose we’ve become so judgemental on the way policing is developed that you’ve 
got to have stuff documented” (FD 9) 
Today there are so many processes that they can seemingly be afraid to step outside of these 
processes and take a risk in case they are later criticised for doing so: 
“Have we become risk averse? We probably have a society as police officers have 
been under investigation where criminal cases have been lost, there’s always 
something to mould and chip away at policing and society, which in the main is a 
good thing but sometimes can be bureaucratic, cumbersome and psychologically 
force officers to take the path of least resistance” (SD 16) 
 138 
The notion of risk aversion and increased bureaucracy can be linked to the comments of SD 
21.  He felt that one of the major changes to the investigation of homicide has been that so 
much work is done in investigating that can be disproportionate to the case.  This quote also 
suggests that too much is done because police services remain mindful of past failures: 
“From first working on murders 17/18 years ago, I think we do too much, when you 
look at the amount of time and resources we put in and whether that’s the legacy and 
things, which are still on-going, but I do think we’ve become risk averse” (SD 21) 
SD 21 went on to describe a case that he considered to be an example of how those 
investigating homicide can do too much that is not necessarily warranted when considering 
the circumstances of the case.  SD 21 explained how SIOs could be afraid of not taking 
certain steps in case it is flagged up should a review take place: 
“We had a murder where a guy killed his girlfriend, drove her into the police station, 
comes in the police station and says “I killed my girlfriend”, even that inquiry was 
7/8 months, hundreds of statements and actions and you think “well is that efficient?” 
and I mean you say there’s no price on justice, but I do think well when you look at 
the public purse and staff resources and shortages, something like that surely should 
be a case of “right we’re going to focus on this, he’s saying he’s killed her, we know 
he’s killed her, there’s no one else involved, he’s saying he’s had a moment of 
madness, well the experts can work around that” but no, we still, and a lot of that is 
SIO driven because they are afraid of that review because there’s always someone 
that knows better, there’s always “why didn’t you do this, why didn’t you do that, why 
didn’t you get this expert”” (SD 21) 
The QC offered a similar perspective.  He also explained that the police almost do ‘too much’ 
during an investigation and suggested that they waste a lot of resources pursuing red herrings 
because they feel that they have to do everything.  The QC described investigative procedures 
today as “cumbersome, a bit bureaucratic” and that there are now “huge teams of people 
having to cover every eventuality with a paper trail that’s bogging them down”. 
SD 21 accepted that it would require a brave SIO to not take certain steps and acknowledged 
that care must be taken in case a suspect were to later change their story.  However, they felt 
that each case should be looked at individually and managed accordingly rather than practice 
‘policing by numbers’: 
“I think you’ve got to look at each one individually where we are guilty sometimes of 
having this checklist and you do have some SIOs who haven’t got that detective 
background because that’s the reality, you don’t become an SIO through experience 
you attend a course, which is a bit odd really, so some will police by numbers as I 
say, it’s like having a picture and they’ll say right they’ll have a chart of top 200 
actions are this and they’ll do, where I tend to think well each case I don’t need to do, 
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to get from a to z you don’t always have to tick b,c,d,e,f,g, whereas some SIOs will be 
rigid, they’re afraid of the review, afraid of the risk, not quite strong enough to policy 
things out and then you’ll have a 10 month inquiry where perhaps you could have had 
a four month one” (SD 21) 
One interviewee held the view that change needs to be proportionate and that the key thing 
for investigators is to know the fundamentals of what went wrong and what needs to be 
changed, as opposed to being overly ‘picky’ and critical.  The following comment from FD 9, 
who at the time of the interview had recently retired from a senior post, illustrates how 
routine reviews of investigations need to be proportionate in the same way as inquiries into 
high profile and problematic cases.  The comments of FD 9 suggest that increased 
bureaucracy in policing might prove detrimental to future investigations: 
“What worries me sometimes is that we can sometimes lose sight of how many times 
something has gone right for one case that has gone wrong and we change the world 
for one case that has gone wrong and there may be a number of factors why that went 
wrong, so I think it’s important to have some perspective on: does this really need to 
change? Was this just human error and mistakes? Because otherwise what we end up 
doing is creating a bureaucracy, which actually affects future investigations and can 
be detrimental” (FD 9) 
The detectives felt that change often comes as a result of high-profile investigations that have 
been subject to criticism.  In considering why this occurs, some of the interviewees’ 
comments reflected the findings of Flanagan’s (2008) Review of Policing that the 
Government must be seen to be doing something in response to investigations that have been 
subject to criticism: 
“A lot of this is driven from the top at Government level and, whichever Government, 
as soon as they get a sense of what the public attitude is towards something they will 
always want to be seen to be doing something.  That’s where it comes from and then 
be seen to say “right, this is what we’ve now put in place” (SD 13) 
The result of this approach was that many significant changes are made in response to what is 
often an exceptional incident: 
“We do an awful lot of those big changes in reaction to one isolated incident, which 
has gone horribly wrong, but that doesn’t mean that everything has to be changed as 
a result” (SD 13) 
However, there was certainly a sense amongst some interviewees that there are also benefits 
to an aversion to risk.  SD 8 felt that the increased accountability that comes with increased 
risk aversion has made the police more intelligent in how they approach homicide 
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investigations, and it is right that the police are held to account.  This did not happen in the 
past: 
“We are far more risk averse than we used to be, but I think that’s a positive thing 
because I think we are far more responsible now, far more intelligent in our 
approach, far more accountable, rightly so, no-one used to challenge the police years 
ago” (SD 8) 
Similarly, some interviewees were of the opinion that the changes mean that it is less likely 
that significant errors will occur.  When asked whether we are likely to see future cases 
where miscarriages of justice have occurred, the majority of interviewees agreed that this 
would be very unlikely: 
“I think we are in a far, far better position now to cover all the basis than what we 
ever were before” (FD 9) 
Despite such changes being made in respect of legislation and guidance, the question remains 
whether it is possible to prevent human error?  During the interviews many detectives 
commented that mistakes will happen and that human error will occur despite the increased 
legislation, regulation and overall increased professionalisation of investigations.  The 
interviewees often portrayed a sense of acceptance that regardless of the changes that are 
made to investigations and scrutiny of the police, mistakes will be made and that they will 
often be the result of human error:  
“That doesn’t mean to say that we don’t still make mistakes, when you’re dealing 
with humans and people trying to do their best there’s still always opportunity for 
error or to do something wrong or for something to be missed” (FD 9)   
SD 25 also felt that human error would always be a factor in homicide investigations simply 
because of the nature of this work: 
“I think there needs to be recognition that policing in general and detective work it’s 
not a widget factory, we don’t make 100 widgets a day Monday to Friday and if the 
machine goes wrong there’s a few less widgets, our business is human misery, we 
deal with people in crisis, unpredictable events, strangely enough mistakes will be 
made” (SD 25)” 
The role of human error in problems that occur during homicide investigations is discussed in 
the literature.  In their research examining 28-day homicide reviews, Nicol et al (2004, p44) 
established that weaknesses or problems in investigations are often the result of: 
Frailties in human processes, which make up so much of what constitutes an 
investigation: perceived poor judgement; inadequate knowledge; a failure to comply 
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to agreed processes; an abrasive management style; and a lack of suitably trained 
personnel. 
It is clear that changes that have occurred in respect of legislation, regulation and guidance 
for those investigating homicide in England and Wales have led to concerns that 
investigations are becoming increasingly bureaucratic and detectives have become wary of 
stepping outside of the processes that have been implemented over the past few decades.  At 
times when budgets are tight the question of whether too much is done as detectives try to 
‘cover’ themselves becomes increasingly important.  
Legislation, Regulation and Guidance as Support 
 
This chapter has focussed primarily upon the challenges that have developed as a result of 
increased legislation, regulation and guidance that detectives investigating homicides must 
negotiate.  Similarly, the literature suggests that such developments signalled a move 
“towards a more ‘modern’, rationalised and bureaucratic system” (Innes 2003, p24) and 
increased standardisation and professionalisation of investigations.  Those interviewed agreed 
and commented that investigations of homicide were now more professional than they had 
been prior to the 1980s.  This was evident in the recognition by many detectives, both former 
and serving, that we are unlikely to see the problems in homicide investigations that we saw 
historically: 
“I think we have so many, the MIM, we’ve got our force policy, we’ve got so many 
laws that we didn’t have back then: PACE, CPIA, all of the laws that regulate us, that 
you’d be hard pressed to say there’d be something that we’d be doing that was 
fundamentally wrong again” (SD 24) 
In considering these changes, the detectives also spoke of how they have led to increased 
accountability, which was seen to be a positive development.  They spoke of how homicide 
investigation is the most serious type of investigation because someone has lost their life and 
another will face a very long period of imprisonment, they therefore felt that it was right that 
they were now so accountable.  This serving detective explained that as a result of past 
miscarriages of justice there is distrust in the police and so accountability is necessary: 
“We don’t do ourselves any favours.  I mean the miscarriages of justice that have 
gone on in the past, people don’t believe the cops unreservedly anymore, years ago 
they did and we could get away with planting evidence, burying evidence, the 
Kiscko’s of this world, the Guildford bombers, and we should be scrutinised.  We are 
dealing with the most serious of offences and putting people in prison for the rest of 
their lives, that’s a massive responsibility and therefore the decisions that led to that 
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should be scrutinised, we should be accountable to the public.  It’s probably our 
transgressions of the past that have led to distrust” (SD 15) 
The detectives held similar views on the increased levels of scrutiny, believing it to be 
necessary due to the seriousness of homicide investigations.  This is reflected in this quote 
from SD 20 who also explained that increased scrutiny, such as from the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission (IPCC), comes as a consequence of the government wanting to 
improve the standard of investigations: 
“You’ve got the IPCC taking a more fundamental role, there’s a real concerted 
assertion from the Government to raise standards in policing, so that brings with it 
more scrutiny and, to be fair, there should be more scrutiny around these 
investigations, it’s right that we are scrutinised” (SD 20) 
SD 20 also felt that because of the scrutiny to which homicide investigations are subject, the 
standards of investigations are very high, particularly when compared to other countries that 
do not experience such levels of scrutiny: 
“One of the things that you can rely on is that British justice will 9 out of 10 times, 
give you that certainty that when you’ve got your man, you’ve got your man because 
of the layers of assessment and scrutiny that they go through. If you think of a system 
that’s far less stable than ours, look at American standards, and, their cops are 
allowed to lie, in certain states it’s different of course, but in some states their cops 
can interview someone and tell them lies to illicit confessions and the difference is 
that the majority of their jobs come as a result of confessions whereas the majority of 
results of our jobs come as a result of evidence, so if that’s not a better standard, I 
don’t know what is” (SD 20)   
Arguably, it could be deduced from the data that the positive view of these changes explain 
why the detectives felt that they were now receptive to reform: 
“Legislation has come in place for good reason and people have got on with it and, 
by and large, people now are as flexible as they ever were” (FD 12)  
Thus, it is undeniable that the changes that have been made to the regulation of homicide 
investigations in England and Wales have been positive in many respects.  Nevertheless, the 
data that have been presented throughout this chapter suggest that the detectives held a 
somewhat ambivalent view of the changes that have been made; they could see its necessity 
but expressed some concerns.   
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has illustrated that the work of detectives investigating homicide is more heavily 
regulated than it was before the 1980s.  There are many more pieces of legislation and 
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guidance documents that must be considered, from the introduction of PACE to the MIM.  It 
is apparent from the data that such change has been the result of an increased drive towards 
the professionalisation of detectives and standardisation of detective work, and as a response 
to high-profile cases that have been subject to criticism over the way in which the 
investigations were conducted. 
The impact of change has been varied, which is unsurprising given the extent of these 
reforms and the fact that they affect almost every facet of homicide investigation.  Many of 
those interviewed talked about the burden that such changes have brought.  The CPIA 
demands that they must constantly review evidence for possible disclosure and they can feel 
pressured into handing over all evidence.  Most detectives were of the view that the MIM was 
not particularly useful, but that it remains to be seen whether its successor will be considered 
an improvement.   Crucially, we have seen that changes to legislation and guidance has led to 
homicide investigation becoming increasingly bureaucratic and detectives increasingly risk 
averse as a result.  It would seem that the increase in bureaucracy has led to a feeling that 
they do too much that is not necessarily proportionate to the nature of the case being 
investigated.  This is a pertinent concern given the current climate of austerity and tight 
demands on police budgets.   
Although the homicide detection rate is around 90% (Brookman et al., forthcoming) and the 
detectives interviewed stressed that many of the challenges they face are not insurmountable, 
the data reveal that ever increasing bureaucracy in investigations is potentially detrimental to 
the way in which investigations are conducted and has resulted in considerable pressures 
upon those investigating homicide.  The contrast between the past and present is illustrated in 
the following comment from the 1960s, that the police officer: 
Has a natural instinct to act according to what he believes is right and not to be 
fettered with permitted or prohibited rules…the British public expect at all times that 
the police will act fairly, and the desire by the police is to live up to this expectation. 
(St. Johnston 1966, p86). 
It would appear that times have changed.   
Further evidence that times have changed lies in the scientific and technological advances 





‘The possibilities became endless overnight’: Advances in Science and 
Technology 
 
In Chapter Two the literature pertaining to developments in science and technology were 
presented.  In the current chapter I present the detectives views on these changes and consider 
in what ways they believe extensive technological and scientific advances have benefited and 
challenged investigations and investigators.  I will firstly provide an overview of how science 
and technology was used in the past as elucidated from the data. This chapter will then 
consider how advances in technology and science have presented many more lines of inquiry, 
but that this has created new challenges in managing this information.  I then turn to consider 
the role that scientific and technological evidence plays at court and the move away from the 
eyewitness and confessional evidence that was so prevalent in the past.  The relationship 
between the use of such tools and evidence and detective skills is then explored.  I next 
discuss the difficulties with staying up-to-date with developments.  Finally, this chapter will 
deliberate the impact of budget on the use of scientific and technological tools in 
investigations, before ending with a consideration of the role of science and technology in 
solving homicides.   
Science and Technology in the Past: The Detectives’ Perspectives 
  
The 27 detectives interviewed had witnessed many developments in science and technology.  
During the interviews they described the narrow techniques that they could draw on in the 
past and this was also evident when examining the homicide case files.  Sending a simple 
message to another police service took far longer than it would today, as this comment from a 
detective who joined the police service in the mid-1970s shows: 
“It's like a typewriter. If you look at the old movies with strips of paper that's called 
teleprinter tickertape and you feed that through a reader and it will type it for you it's 
like coded, some people can actually read the tickertape. And when you used to type 
the teleprinter message you would select, so you were in [names police station] and 
you want to send a message to [names police station] you would select them on the 
teleprinter, you then type what you wanted on the teleprinter, tickertape would be 
produced, you would check to make sure it was what you wanted to send, then you 
would put it through the sender and it would send that message to the police station” 
(FD 4) 
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As a result of the limitations of technology there appeared to be more reliance upon people.  
It is perhaps because of this lack of technological capability and reliance upon individuals 
remembering information that detective work of the past was seen to be akin to a ‘craft’ as 
opposed to a ‘science’ (Tong and Bowling, 2006): 
“We used to have people known as the ‘memory man’ and people could remember 
things, “go and speak to him, that guy can…”” (FD 1) 
As with technological capabilities, the forensic opportunities of the past were also restricted.  
One interviewee explained that an often-used scientific technique was blood grouping.  This 
allowed the police to identify an individual’s blood group and could also inform them if 
someone was a secretor or non-secretor, in other words whether an individual produces their 
blood type through bodily fluids such as saliva.  The blood group of a rapist, for example, 
could be determined from a semen sample left at the scene.  This enabled the police to 
eliminate individuals from an inquiry.  However, in order to utilise such techniques, the 
detectives explained that they needed a considerable amount of blood and it could only be 
used largely for elimination purposes.  Alongside blood grouping the interviewees described 
the use of fingerprinting, the examination of fibres and striation marks left by weapons as 
being the foremost procedures that were used.  The scientific and technological tools 
available to investigators in the 1980s and 1990s were gleaned also through examination of 
the homicide case files.  The files refer to blood trails, blood types, various swabs and 
samples taken from the victim in the 1980s case and a focus on CCTV in the 1990s homicide.  
Whilst it was clear that the capabilities of science and technology in the past were basic, the 
findings suggest that this did not necessarily mean that investigations of the time were 
flawed.  When speaking to a detective involved with an unsolved murder from the 1980s20 
they commented that what stood out to them was the amount of work that would have been 
put into this investigation, particularly given the lack of technology and the fact that much of 
the paperwork was completed by hand.  This case was originally investigated before the 
introduction of HOLMES.  Moreover, a review of the investigation conducted in the early 
2000s found that: 
“The initial investigation itself was thorough and left no obvious lines of enquiry 
outstanding” (1980s Homicide Case File) 
                                                          
20 An individual has since been convicted of this homicide. 
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This demonstrates that although this investigation relied on the card index system at the time 
of the original investigation, it was thorough and there were no issues identified with it 20 
years later.  This suggests that the ‘craft’ of detective work of this time was effective.  
Although, of course, such limitations proved highly detrimental to the Yorkshire Ripper 
investigation:  
“Whoever investigated this would have had the same problem of information 
overload, piles and piles of paper, filing cards, no computer linkage. The things we 
take for granted now in an inquiry were not available to us then.  We were really 
using the same tools that poor Inspector Lestrade was having to put up with in the 
days of Sherlock Holmes and I think this is possibly why somebody with a sense of 
humour in the corridors of power christened the first national computer, HOLMES!” 
(Yorkshire Ripper Archive) 
Today the scientific and technological advances that modern day investigators can draw on 
have continued to develop and do so rapidly.  In short, as Cooper and Mason (2009, p285) 
point out “over the past half century the use of forensic science in policing investigations, like 
policing itself, has changed out of all recognition”.  
A former detective who joined the police service in 1972, explained that investigations today 
are much more complex than they were, which is largely due to these changes: 
“Investigation has become more complex.  Who’d ever think these days that you can 
access the things that you can with a mobile phone?  That you can trace people’s 
movements with phone calls, text messages, put people at scenes of crime?  Forensic 
evidence now with DNA and fingerprinting and fibres, it’s a massive world out there” 
(FD 1) 
How has this impacted upon homicide investigation and detective work?  This chapter will 
now move on to explore these issues.  I begin by considering the masses of information that 
scientific and technological evidence generate. 
The Increased Volume of Information  
 
“There’s an awful lot of data management, which is now becoming a fundamental 
part of a murder inquiry” (SD 16) 
From the development of the HOLMES system, continued progress in DNA testing, the 
prevalence of CCTV, to the use of mobile phone evidence, the growth in scientific and 
technological evidence over the last few decades has been vast.  This can be seen when 
comparisons are drawn between the homicide case files that were examined.  Whereas the 
cases from the 1980s and 1990s referred to fairly limited scientific and technological tools, 
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aside from the use of CCTV in the 1990s, the case from the late 2000s shows more advanced 
techniques.  As well as CCTV, the policy file refers to DNA, mobile phones and computer 
work.  One of the foremost benefits that the increased availability of such tools and evidence 
has brought is the many lines of inquiry to pursue.  These are lines of enquiry that a detective 
of the 1970s, 1980s and even the 1990s would be largely unable to utilise.   
“The introduction of DNA evidence and the massive impact that’s had, the use of 
CCTV evidence and the availability of that from a huge range of sources now, not just 
the cameras on the street, fire engines have got cameras, buses have got cameras on, 
everyone’s got a camera on their phone. The use of telephony evidence is massive for 
us as well; from every inquiry from the simplest domestic murder telephony is a line 
of inquiry that an SIO would pursue. So there’s lots there!” (SD 15) 
With an estimated 5.9 million cameras in operation in the UK (Reeve, 2013) the advantages 
of the availability of CCTV evidence in the investigation of homicide are obvious.  During 
the fieldwork I viewed CCTV footage that had captured a shooting, providing the police with 
crucial information, such as the vehicles used and what happened immediately before and 
after the offence.  The growing emphasis on CCTV was also apparent when looking at the 
case files.  The 1980s case details the use of a police patrol car using a tannoy to inform 
people in the area of the case and encourage witnesses to come forward.  The emphasis was 
also on house-to-house.  In comparison, after the appointment of the SIO, the first decision 
documented in the 2000s policy file was the recovery of CCTV footage.   
The ability of science and technology to provide investigators with new information and 
additional lines of inquiry to pursue is also apparent in the growing use of mobile telephones 
within society.  Statistics collated by Ofcom show that the proportion of adults in the United 
Kingdom who owned or used a mobile telephone was 93% in 2015 (Ofcom, 2015).  This 
figure has grown significantly since 2000 where statistics show that 36% of individuals 
owned a mobile telephone (Ofcom, 2011).  The extent of this growth is encapsulated in the 
following quote: 
The use of mobile telecommunication systems in worldwide society has now reached 
almost epidemic proportions.  There is scarcely any aspect of life in modern society 
that has now been impacted by the ability to send and receive voice and text messages 
almost at will.  (Mellars 2004, p266). 
One way in which investigators will make use of this during an investigation is through ‘cell 
site analysis’.  One detective described how this allows investigators to trace the movements 
of an individuals’ phone: 
 148 
“Wherever you are you’ve got your telephone and it’s registering on a mast 
somewhere.  If I committed a murder now and I drove to London, every single mast in 
London would record my movements. So that’s a massive advancement in 
opportunities for us” (SD 8)   
Another detective outlined the first homicide case that their police service prosecuted which 
relied heavily upon ‘cell site analysis’.  SD 8 explained how the offender had disposed of the 
body at an isolated spot 40 miles away from the murder scene.  The investigators already 
suspected the offender, who was being held in police custody and refusing to answer any 
questions during interview.  He explained that it was crucial to try and link the suspect to the 
remote deposition site.  Using this technique the police were able to prove that 24 hours 
before the body was discovered, the suspect had driven to that location.   
As the use of mobile telephones has grown, so too has the use of social media, a phenomenon 
that emerged in the mid-2000s with the introduction of Facebook.  There is undoubtedly a 
relationship here since smartphones have become increasingly popular and the ability of 
individuals to access their various social media accounts, such as Facebook, Twitter and 
Instagram, through their smartphones available.  This can also provide opportunities to 
investigators as, according to Al Mutawa et al (2012, p524) “the increased use of social 
networking applications on smartphones makes these devices a goldmine for forensic 
investigators”.  The detectives reinforced this as they explained how the popularity of social 
networking provides them with a wealth of information as it captures the communications 
between various individuals and communities.  
One interviewee explained that technological evidence, including covert tools, can provide 
another way of gathering evidence in cases where people are reluctant to speak to the police, 
something that is often the case in their metropolitan force, and in ‘Category A’21 
investigations where there are no known suspects: 
“We had a shooting a couple of weeks ago, know who’s done it but can’t get the 
evidence. So it’s forensics yes, covert techniques are massive in investigations, 
certainly here where nobody will speak to you in [names force], they don’t speak to 
the police, so you have to find other ways, to the technology that offenders use that we 
can exploit like telephones, laptops in order to get information to piece together a 
thread of evidence that will prove the case” (SD 24)    
                                                          
21 The categorisation of homicides helps “guide the initial allocation of resources” (ACPO 2006, p77).  
A ‘Category A’ homicide is one of “grave public concern or where vulnerable members of the public 
are at risk, where the identity of the offender(s) is not apparent, or the investigation and the securing 
of evidence requires significant resource allocation” (ACPO 2006, p77). 
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As well as helping investigators to prove an offender’s involvement in a homicide and 
providing additional avenues to follow, advances in science and technology help investigators 
piece together what has taken place during an offence and the role played by an offender.  SD 
8 described a case in which the offender had claimed that the victim had died as a result of a 
traffic accident.  The investigators used a technique called ‘acid black’, a chemical that is 
poured onto a surface to show where blood has been present by identifying the protein left 
behind, even once blood is washed away.  This allowed investigators to prove that the victim 
had been bleeding in the kitchen.   
The generation of information that comes as a result of developments in scientific and 
technological evidence has clearly been of great benefit to investigators; providing many 
lines of inquiry, being able to plot an individual’s movements, identifying what took place 
during the commission of a homicide and so on.  The data, however, show that these new 
opportunities, in particular the technological developments, have presented those 
investigators with challenges that must be negotiated in order that the evidence can be used 
effectively. 
One of the difficulties that social media brings to investigations is how to manage the 
possibility of sensitive information pertaining to cases being released by the victim’s family 
members, who will be privy to more information than is released into the public domain.  SD 
8 explained how in one case the parent of the murder victim would often release details of the 
investigation onto Facebook within hours of having spoken to the detectives, something that 
could clearly prove detrimental to the case.  The following comment illustrates this point and 
is also indicative of how detectives themselves can find it difficult to keep up with and 
understand new forms of social media:      
“I had a real challenge on an investigation because the mum was an unstable 
character, she was a heavy drinker and when I’d go to give her an update on 
something in the investigation, I didn’t understand what Facebook was at the time 
none of us did, she’d be on Facebook within an hour telling the whole world about it, 
releasing all the information and as many times as I asked her not to she’d apologise, 
she was quite a vulnerable woman, and she’d get drunk again and do it again” (SD 8) 
One detective explained that the prevalence of social media is such that the task of informing 
a victim’s next of kin of their death also becomes challenging due to the speed with which 
information today can travel.  Informing families promptly thus becomes an even bigger 
priority than it would have in the past.  Therefore, it is not just the way in which information  
released to the family is managed that can prove to be problematic for investigators, but the 
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management of the masses of information that social media can generate, too presents a 
significant challenge.  Investigators are therefore presented with a huge amount of work in 
understanding that information, making links between different relationships and so on.  In 
2011 the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA)22 announced that training 
programmes were to be updated to include the use of social networking such is its widespread 
use.   
Alongside the information generated through social networking, CCTV was often mentioned 
as providing a particular challenge because of the amount of data that it produces.  The case 
file of a homicide from the 1990s describes that the CCTV footage obtained is “95 hours and 
it takes 2 days to view a 4-hour tape” (1990s Homicide Case File), giving a stark indication 
as to the volume of information generated by CCTV evidence alone and proving the major 
role that it plays.  However, before this information can be examined, investigators must 
identify where the cameras are, a difficult task when we consider that CCTV cameras no 
longer just consist of those on the street and can be found on buses, privately owned premises 
and individuals’ homes. 
The detectives explained that not only are there challenges associated with identifying where 
relevant cameras are, but highlighted the importance of setting appropriate parameters and 
timescales for what is recovered.  These discussions also brought to the fore concerns around 
resources and the importance of having trained staff that are able to retrieve CCTV footage:  
“The difficulty we find is the practical knowledge of how to download the product 
before it’s recorded over again, because some systems record every 24 hours so say 
we have a murder, the victim has been dead for 2 or 3 days, you’re up against it 
straightaway with any CCTV enquiries or opportunities because whatever system’s in 
that vicinity they could already have recorded over the offender running off for 
instance, so for us the challenge is identifying what sort of system is it on: is it a hard 
drive? Is it a disc? Or is it a tape? All those type of things and getting the engineers 
out to download it in those timescales” (SD 8) 
SD 8 went on to explain how their police service does not have designated officers with 
responsibility for CCTV, but have “in-house informal experts” who have worked with 
CCTV evidence over their careers and know how to deal with the systems and who to contact 
if they are experiencing difficulties.  However, when we consider that NPIA (2011a) 
guidance highlights the importance of securing CCTV imagery as soon as possible, the 
                                                          
22 The NPIA was wound down in 2012 and its functions subsumed by the College of Policing and the 
National Crime Agency. 
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concerns of the detectives become pertinent.  Additionally, because of the challenges that are 
associated with the retrieval of CCTV evidence, Gerrard (2007, p13) stresses that such a task 
is “clearly a job for specialist staff that have the right equipment and appropriate level of 
training” and so the use of informal experts may not be appropriate given the task they are 
facing.   
Conversely, one detective described the introduction of a dedicated CCTV recovery unit 
within their force and the benefits this had brought.  This enables them to ensure that they can 
keep up with changes in technology, a matter that will be considered later in this chapter.  
This serving detective also explained how the introduction of a dedicated team helps 
overcome the challenges outlined above: 
“It cannot be underestimated how good having a set of trained, dedicated people to 
look into the evidence retrieval and find innovative ways of trawling, understanding 
the territory because CCTV is one of your staples when it comes to finding out what’s 
happened. And even if there is an incident and there isn’t CCTV sometimes inside, 
you’ve still got everything that takes place outside, which helps you build a picture” 
(SD 20) 
It is not just the volume of information that CCTV evidence produces that is vast, the 
widespread use of mobile phones and the sophistication of handsets today also generates a 
significant amount of data that must be managed: 
“The data storage is phenomenal, you have now on a phone what you’d have on a PC 
on your desk 30 years ago…If you download somebody’s phone it could be 50,000 
pages of A4 paper, so how do you get through all of that to extract the bits that you 
actually need, so there’s challenges in dealing with the volume of data that is now 
available to us” (SD 15) 
One former detective now working on HOLMES as a civilian explained how this system, one 
of the first and arguably most prolific technological breakthroughs in criminal investigation, 
has developed in such a way that it continues to assist investigators in managing substantial 
amounts of data.  The importance of HOLMES is evident in its continued development and 
HOLMES2 was introduced in the early 2000s (Brookman, 2005), which has recently 
upgraded to its 16th version and its capabilities continue to progress.  The following quote 
alludes to the changes that version 16 brings, but also explains why change continues to be 
necessary:  
“So, you’re talking about storage in the cloud and things like that whereas now we 
store on servers within the force, so things will change and it will continue to change 
because it does need to adapt with modern day technology...I mean if the criminal out 
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there is using modern day technology, we have to be in a position to keep up with 
that” (FD 17) 
This section has shown that the development of scientific and technological evidence has 
brought investigators much more information than they would have had access to in previous 
decades, and that this has both brought new challenges that must be managed whilst 
benefiting them immeasurably.  Another way in which the introduction of scientific and 
technological tools has assisted and impacted on investigations is at court.  It is to this that I 
now turn. 
Science and Technology on Trial 
“A lot of convictions in the past were based on confessions or false confessions or 
oppression whereas very often now the evidence now is far safer in terms of the 
technology that proves it” (SD 23) 
The detectives explained that because of advances in science and technology, often noting 
DNA particularly, the evidence in cases today is stronger than it used to be, when convictions 
often depended upon confessions and eyewitnesses, which were not always reliable.  The 
difficulties associated with this and the benefit therefore of today’s evidence is summarised 
below: 
“Our reliance on eyewitnesses may have diminished a little bit in cases where we 
have strong scientific evidence, the need to rely on eye witnesses will never go away, 
but witnesses can be wrong even truthful witnesses can be mistaken in what they are 
saying so identification is always an issue if you don’t have scientific evidence and, as 
I’ve said, well-intended, honest, truthful witnesses can be wrong so reliance on 
science does away with that to a large degree and there’s a massive improvement on 
as I say 20 witnesses all of whom, say slightly different things, if you’ve got a 
fingerprint and blood on the weapon it’s not as open to challenge as destroying a 
witness who may be reluctant, nervous, frightened about giving evidence and the 
implications of being involved in a serious case” (SD 15) 
This perspective is also apparent from the literature as Cooper and Mason (2009, p288) 
explain how “technological developments have meant that forensic findings have become 
increasingly reliable, proven in court and widely accepted evidence”. 
One serving detective described an example of the strength of technological evidence.  SD 13 
outlined a case in which two individuals had come together to have a fight, but which 
resulted in one of them being fatally stabbed.  The fight had been coordinated beforehand by 
two groups using Blackberry Messenger, the messages from which, unlike with texts cannot 
be traced.  The only way the messages could be viewed was if you were a part of the group 
message or if you were able to retrieve one of the handsets.  SD 13 explained, however, that 
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individuals who were part of the group message, but not connected in any way to the 
incident, started to come forward and provide investigators with their mobile phones.  The 
content of the messages allowed investigators to prove that the offender intended to stab the 
victim, which enabled them to undermine his self-defence argument.  Similarly, the QC also 
suggested that these changes have led to guilty pleas being made in many cases such is the 
strength of the evidence. 
Another serving detective described a case that shows again how technological evidence can 
impact upon a case at court, in this case the ability of mobile phones to record video and 
capture images provided investigators with first-hand evidence of what took place: 
“I dealt with a murder in [names place] a couple of years ago, three men had beaten 
this guy to death in a flat and tortured him, it was a horrendous, horrendous murder 
and they’d taken photographs, the father and the son attacked this guy, and the father 
made the son take photos of him strangling the victim and punching the victim and it 
was horrendous, so we managed to download that from his phone and he pleaded 
guilty, he pleaded guilty to murder, not many people do, because he had to and you’d 
never have had that before” (SD 8) 
As a result of the stronger evidence that is presented today the interviewees explained that the 
defence now have to find other features of the prosecution’s case to challenge.  One detective 
explained how in the past the defence could spend several days challenging a suspect’s 
interview before PACE required that they were recorded.  This is no longer an avenue for 
them to pursue.  This suggests that changes affecting investigations will later impact upon the 
arguments of the defence.  Some interviewees suggested that the defence will often challenge 
the process of the investigation, the SIO’s decision-making, or crucially the continuity of 
forensic evidence, as SD 15 explains: 
“And it’s open to scrutiny in court I mean these are lines of defence that will be 
followed by the defence team, the issue of cross contamination, where items were 
stored, how items were handled, we have to prove continuity on that exhibit probably 
beyond anything that was done in the past even down to the names of receptionists at 
laboratories that took it off us in order to prove that there is not possibility of cross 
contamination, which bench they were dealt with in the laboratory, when was that last 
cleaned, all that record keeping needs to be done in order that we can prove from that 
it was recovered to the time it was analysed there was no potential for cross 
contamination to have occurred” (SD 15) 
This serving detective went on to explain how the issue of contamination can be used by the 
defence to place doubt in the minds of the jury, even if it is an issue not directly linked to the 
case in question:  
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“The systems that are in place now are far better than they were, that’s not to say that 
it’s infallible, and LGC is a forensic provider that had some issues with 
contamination at a laboratory and, although it didn’t impact on a case of ours, it was 
raised in front of the jury because they were a forensic provider on a case we had 
going through court and, although it was absolutely not related to our case in anyway 
shape or form, the defence raised contamination at their laboratory as an issue. It is 
then in the jury’s mind of “can I rely on what this laboratory is telling me?” so it is 
an area that they will exploit” (SD 15) 
Interestingly, when examining the case files of a homicide that occurred in the mid-1980s, the 
preface to the Crime Report references the issue of continuity.  The Crime Report states that 
the person responsible for sealing the exhibits should be the person that opens them in order 
to ensure continuity.  This not only shows that there was an awareness of such issues in the 
past, but the fact that the data suggest that continuity remains a particular concern is therefore 
unsurprising given the importance of DNA and other forensic evidence upon which many 
homicide investigations and prosecutions today hinge.  The importance of contamination 
from the very start of an investigation and the impact this has upon cases when they reach 
court can be found in the literature (Sawyer, 2011). 
As well as issues around contamination some interviewees suggested that the defence might 
question the SIO’s decision-making.  This leads to SIOs having to justify their decisions in 
terms of what and what is not sent off for forensic testing or included within CCTV 
parameters, for example.  FD 12 explained the importance in setting the correct parameters 
and documenting this because it will likely be scrutinised by the defence: 
“It’s about looking at what your scenes are, what your parameters are, what your 
timescales are and I think that’s where pressure comes on SIOs about making these 
bold decisions about what they are going to look at and what not…it’s got to be done 
professionally and of course it will be questioned by the defence so we’ve got to make 
sure it’s documented and recorded appropriately” (FD 12) 
The QC agreed that this was something that SIOs could be nervous about and had witnessed 
this when he had been involved in detective training.  However, he explained that in reality it 
was rare for their decision-making during the investigation to be scrutinised at trial.  
Although he explained that there had been some cases in his experience in which errors had 
been made during the investigation, which would come under the spotlight at trial, such as a 
case in which the police had failed to find the victim’s body.   
Developments in science and technology also appear to have impacted upon the expectations 
of jury members.  SD 14 explained that jurors prefer to hear DNA evidence over 
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technological evidence, which they find harder to visualise.  This may be linked to the 
influence of media portrayals of DNA, which perhaps lead individuals to feel more 
comfortable with it, and find easier to understand, when it is presented to them in court as 
members of a jury.  This is related to the ‘CSI effect’, something that would not have been a 
consideration of juries of the past who were predominantly hearing about eyewitnesses and 
confessions.  The ‘CSI effect’ is defined as “the ascribed influence of fictionalised and/or 
‘reality-based’ television crime programs upon audience knowledge and expectations of the 
criminal justice process” (Huey 2010, p49).  Whilst some argue that there is a lack of 
academic study examining the extent of the ‘CSI effect’ (Dowler et al., 2006), the comments 
of the QC suggest that it can influence juries: 
“One of the problems that creates is the jury who watch too much television think that 
unless there’s somebody in a white coat, there isn’t enough evidence” (QC) 
This is illustrative of the central role that science and technology now plays, not only during 
the investigative stage, but once the case is being heard at court23.  This also demonstrates a 
shift from a past focus upon confessions and eyewitnesses to tangible evidence.  However, 
whilst juries might feel a ‘familiarity’ with some evidence as a result of media coverage, 
there are questions around how juries understand the complex evidence that is often 
presented to them as they, alongside judges and magistrates, “rarely have scientific 
knowledge or skills, particularly across the range of disciplines that could be involved in a 
particular case” (Carson 2007, p414).  Indeed, according to the QC the jury do not fully 
understand the detail of such evidence and that this is compounded in cases where there is a 
dispute amongst experts on an issue.  He also explained that this necessitates careful 
consideration of how such evidence is presented to the jury. 
That is not to say that the balance has shifted entirely away from those perhaps more 
traditional forms of evidence.  SD 13 explained that even in those cases where they have 
compelling forensic evidence, Barristers like to present a case that also features eye witnesses 
as they feel that these are particularly jury friendly: 
“Even when we’ve got really good forensic evidence, we’ll always try and find good 
eye-witnesses as well” (SD 13) 
                                                          
23 One detective also explained how jury members today are sometimes shown ‘body graphics’ to 
depict the victim’s injuries so that they do not have to view graphic crime scene photos, an example of 
the impact that technology is having upon the way in which evidence is presented to juries. 
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It is clear that the availability of technological and scientific evidence has an impact on cases 
beyond the investigative process itself.  New tools and evidence allow the police and 
prosecutors to present cases that are arguably stronger than those of the past when they relied 
upon confessions and the accuracy of eyewitnesses.  This has in turn presented difficulties 
around ensuring continuity of evidence, risks of contamination, detailed documenting and 
justification of why certain decisions were made.  These are issues that are exacerbated by 
other changes.  As DNA becomes increasingly sensitive, issues of contamination are 
amplified and, as budgets become tighter, decisions around what are sent for testing become 
increasingly difficult.  These concerns will be returned to later in this chapter.  Finally, 
developments in this area have led to changes in what areas are open to challenge by the 
defence, now that interviews are recorded the other side must pursue other avenues to attack.   
A Question of Detective Skills? 
 
“The SIO from day one, clearly, you can look through his decision-making, and 
clearly always thought that the forensic evidence was going to come in because of the 
nature of the attack, and it never did, and suddenly finds himself 6 months down the 
line thinking “where do I go now?”” (SD 13) 
It was clear from the interviews that the importance placed upon science and technology, and 
DNA particularly, has led some detectives, both former and serving, to wonder whether the 
advent of science and frequent presence of forensic opportunities could lead to difficulties 
when those rare cases that do not feature any useful forensic evidence arise.  The above 
remark is demonstrative of this concern.  This former detective, who now works as an advisor 
to SIOs, was asked whether anything has been lost with developments in science and 
technology: 
“That’s a good question that actually. What I think we may have lost is that SIOs very 
often rely on it when it’s not there. So, I probably class myself as a little bit of an old 
fashioned SIO in many ways, in as much as, that some of the mistakes that I see are 
that they don’t investigate it properly because they’re always looking for the easy 
route” (FD 2) 
Many of the detectives explained that the retrieval of DNA evidence at a crime scene today 
would often ensure an early resolution of the case, whereas in the past detectives would not 
have such opportunities and so they would have to thoroughly investigate the case using 
house-to-house, local intelligence and other more traditional techniques.  Despite noting that 
the role of DNA in investigations may be somewhat inflated, McCartney’s (2006) supports 
this.  One respondent that she interviewed explained how the police perspective towards 
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forensics can lead to tunnel vision and a lack of focus upon other lines of inquiry, “there 
tends to be a reliance on forensic evidence in terms of once you have it, other avenues aren’t 
followed up” (McCartney 2006, p185).    SD 8 explained that because of DNA evidence SIOs 
today are not used to running such protracted cases and so can struggle when cases, which do 
not feature forensic evidence, arise as these will likely be lengthy investigations.  
This viewpoint was somewhat reiterated by FD 3 who felt that there has been a reliance on 
such techniques simply because they are typically present in a homicide investigation, more 
so than it being because people are looking for an easy route.  FD 3 agreed that the reliance 
on science has come at a cost of “old-fashioned detective work” (FD 3) as they believed 
these skills had been lost “to a certain degree” (FD 3) as a result.  Again, this is reinforced 
by McCartney (2006) as one interviewee stated that “the police can be blinded by their own 
science and believe it will save them from investigating a case properly”.  It is interesting to 
note, however, that despite acknowledging that some sort of forensic evidence is usually 
present, FD 3 discussed a recent case in which there was not any, and another recent case in 
which there were limited forensics.  Also referring to this case, SD 13 described this as a 
situation in which he would like to bring in a team from 20 years ago to see what progress 
they might make.  Although cases such as these are seemingly rare, a second interviewee 
described an investigation into a homicide that occurred in the late 2000s and that remains 
unsolved at present, which too features limited forensic evidence, despite the brutal nature of 
the attack, as well as a lack of technological evidence such as CCTV.   
This was not the view of all interviewees.  SD 27 felt strongly that advances in technology 
and science have not led to the diminishing of detective skills.  They argued that the training 
that is in place and the setup of the MIR would prevent this.  SD 27 stated that if this did 
happen it would be the result of laziness as opposed to anything else.  The detective described 
DNA evidence as “a bonus” and that a systematic investigation would still be required.  
Additionally, the concern that detectives rely on scientific and technological evidence is 
somewhat challenged when we consider other literature, for there is some suggestion that 
such evidence does not play the key role in investigations that the data implied it does.  
Brodeur (2009) through his examination of homicide case files in Quebec found that 
scientific expertise, although important, actually played a relatively minor role in the majority 
of cases that were studied.  Williams and Johnson (2005) also stress that biological material 
that may be suitable for DNA testing and input onto the database is rarely recovered from 
crime scenes, going on to also note that its role in detections is also marginal.  On the other 
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hand and in exploring the “reliance on science” and detective skills in relation to the 
investigation of cold cases, Allsop (2012) found that the two worked hand in hand and that 
detective skills are necessary in ensuring efficient use of science and technology.  Further, the 
literature suggests that detective work has shifted from being an ‘art’ or ‘craft’ to a ‘science’ 
“as detectives have had to master increasingly complex technology and scientific methods of 
investigation” (Tong and Bowling 2006, p324), something that the authors recognise as being 
a change from detective work of the past.  The view that detective work now is more of a 
science was reflected by SD 16: 
“I think we went through a phase with detectives where they would like to say it was 
an ‘art’ whereas the generation that’s coming through now would say it was a science 
and I think there is a bit of an ‘art’ to it so when I’m talking about instinct and 
listening to that so there will always be an ‘art’ and ‘science’, but I think the balance 
has shifted for it to be a more systematic, more scientific, more hard data”(SD 16) 
Some of the former detectives interviewed stated the importance of pursuing all possible 
lines of inquiry whilst capitalising on the forensic evidence that has been recovered from the 
scene.  They explained that it was important to understand the importance of the forensic 
evidence, but not to be “blinkered” (FD 1) in only pursuing the individual who may have left 
that evidence behind, for there may be others who were involved in the commission of the 
offence.  The detective explained that it was a combination of exploring all lines of inquiry, 
whilst making the most of the valuable evidence that you have.  One detective described a 
case that they had worked on in the mid-2000s, the circumstances of which appear to indicate 
that as well as keeping an open mind whilst making the most of technological and forensic 
evidence, what can perhaps be deemed detective intuition or hunches can work effectively 
alongside it: 
“I remember when I was an SIO, and two of my detectives had been to the scene, I 
asked them where they had been, because I didn't know anything about it, and they 
said: “oh we've just been to see an old drunk that has been pulled out of the canal” and 
I thought “what's that all about?” So I said “was there anything unusual?” and they 
said that: “there was a bit of blood under the canal bridge and that there was an 
Inspector out there patrolling the scene but we left”. So I said to the Sergeant: “Well 
I'm going to have a look at it”.  I went out there and the Inspector was about to close 
the scene and I said: “hang on a minute; I want to have a look at this”.  So, you've got 
a canal very close to the City Centre, so you've got a bridge that goes over it and on the 
towpath was a half-eaten burger, you've got blood on the wall, so you've got blood 
there, you've got possessions that are scattered on the tow path, the body is out of the 
water.  I'm looking at him and he's got a broken nose and I think there is something 
funny about this, so I treat it as a potential murder investigation then and do all the 
business that you’ve got to do. We started getting information very quickly and we got 
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CCTV, CCTV showed him with somebody around his neck being led towards that 
canal, and we convicted one person of murder.  Forensically we had blood on his 
clothes, which was the deceased's blood.   Another example of forensic evidence, but 
had I not gone to the scene it would have been swept under the carpet” (FD 3) 
Whilst advances in technology and science are undeniably significant, one detective 
emphasised that this information provides only direction and so all possible lines of enquiry 
must still be explored.  This was their response when asked whether science and technology 
can ever be a hindrance in investigations: 
“I think people have got to realise, for example, with intelligence evidence gathered 
from the mobile phone, it’s the phone not the person, that doesn’t mean to say that the 
person’s been there, that phone’s been there, it’s not the person.  I think sometimes 
people can assume the wrong thing by that.  ANPR24, for example, if that hits 
somewhere, it’s the car, it doesn’t tell you who’s driving it, but it gives 
direction…were there any pictures taken? Where was it going? Did they call in at the 
petrol station? Is there footage at the petrol station of the individual? It can give you 
a new line of inquiry” (FD 1) 
Ultimately, as FD 17, who now works within the police service as a civilian, acknowledged 
whilst the lack of forensic or technological evidence would be a “knockback” (FD 17) to an 
investigation, there are so many other lines of inquiry to pursue in today’s investigations that 
there will always be other avenues to explore, thanks also to these advances.  As with FD 1, 
FD 17 stressed that investigations should not rely on just one particular line of enquiry.  This 
is especially important when we consider that one of the primary concerns surrounding the 
use of science and technology in investigations was the difficulties that are faced in keeping 
up with developments in this field.  
Lagging behind? The Impact of Continually Evolving Science and Technology 
  
This chapter has shown that developments in technology and science have provided 
investigators with valuable tools to assist them during investigations.  The development of 
DNA testing is one example of this and which continues to evolve.  According to the data, 
however, this continued evolution has proved to be challenging for investigators (similar 
findings were uncovered by Brookman et al (Forthcoming).  During the fieldwork I was 
informed of two new techniques involving DNA testing, DNA SenCe and DNA 17.  DNA 
SenCe allows tiny amounts of DNA to be analysed and which focuses on “maximising the 
sensitivity of the standard DNA profiling success” (Laboratorytalk, 2008).  FD 3 explained 
that this approach allowed those investigating a murder to secure solid evidence against the 
                                                          
24 Automatic Number Plate Recognition. 
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person they suspected to be the perpetrator.  Two detectives that were speaking to me 
informally between interviews mentioned DNA 17; they remarked that this new technique is 
almost too sensitive, which was confirmed by the literature.  Describing DNA 17 as “the 
biggest change to profiling since 2000”, Forensic Access (2014) urges caution as DNA 17, 
which was introduced in July 2014, is considerably more sensitive than SGM Plus, which it 
replaces, and that as a consequence:  
DNA is more likely to be detected in many more cases…in many of these cases it will 
be even more important to consider that this DNA could have been transferred 
completely innocently; from a passer-by, for example, or by secondary or tertiary 
transfer.  “Contamination” of the crime sample may also come from many more 
routes and scenarios and prevention mechanisms will need greater consideration.  
Continued and rapid changes will likely exacerbate the concerns that have been discussed 
here: if there are concerns that the increased use of DNA, and indeed other forensic evidence, 
has led to a diminishing of more traditional detective skills, the caution urged above becomes 
even more pertinent, since the increased sensitivity of DNA testing means that keeping an 
open mind and thoroughly exploring and investigating all possible lines of enquiry should 
remain a priority for those investigating homicide.  The concerns around continuity and 
contamination are also heightened as DNA becomes increasingly sensitive: 
“Years ago when we needed buckets of blood to get a profile from it wasn’t an issue, 
now you can get DNA maybe from a fingerprint you have to be really careful, even 
breathing on an item could introduce foreign DNA, so it comes with issues” (SD 15) 
Although advances have been rapid in the last few decades, England and Wales were 
amongst the last countries in Europe to benefit from DNA 17.  During a presentation 
observed during the fieldwork it became apparent that the closure of the Forensic Science 
Service in 2012, and a lack of government funding, has meant that England and Wales are no 
longer leading the way in developments in forensic science, as one scientist remarked, 
England and Wales have gone from “pioneer to nowhere near” (Fieldwork Notes).  The QC 
described the closure of the Forensic Science Service as “awful” and the new system as 
“disjointed”.  Therefore, whilst changes that do occur can be problematic for investigations 
in the manner as discussed above, this also highlights how changes that are driven at 
government level can affect the resources that are available to the police, resources which 
undoubtedly play a major role in the investigation of homicide. 
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It is not just advances in DNA that the police must keep up to date with.  A recurring issue 
that surrounded the use of telephone data was that the police service struggle to keep up with 
those rapid advancements in technology.  As FD 3 put it: 
 “We need to be on top of our game and we are not because we are lagging behind 
and every force is the same, because it is changing all the time…and we are lagging 
behind” (FD 3) 
The phrase ‘lagging behind’ was used by more than one interviewee and it was apparent that 
they felt that their capabilities are not always on a par with what technology today can do 
because it develops so quickly.  During the fieldwork it was evident during one briefing that 
the police were unable to examine the newly developed mobile phone of one of the suspects 
in a homicide.  In this case the police were unable to access the Blackberry messages of the 
persons involved25. 
Whilst there was no suggestion from the interviewees that the struggle to keep up with 
progressions in science and technology had hampered their investigations to a significant 
degree it was an issue that was regularly raised, indicating that it is a concern of today’s 
detective.  According to SD 23 the reason for the difficulties in maintaining pace with such 
developments is a lack of funding: 
“I think the issue is money, it’s not our inability to keep up with technology, it’s 
working in increasingly reducing budgets, I mean even now you’d think that that the 
police would have at their disposal an endless pot of money around forensic 
examinations, we can’t just submit, we have to prioritise and assess what we submit, 
when we submit forensically. And a crime should never not be solved because you 
can’t afford it, but the sad reality probably is that, you know, um some stuff never gets 
submitted because of the cost implications, so I think going back to the technology 
question, um you know, the police will always struggle to keep up with criminality 
from a cost perspective really. That said though, don’t underestimate them, there’s 
more going on than you’d appreciate” (SD 23) 
It is to the issue of budget that I now turn. 
 
                                                          
25 The issues that certain handsets can present are reflected in the literature.  Al Mutawa et al (2012) 
examined BlackBerrys, iPhones and Android handsets in order to identify whether an individual’s 
social networking activity conducted through their phones was stored and so could be subject to 
examination.  Interestingly, they found that “no traces of social networking activities could be 
recovered from BlackBerry devices”, unlike with the Android and iPhone, both of which stored a 
significant amount of data “that could be recovered and used by the investigator” (Al Mutawa et al 
2012, p533).   
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Doing More with Less: The Impact on Budget 
 
“We are expected to do much more with less and inquiries now bring lines of inquiry, 
which even 10 years ago weren’t even thought of, so resources is probably the biggest 
issue” (SD 15) 
Carson (2007, p408) writes that “[the idea that] justice might have a price tag or budget 
offends popular sensibilities and is rarely highlighted in academic discourse about criminal 
justice”.  Whilst the idea of discussing budget in relation to crime, and homicide in particular 
may seem uncomfortable, the cuts to police budgets mean that it is a necessary consideration, 
particularly when we consider that the scientific and technological tools that can dominate 
homicide investigations demand substantial expenditure.  This was explored by Allsop (2013) 
in her work on cold case investigations.  Allsop (2013, p364) considers the investigation of 
cold cases in two pilot studies, which required “upgrading DNA extracts and employing 
advanced profiling techniques on samples retained from historic crimes”.  Allsop (2013, 
p364) explains that Operation Advance, which looked at historic stranger rape offences saw 
the conviction of 47 offenders for crimes that had been perpetrated between 1980 and 2005, 
and which cost £1.75 million, “a relatively small investment in policing terms given the 
results achieved”.  Additionally, Allsop (2013) reported that Operation Stealth, an 
examination of unsolved homicides also saw encouraging results. 
Although caution must be urged, as costs will depend upon the circumstances of the 
offence26, the advent of scientific and technological tools will impact upon the cost of police 
investigations of homicide.  To give some idea as to the monetary demands of such tools, 
during a presentation given by an SIO during the fieldwork, it was noted that sending just one 
exhibit for forensic testing could cost around £2,500.  Similarly, the homicide case file from 
the 1990s reveals the budgetary demands that forensics can create.  In this case the victim 
was reported missing in the mid-1990s, but the remains not found until the late 2000s.  The 
case file notes that the forensic spend after the discovery of the body was £26,000 and notes 
that there is an initial cap on ‘Category A’ investigations of £50,000.     
However, budget is not something that would have been a key concern for the detective of 
the past as the data reveal a sense that money would be very much ‘thrown at’ a homicide 
investigation: 
                                                          
26 I asked the detectives that I interviewed if they could give me an estimate as to how much a 
homicide investigation will cost and whether this has changed, but they were all unable to answer.  
They explained that the differences between homicides made even giving estimates difficult. 
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“With [names case] they threw money at it.  I would come on duty at 6 o’clock in the 
morning to get to [names place] for 7 o’clock and then back on at 6 o’clock the next 
day, which went on day after day and you’re talking 18 hours overtime for all those 
people for all those days and we worked rest days because they cancelled rest days, 
but no one batted an eyelid because it was important and had to be done, nowadays 
you would be “who’s on rest days, who’s not on rest days” and all that would be 
taken into account” (FD 4) 
Although this observation does not refer to any forensic or technological costs, which would 
not have been prevalent in 1981, it does illustrate the general attitude towards homicide 
budgets of the past.  Again, this was evident in the case files where there was little mention of 
budget in the 1980s investigation.  This is a view that the data suggest has changed and has 
impacted upon the way in which scientific and technological techniques and evidence is used.  
This is also reflected in the following extract taken from the SIO policy file relating to the 
1990s homicide.  The victim’s body was eventually found in the late 2000s and the extract 
demonstrates the SIO’s thoughts on forensics at that stage.  It should be noted that there was 
no mention of budget in the file that was produced in the 1990s, which may be due to there 
being less emphasis on budget at the time, but also likely because it was a missing persons 
case with no body, therefore there was no opportunity for forensic work to be carried out: 
“The forensic spend is clearly significant and will increase as these additional 
submissions are made.  This is a very high profile and important investigation and I 
believe every forensic opportunity to identify an offender should be pursued” (1990s 
Homicide Case File) 
There was a sense during the interviews also that difficult decisions had to be made in respect 
of what forensic exhibits are or are not sent off for testing because of budget considerations.  
This too was evident in the 1990s case.  The SIO who was appointed following the discovery 
of the victim’s remains in the late 2000s writes that what has been spent in relation to 
forensics has been “necessary and proportionate” (1990s Homicide Case File).  This is 
indicative that SIOs are increasingly mindful of budget.  The following comment, taken from 
an interview with SD 15, summarises how the police manage the obvious need for testing of 
exhibits with this mindfulness of budget: 
“We make a decision early on, say on forensics you may have 1,000 items that you 
can send off to analyse, but is that proportionate for what you are trying to achieve?  
So you sit down and have a forensic management meeting, you’ll sit down with your 
crime scene advisor, the SIO, the exhibits officer and you will come up with a plan, if 
you like, for phased, you may phase your submissions, so if you have the culprit’s 
fingerprints at the scene, do you need 30 of his fingerprints at the scene? So you will 
achieve the evidential standard in the least expenditure” (SD 15) 
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Whilst this appears to be a logical approach to the way in which scientific and technological 
evidence and budgets are managed, SD 23, who works for a different police service, 
suggested that there can be conflict between the SIO and those responsible for the budget: 
“I’ve never scrimped on resourcing, but I have had to go into some real battles along 
the way with budget holders.  Because I don’t hold the budget for forensics, I don’t 
hold a budget for telecoms, I don’t hold the budget for external technology providers, 
so I will ask for that stuff to be carried out or those things to be done, but I will have 
to lock horns along the way with budget holders” (SD 23) 
One former detective emphasised also that budget is something that SIOs have to be mindful 
of and stressed the importance of SIOs writing clear policies and strategies around this in 
order that they will withstand scrutiny.  This is important when we consider that defence 
barristers will ask questions around why certain exhibits were or were not sent off for 
examination: 
“That’s not saying that money is the first thing we think about but we have got a 
limited budget, so we’ve got to be more realistic about what we can do and the more 
precise SIOs can get with these policies and strategies of what really needs to be done 
that means that everything comes together and we get the right outcome and that 
outcome will stand the test of time and the reviews and scrutiny and everything else” 
(FD 9)  
Fundamentally, the interviewees indicated that the issue of money is not something that 
would hinder an investigation and that investigators would never be told that they could not 
have additional money to progress, as the quote below from a former detective who continues 
to work within major crime investigation shows: 
“We’ve lost staff and people have lost their jobs as a result of the issues that are 
around at the moment, so we are always conscious of finance but on homicide nobody 
has ever said to me “you cannot have that analysed because of money”” (SD 15) 
Budget is clearly something that the current detectives are mindful of.  This leads us to 
consider the view of some that the availability of science and technology in investigations 
could lead investigators to go too wide in their efforts to ensure that everything is covered 
and everything is collected, reinforcing the view that there needs to be an awareness of 
budgets and proportionality.  The following quote illustrates the importance of this and shows 
that there are such cases in which investigators will indeed go too wide ‘just in case’: 
“I think there should always be those checks and balances and the person who holds 
the purse strings in this force will always say “in theory this is no limit to the amount 
of money you can spend on this investigation but you need to convince me there is a 
purpose or potential there” and in my experience some SIOs do go off at tangents and 
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think “well I’ll get this done because in my head this might possibly lead to a very 
peripheral, association to the crime” but going back to pragmatism and what is 
realistic, we can’t do everything all the time” (FD 27) 
In summary, it is clear that those interviewed did not feel budgetary restrictions proved to be 
a hindrance to investigations.  At the same time, however, the data suggest that investigators 
are conscious of the cost that scientific and technological tools and evidence can bring, which 
can lead to difficult discussions to be held with those responsible for budget and careful 
decisions to be made in respect of what evidence is tested.  Police budgets continue to face 
cuts and so such difficult decisions will surely endure.     
Conclusion 
Scientific and technological tools and evidence appear to play an important role in major 
crime investigations today and have benefited investigators immeasurably, providing new 
avenues to pursue and a chance to put together a clear picture of what took place.  It has also 
changed the nature of detective work as some consider it to have shifted from being an ‘art’ 
or ‘craft’ to a ‘science’ 
These changes have also provided many new challenges, including the struggle that the 
police can face in attempts to keep up with advances in science and technology.  As 
technology continues to progress and become more sophisticated, there is the risk that the 
police will be unable to fully capitalise on this evidence and important lines of enquiry may 
be missed or lost.  The budget pressures that police forces continue to face perhaps intensify 
this, budget pressures that could potentially affect the pace of developments in their 
technological capabilities.  When we consider that the cost of sending exhibits for forensic 
testing is significant, it is clear that increased budget pressures may also mean that difficult 
decisions around what evidence is sent for such testing will continue, placing investigators 
under further pressure. 
This chapter has also shown that although cases in which there is a lack of relevant forensic 
or technological evidence are rare, they do occur.  Additionally, as DNA testing becomes 
increasingly sensitive there will be a growing need for investigators to be mindful of the fact 
that DNA evidence could have been left at the scene innocently and must therefore be sure to 
pursue all lines of enquiry thoroughly.  If traditional detective skills have diminished with the 
availability of sophisticated scientific and technological evidence, those investigations that do 
not feature such evidence may struggle.   
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Chapter Eight 
‘The most accurate thing I have ever seen is ‘Life on Mars’’27: Changing 
Detective Status and Culture 
 
The previous chapters have shown that the investigation of homicide in England and Wales 
has changed dramatically over the past four decades.  It is perhaps unsurprising therefore that 
the very culture of detective work and its status also appears to have changed. It is these 
matters that will be the focus of this last findings chapter. 
The findings in relation to the kudos that used to surround detective work will firstly be 
presented during which we consider the ‘job for life versus ‘just a job’ debate that emerged 
during the interviews, before I move on to discuss how such matters have seemingly led to a 
decline in detective recruitment.  The findings that emerged in relation to the changing 
culture of detective work will then be presented, with particular focus upon the drinking 
culture, the feared Senior Investigating Officer and the female detective.  Finally, I consider 
the way in which training has developed as a way of illustrating further the extent of change 
to the role.   
The Loss of Kudos 
 
According to the interviewees, to be a detective during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s 
carried with it a degree of kudos.  Detectives at this time were seen as being different to other 
police officers, as ‘something special’.  They described how detectives were considered to 
know a lot and were perceived as being more expert than others.  Detectives were also said to 
be the most likely to take risks, which is evident in the literature (Hobbs, 1988; Maguire and 
Norris, 1992).  SD 16 who joined the police service in 1994, described being a uniformed 
officer going into the CID office as “daunting” and explained that there was an “air of 
superiority” and an “us and them” relationship between the uniformed officers and those in 
CID.  Such phrasing is demonstrative of both the kudos that detectives carried and of the 
impression that they were set apart from everyone else: 
“Because you were a detective you’d carry a bit of kudos with you” (FD 1) 
                                                          
27 ‘Life on Mars’ was a 2006 BBC television series.  In series one DCI Sam Tyler wakes up as a 
detective in the 1970s.  The show depicted his challenges at adapting to a very different world of 
investigations. 
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However, the majority of detectives, both former and serving, agreed that this kudos no 
longer exists.  According to one interviewee the detective is now viewed as being no more or 
less important than a uniformed police officer, suggesting also that the divide between 
uniformed officers and detectives is no longer apparent: 
 “You are not seen as something different anymore, you are just a policeman in plain-
clothes” (FD 4) 
On the other hand, some detectives felt that this kudos remained.  When speaking to two 
serving detectives informally between interviews they suggested that it remained because of 
the work and effort that they had put into becoming detectives, and that this set them apart 
from those in uniform.  This was later discussed during an interview with one of these 
individuals, who was a junior SIO.  He explained that being a detective and wearing plain 
clothes showed that they were elite: 
“I worked for my D. [Not wearing a uniform] is our badge of eliteness” (SD 14) 
Nevertheless, the dominant view was that the kudos no longer existed.  Some felt that other 
areas of policing now carried kudos and that there was an equal amount of status for those 
working in the firearms department, for example.  Others suggested that there is more 
awareness of detective work now and so the mystery that used to surround it is no longer 
evident.  Alternatively, one interviewee noted that the term ‘detective’ itself has been used 
too widely and suggested that this has played a part in the loss of kudos surrounding this 
position: 
“A fingerprint officer’s called a detective, a scenes of crime officer’s called a 
detective, a family support officer’s called a detective, but are they detectives? And I 
think we shouldn’t be too liberal with the way we use the term detective. Detective 
should apply to something, not just a person that works in plain clothes, it should be a 
quality to be a detective, and to carry that badge of honour with you “I am a 
detective”, which says you are something special and I believe that they are 
something special” (FD 1) 
As the interviews continued it became increasingly apparent that the status of the detective 
has changed greatly and the way that the detectives themselves view their position has shifted 
significantly, this became apparent as the phrase ‘just a job’ was repeated.  It was suggested 
by many of the interviewees that for younger officers today to be a detective is merely seen 
as ‘just a job’ and not perhaps seen to be the calling that it was for those working during the 
1970s, 1980s and early 1990s: 
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“I think it’s the same type of breed of people. I think that perhaps what has gone now 
is the yearning of some people, they don’t have the calling anymore they see it as just 
a job, people join the police service as a job, I mean I never thought I’d ever say that 
but people do, they don’t see this as a service they’re doing to a society or something 
they feel that they want to do, it’s a job” (FD 1) 
One interviewee outlined the benefits of the ‘job for life’ ethos that used to exist.  FD 6 
suggested that the vocational nature of detective work engendered a commitment to the role 
and detectives would work very long hours without being concerned by overtime: 
“It was something about the vocational work that gave you commitment and drive, 
you worked long hours, you’d come in at 8 o’clock in the morning and if you were 
still there at 8 o’clock at night you wouldn’t question it, you wouldn’t say “I need the 
overtime”, it was just done as part of the job” (FD 6)     
These comments do provide us with an indication as to what might have been the impact of 
this shift in ethos.  Specifically, it suggests that there has been a loss of commitment to the 
role with more emphasis upon working hours and pay.  Indeed one serving detective 
suggested that those joining the police service today are mindful of the fact that they have to 
pay off university fees and so are looking for something that will provide them with a stable 
income: 
“I think it goes back to society and we, as the police, recruit from society and as 
detectives we recruit from the police and the pay that constables get now is pretty 
horrific, but a lot of people come out of university, they need a job that’s a steady 
income to pay off their fees and they don’t see it as “this is something that I’m going 
to be doing for 30 years” they see it as “I’ve got to earn this money”” (SD 24) 
In considering the reasons why there has been a shift from a ‘job for life’ to ‘just a job’ mind-
set, many of those interviewed suggested that there is an increasing desire amongst 
individuals to try and achieve a ‘work life’ balance. 
“People want to do their job and go home” (SD 21)  
However, it is clear that the work required of a detective still does not lend itself to achieving 
a ‘work life’ balance due to the unpredictable working hours, particularly during the initial 
stages of a murder investigation: 
“The first 3-4 days can be utter madness, then I say you’re working through, working 
through means from 7/8 in the morning to when it finished at night time, which can be 
11/12, you’re working through most days and I’d say right through whatever rest 
days, you know, 7-10 days right on the trot on the first start of a murder” (SD 24) 
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One SIO talked about how family life can be affected by the work and the commitment it 
requires: 
“Obviously your own home life gets put on the backburner. In one year my wife was 
40 in March and I was 40 in December and I missed both 40th birthdays because I 
picked up murder investigations. And you can’t walk away from them because if that’s 
your role at the time…” (SD 8) 
The possible impact of this shift in mind-set was that the commitment, that one former 
detective suggested came as a result of the ‘job for life’ ethos, is no longer there. 
“Absolutely, we have a nightmare here sometimes, “no I’m not staying on” and 
tumbleweed when you ask them to, which we never had, never, never had back in the 
day” (SD 24)  
In summary, the findings suggest that whereas the former detectives talked of detective work 
as a vocation or even a ‘calling’ and the role carried much kudos, today’s detectives are more 
likely to take other ‘lifestyle’ factors into account, such as the working hours. However, it 
became clear that Police Services are experiencing difficulties in recruiting detectives, 
suggesting perhaps that the role has changed to such an extent that individuals no longer wish 
to pursue it.  
A Decline in Recruitment 
  
The data reveal that difficulties in recruiting detectives were reportedly being experienced by 
five of the seven forces, in both England and Wales, which were represented in this study.  
SD 25 told of there being 15 vacancies for detectives in their police force, but a lack of 
applicants.  According to one serving detective, who joined the police service in the 1980s, 
this issue would not have been a concern for police services 30 years ago: 
“Years ago you’d be filling dead men’s shoes” (SD 18)  
The issue of recruitment has been recognised elsewhere (HMIC, 2017).  When asked why 
police services were struggling to recruit detectives many interviewees were at a loss to 
explain it.  However, the following comment demonstrates how the role of the detective was 
viewed in the early 1990s.  A serving detective with 24 years’ service, SD 8 talks about why 
he wanted to become a detective.  The reasons given are linked to the kudos and culture that 
was associated with the position.  This might explain why, with a loss of kudos and a change 
in detective culture, there are now issues with recruitment: 
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“In my day it was more about being a detective, because when you had someone 
escape from prison the CID would come on at 4 o’clock in the morning smashing 
every door in the street causing absolute mayhem getting control of an estate and 
they’d catch the person and it was great and then by 11 or 12 o’clock they’d be 
playing snooker and they’d be drinking and it was that type of culture and the 
youngsters wanted to be a part of that gang because they wouldn’t, half of them 
wouldn’t carry a radio, they were rebels really, they were sent all over the force to do 
different jobs and for me I used to look and think I need to be a part of that and I did 
everything I could to be a part of it, they had the best jobs, that’s how I saw it, you 
know, they chased the best people, they arrested the best people, they were allocated 
the best work,…I found it really exciting the prospect of being part of that team you 
know” (SD 8)  
Another explanation was that there are other factors that inform an individual’s decisions in 
deciding whether or not to become a detective today, such as the working hours required and 
the pay, as was discussed previously.  SD 24 explained that whilst a uniformed officer is 
required to work shifts, which they acknowledged brings its own challenges; they will receive 
a quite significant shift allowance, which a detective would not.  Additionally, SD 24 
suggested that whilst the uniformed officer has to work their 10 hour shift, once that is over 
they can go home, whereas she explained that when the detective goes home they are still 
thinking about what work needs to be done.  SD 24 was of the view that nobody wants that 
responsibility for less money: 
“One of the things that’s very prominent is the fact that nowadays if you are a 
uniformed police officer you are on shifts, which is horrible but you get quite a 
significant shift allowance, which is thousands of pounds more than a detective with 
less, I would say, responsibility long term. Although they have responsibility for ten 
hours where they’ve got to keep everybody safe and do the job and answer everything, 
but at the end of the ten hours they say “thanks very much” and go home, whereas 
detectives wake up at 2 o’clock going “oh my god I haven’t done that”.  Nobody 
wants that responsibility with less money” (SD 24) 
SD 25 suggested that the pressures that the organisation are facing more broadly, such as 
cuts, are damaging the “mojo” of the police, which will in turn lead individuals to be reluctant 
to join the police and reluctant to progress through the ranks: 
“We are a-political and we are not allowed to have a view on politics, but it does feel 
like under this current government that there has been outright hatred for the police, 
it is barely concealed from my point of view...they have knocked the stuffing out of us 
and I am not sure how we will get it back, us as an organisation have taken an 
absolute kicking over the last five years and I think that general the confidence and 
gusto of what we had before that made us successful is gone and I find that really 
frustrating” (SD 25) 
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SD 24 suggested that the problems around recruitment might have a detrimental impact in 
years to come: 
“I think having a lack of people wanting to come into the detective world, a lack of 
experience in investigating major crimes and everything around that, I think that’s 
going to have a knock on effect in the future, I may not see it, but it’s going to have a 
huge knock on effect and if you did your... your PhD, a review of it in 8 years, 10 
years’ time you might find a poor situation in relation to it” (SD 24) 
This chapter has so far considered the findings in relation to the changing status of the 
detective and the problems with recruitment.  The data revealed that as well as changes in 
respect of the status of the detective, there have been significant changes in the culture 
surrounding detective work.  It is these findings that will now be presented. 
The Changing Detective Culture 
 
The majority of the interviewees agreed that detective culture has changed significantly over 
the years.  This was a view held by both the former and serving detectives.  The former 
detectives talked about the culture that used to exist particularly in terms of the working 
hours and drinking culture.  Many remarked that detective work during the 1970s and 1980s 
was very much like the television series ‘Life on Mars’, a British show that depicted detective 
work at this time: 
“The most accurate thing I have ever seen is a television series and it’s that ‘Life on 
Mars’, I know its entertainment and all the rest of it, but it was! It was macho, it was 
very sexist, it was definitely testosterone, it was definitely work hard and play hard, it 
was all of those things” (FD 6) 
“There’s the standing joke amongst detectives: the first time I watched it I thought I 
was watching a documentary” (SD 25) 
They spoke of a ‘longest hours’ culture and explained that they had to be seen to work the 
longest hours and be the last to leave whether or not they had work to do.  One former 
detective linked this to the machismo culture that used to surround detectives:   
“You’ve got that whole culture thing then, the hard-nosed, long hours, hard drinking, 
hard smoking detectives...I don’t think there is as much machismo, being able to do it, 
“yeah I’ve got to work on yet I have done 16 hours, I can do 16 hours and I’m still 
going out and having 25 beers and then”...huge cultural change” (FD 5) 
The culture of the 1970s and 1980s is demonstrated in the remarks of a scientist who worked 
on the Yorkshire Ripper investigation:  
 172 
“One of the things that I did learn, although I rather had known it to some extent 
before, is that police officers, particularly the senior police officers, have an 
enormous capacity for work and play” (Yorkshire Ripper Archive) 
The detectives’ approach to drinking alcohol appeared to be particularly demonstrative of the 
extent to which the culture has changed.  
From Police Bars to Coffee Bars 
  
The drinking culture was described as having been an important part of detective work 
historically (Hobbs, 1988).  The importance of the drinking culture was evident in the 
comments of the detectives who spoke of the social side of attending the ten-week training 
course.  FD 11, for example, described it as “a lot of fun out on the booze every night”.  FD 
12 considered it an integral part of being a detective at this time: 
“Young detectives used to save up slush funds to go on those and come back three 
stone heavier and a few hundred pounds lighter because of the social side of it!  All 
looked upon as an intrinsic part of being a detective” (FD 12) 
SD 8 explained that such importance was placed upon drinking that if you did not partake in 
it you were considered odd: 
“In years gone by that was the culture, you had to be in the pub afterward or you 
were seen as odd, you weren’t part of the team, it was an equal part of the 
investigation process really” (SD 8) 
Police services had their own bars that police officers and detectives could drink in.  This 
clearly went some way to facilitating the drinking culture and many interviewees explained 
that the closure of these played a part in its decline.  However, one serving detective 
explained how in the early years of her career, detectives would keep alcohol in their desk 
drawer so that they could have a drink.  The following remark demonstrates how the 
importance of drink was apparent until just 10 years ago: 
“Years ago there used to be a much more social aspect to being a detective, I mean 
they had bars in police stations, I mean there were terrible, terrible things that 
happened like drink driving and bad things and there were detectives even when I 
started like 18/19 years ago, it would be after a late you’d go out for a drink, up until 
probably about 10 years ago that sort of started going.  Nowadays it’s not a very 
social environment and I think it stopped when there were no bars in the police 
stations, which wasn’t a wholly bad thing but people then started realising the work 
life balance” (SD 24) 
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When asked what was the most important part of being a detective working on homicide 
investigations, FD 7 responded that it was bringing some closure for the families, but also the 
sense of having worked well together as a team, which was ‘celebrated’ in the pub: 
“Seeing the bad people locked up and bringing some relief to their families, but 
there’s also a sense within the team as well of a job well done and then you go on the 
piss” (FD 7) 
It was apparent that the drinking culture historically was significant.  However, several 
detectives commented on the benefits that came with a prevalent drinking culture as some 
commented that it provided a release after a long and difficult day at work.  For some it 
seemed as though the drinking culture acted almost as a way of providing welfare to the 
detectives, they could unwind after work and talk about what had happened that day.  One 
former detective described how during the 1980s the welfare was to go down the pub and 
have a drink and suggested that this was effective.   
A serving detective who joined the police service in the late 1980s and the CID in 2000 
supported this view.  He also considered the closure of the police bars to be responsible for 
the loss of the drinking culture.  This participant believed that this proved to be detrimental to 
the detectives as they lost the opportunity to fully unwind and discuss the case with the rest of 
the team: 
“There is no opportunity now for that generic debrief in an informal setting” (SD 22)  
The change in the drinking culture that surrounded detective work became particularly 
apparent in one passing comment made during an informal chat with a detective who 
remarked that today you would be more likely to find a detective in a coffee shop, or a gym 
as Maguire and Norris (1992) found, than a pub.  The dates of Maguire and Norris’ (1992) 
findings are noteworthy as they indicate that changes in culture were evident in the early 
1990s.  This would suggest that cultural change began before the 1990s, which would 
correspond with the spotlight being shone on detective work in the 1980s. 
The findings indicate that the drinking culture amongst detectives was prevalent, but that this 
did serve a purpose in terms of providing a form of welfare to detectives whose work 
involved long hours and difficult, sometimes distressing, work.  It appears that the loss of that 
drinking culture has in some ways been detrimental in that they have lost this opportunity to 
unwind.  On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that it is quite feasible that the 
interviewees downplayed the extent of today’s drinking culture for the purposes of the 
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interview.  Although the former detectives who remain within the police service did describe 
its decline.  It is not just the detectives drinking habits that have seemingly changed.  When 
discussing culture, the interviewees also spoke about the way in which investigations were 
approached, which sometimes resulted in a tunnel vision mind-set.  It is to this that I now 
turn. 
‘We Need to Get our Man’: Feared SIOs and Tunnel Vision 
 
The way in which the interviewees described senior detectives and SIOs of the past is 
indicative of a very different culture of investigative work to that which exists today: 
“It was usually, or historically, a white male old-school detective that’s epitomised by 
your kind of ‘Ashes to Ashes28’, you know, “get him, do this, do that”” (SD 20) 
A similar description was proffered by SD 25 who joined the police service in the mid-1990s: 
“They were predominantly men in their late 40s, seasoned detectives and you could 
see that just by looking at them and they walked around in great suits [laughs] and 
they weren’t quite God status, but they were highly respected individuals” (SD 25) 
SD 8 went further and described SIOs as being feared and that this was the case as late as the 
early 1990s: 
“I think certainly in my career in the early 90s it was all about the SIO, and I say 
were the men because there weren’t any women when I was sort of growing up in the 
police.  SIOs were the Dons, the Gods, the feared ones, were the real tough hard men, 
egos, very powerful people” (SD 8) 
This status could be attributed to the years of work that individuals who held these positions 
had accomplished: 
“The Head of CID was probably the most feared man in the force.  I remember when 
I joined as a young PC in uniform, the DI who ran the CID, who ran the detectives, 
was a feared character, he ran the show really and you wouldn’t become a DS or DI 
without having done years of detective work, which was then deemed to be the hardest 
work, dealing with the most violent and most dangerous and most risky situations” 
(SD 8) 
                                                          
28 ‘Ashes to Ashes’ was a BBC series and the sequel to ‘Life on Mars’.  Featuring many of the same 
characters this series was set in the 1980s. 
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The characteristics of SIOs were also linked to the tendency for investigations to be 
approached with tunnel vision29.  FD 5 gave an example of an SIO who had decided that he 
was correct about the circumstances of a case.  FD 5 described this SIO as a “brute”: 
“He was just not a nice bloke.  He made a decision on a really strange, bizarre, 
brutal rape.  She’d been picked up by a couple, taken to a mountain top, tied up in her 
car using seatbelts and raped and dumped her.  She was interviewed and she 
described the car as being a Mitsubishi Colt, a Mitsubishi Stallion so they are quite 
rare anyway, so he decided she was wrong because she was a girly and that in fact it 
must have been a Datsun Cherry of which there were bloody thousands, so we started 
working through all the Datsun Cherry’s.  He also decided that the person that had 
done it must have come from one of the cities because if he was up here they’d know; 
they’d have picked him up because the local community would have told us who he 
was” (FD 5) 
FD 5 went on to explain that the SIO in this case was proved wrong since the offender was 
found to drive a Colt Stallion and lived in the area.  When we consider that SIOs were 
described as brutes and as being feared it is possible to understand why others working with 
them would not feel able to question their decision-making, potentially leading to tunnel 
vision in investigations.  Crucially, this mind-set is something that has been considered a 
factor in cases of miscarriages of justice and other flawed investigations FD 6 described how 
this might transpire: 
“I think in a number of miscarriages of justice what can happen is you develop a 
mind-set where you think for a number of reasons that this person is a suspect so you 
stop actually investigating as an investigator and what you do is prove that this 
suspect committed the murder, which then leads to people trying to do things that 
actually fit the suspect as opposed to the investigation” (FD 6) 
FD 6 explained that such approaches had taken place within the police service that he had 
worked: 
“And I know that happened in [names place] this idea of “well you saw who it was 
they were wearing a hat weren’t they? And what colour was the hat?”, “I don’t 
know”, “It was quite bright wasn’t it?”, “yeah could’ve been”. And then in an easy… 
you start to develop evidence to fit your suspect” (FD 6)  
FD 6 went on to describe the way in which the SIO motivated the team and the drive towards 
getting a result: 
                                                          
29 Tunnel vision is the focus on one viable suspect or line of enquiry to the exclusion of all others. 
Rossmo (2016, p216) describes the approach, which sees investigators “arresting the first likely 
suspect, then closing the investigation off to alternative theories, [as] a recipe for disaster”. 
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“What used to happen in the 80s, 90s is you’d come in the morning and the DS, the 
SIO, would motivate you all “you’ve got to nail this bastard, go and do this, house to 
house inquiry team I want you to get in the pubs, I want you to get here at 6 o’clock 
tonight and see what you’ve got”, so it was all very there’s the wall and we’ll blast 
everything at it and try and find something that leads us in a direction” (FD 6) 
FD 6 explained the repercussions of this mind-set to investigations, which illustrates why 
miscarriages of justice occurred during these times: 
“I think it was very flawed because what I think happened in [names homicide case] 
is then you start thinking “yes” and then particularly you’ve got defendants who have 
got criminal records, who are well known to the police, who are on the dark side of 
life and all of a sudden “yes it must be them and now what we’ll try and do is prove 
it’s them” and nobody had the reigns to draw people back and say “let’s start 
investigating it from another area, another direction, let’s forget about this group of 
people, what evidence is there?” It was cultural that kind of drive” (FD 6) 
FD 6 explained that to challenge the decisions of SIOs at this time would lead to you not 
being considered a team player, which would subsequently mean that you would not be 
selected to work on future inquiries: 
“I think the [names homicide case] is a good example that people are motivated, it’s 
almost a testosterone pumped male culture that sometimes you think “hang on a 
second this needs somebody” but of course in the days that I’m talking about the 80s, 
90s that person that stood out and said “hang on” you weren’t seen as a team player, 
so very quickly wouldn’t have been called onto the inquiries because you weren’t a 
team player and you didn’t actually see the world the way everyone else saw it” (FD 
6) 
This is an example of what Rossmo (2006, p17) calls ‘groupthink’, a situation in which 
individuals are reluctant to “think critically and challenge the dominant theory”.  Rossmo 
(2006, p17) explains that ‘groupthink’ often occurs amongst groups who are under pressure 
to make decisions and can be therefore applied to investigative work. 
The views of FD 6 were reiterated by FD 9: 
“I think the big issue was when years gone by when you had the suspect’s name and it 
all looked as if it fitted that people would pursue that at the cost of maybe being more 
open-minded” (FD 9) 
Although the literature surrounding the culture of detective work is scarce, what exists does 
reveal that detectives of the 1970s and 1980s would often ‘bend the rules’. Maguire and 
Norris (1992, p21), for example, found that because their work was ‘unseen’, detectives 
could “sail close the wind” without significant repercussions (Maguire and Norris 1992, p21).  
When we consider the way in which the SIO was perceived and the consequences to those 
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who challenged their decisions it is perhaps unsurprising that the participants in this study 
reiterated this.  However, they stressed that in the main the rules were stretched as opposed to 
fully disregarded: 
“You can’t bend the rules at all now, those days are gone, you used to a long time ago 
not in a dishonest way, you’d stretch it (FD 2) 
It must be acknowledged that the time periods of investigations that are at the centre of this 
research include those that preceded the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and 
other pieces of legislation governing investigations and detective work.  Therefore, a lot of 
what took place was not necessarily illegal in some instances as the legislation was simply 
not in existence.  However, FD 5 explained how in one case PACE was disregarded some 
five years after it was introduced suggesting that it did not immediately correct practices: 
“I was a custody officer in [names place] and we had a manslaughter, we had a lot of 
people who were involved in it, they had one person in custody that I was aware of, as 
the custody officer I was to be aware of everybody who was in the police station in 
custody or helping us with our inquiries, and I became aware that they had four other 
people in the CID office and I had no clue! This was 89 or something like that.  
Bloody stupid! “They’re only helping us with our inquiries”, “so why aren’t they in 
this book then?” I went to the DI with that one because it was my responsibility” (FD 
5) 
Over 30 years later the feared SIO seems consigned to history and the tunnel vision described 
above less likely today because of the way in which criminal investigations have been 
reformed: 
“Much like the dinosaurs, Gene Hunt30 went his way probably around the early to 
mid-1990s, he was gone” (SD 25) 
Today’s SIO 
 
If the feared SIO and the tunnel vision described here is no longer present, it is important to 
consider what was said about today’s SIO and their approach to investigations.  SD 8 
explained that SIOs today are now focused on doing things right as opposed to just getting a 
result, a contrast to the comments of FD 1 who explained that in the past the focus was not 
“how you got there, it’s if you got there”: 
                                                          
30 DCI Gene Hunt was the main character in the aforementioned television series ‘Life on Mars’ and 
‘Ashes to Ashes’. 
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“I think they’ve definitely changed.  Now I like to think that they are smart people 
with compassion, emotional intelligence, soft skills, are really conscientious, want to 
do things right” (SD 8) 
SD 23 also stressed the importance today of getting the right outcome as opposed to any 
outcome: 
“It’s about finding out what’s happened and that might be proving what hasn’t 
happened or proving somebody didn’t do it as much as proving they did because I 
don’t want to see the wrong person in prison” (SD 23) 
SD 20 explained that the approach to investigations of the past would not be suitable today 
and believed that this was partly due to the fact that the world is a more diverse place: 
“The world’s more complex than it was when that was taking place, it wasn’t as 
transient as it is now, you know, you look at the stats, I forget what they are now, but 
it’s something like 70% of people will always live within 5 miles of where they are 
born, well that’s changed and we’ve got communities that come in, Eastern European 
Labour markets and people return home at different periods, you’ve got all these 
added complexities of society, you’ve got different communities rubbing up against 
each other, communication barriers, all these things that are now taking place and 
it’s no longer like policing a town where you could go into a pub and everyone knew 
who everyone was, all that’s gone” (SD 20) 
SD 20 worked for a large city police force, which might at least in part explain their views 
around the increasingly transient nature of communities today.  However, the view that the 
approach to investigations that was evident during the 1970s and 1980s have no place in 
investigations today was echoed by other interviewees.  SD 13 who worked for a smaller 
police force explained that the culture was also partly due to the hierarchical nature of the 
police as an organisation and that there is now a deliberate move away from this.  Crucially, 
in light of the above comments, this involves encouraging individuals to contest decision-
making: 
“People are actively encouraged to challenge decision-making by managers, we’re 
losing that kind of hierarchical, we are a very hierarchical organisation and we are 
being encouraged to step away from that, there’s definitely greater familiarity” (SD 
13)  
One example in which the changes in respect of culture that have been discussed here are 
apparent is when we consider the way in which briefings used to be run when compared to 
how they are led today.  In particular, the changes to briefings reflect the changes in the SIO 
and how investigations are led. FD 11 explained that at the briefing at the start of the day the 
SIO would outline the important actions to be carried out and that: 
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“If you hadn’t done the job you were humiliated in front of everyone else, so you 
came back with results or look out, you’d be kicked off the inquiry” (FD 11) 
This illustrates the way in which SIOs at this time interacted with their teams.  Although FD 
11 denied that the fear of returning to the second briefing of the day without results led to 
poor practices believing that it was key to identifying lazy detectives, it is possible to see how 
that would have been a risk. 
The data reveal that briefings held during modern-day inquiries are considerably different and 
illustrate how the mind-set towards investigations has shifted.  SD 13 explained that in the 
early stages of an investigation they would be less of a two-way process and so would be 
more directed by the SIO, which is somewhat reminiscent of how the former detectives 
described briefings in the past: 
“At those early stages the briefing is less two way and more directed from the front 
because you’ve got very little information at that stage and it’s only beginning to 
unfold and the key thing is to make sure that all the team that you’ve got assembled 
are actually working on the things that are going to progress the investigation in the 
best way. Now every individual is going to have their own ideas about what they 
should be dong, but you really just need one person to say: “no this is what we are 
going to do”” (SD 13) 
However, he went on to explain that this would change as the investigation progressed: 
“Then individuals would be holders of detailed information but only in one specific 
area and so the whole team perhaps needs to know that, so even though in the 
briefing, their briefing me as the SIO at the same they’re briefing the rest of the team 
as well” (SD 13) 
Although the complexities of investigations today are such that a two-way process of 
communication is necessary to ensure that the SIO and others are appraised of any 
developments; it is clear from the data that they also indicate a wider change in how 
investigations are led and the culture of this work.  This was also evident during the 
observations of briefings that I undertook.  Indeed, one was filmed by a television crew for a 
documentary and an SIO working for a large city police force explained that they allow work 
experience students to visit the Major Incident Room.  This reflects an openness to 
investigations that was not apparent historically: 
“Murder inquiries were closed events, they were closed events, you were in the 
murder inquiry room and you didn’t talk about it outside that it was only the murder 
inquiry team that knew about it, it was only you that talked about it and nothing 
would be released outside, whereas there is a far more transparent view now, I hear 
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that major incident rooms now are opening up to people to come in and out like 
yourself…and that's the way it should be” (FD 6) 
Additionally, during my time observing a major crime team one SIO explained to me that she 
would find innovative ways to format briefings to take into account the fact that individuals 
respond to information being delivered in different ways.  She showed me a PowerPoint that 
she had devised, which contained the details of the case that they had at that point.  It also 
included a recording of the ‘999’ call reporting the murder and images of the victim and 
crime scene.   
The vast changes to the culture of detective work are also clear when we consider that the 
once male-dominated world of detective work that according to one interviewee often saw 
females just making the tea now sees them as detectives and SIOs. 
The Female Detective 
 
Of the 27 interviews conducted five were with female detectives, both former and serving, 
and so they were asked, amongst other things, specifically about their experiences of working 
on homicide investigation and how the position of female detectives has changed in the last 
30 years.  It was clear from speaking to these women that detective work historically was 
very much dominated by males.  FD 9, a retired detective who joined the police service in 
1983, described investigation at this time: 
 “Investigation was more of a man’s world when I joined” (FD 9) 
This was also evident during other interviews when the CID was described as just having a 
‘token woman’ working within the department.  They would usually be tasked with particular 
roles, such as dealing with rape cases or working with victims of crime.  Interestingly, when 
asked why she decided to become a detective, SD 22 said that she had wanted to do so ever 
since the first murder investigation she worked in 1989 when she was there to make the tea, 
which is indicative of the way in which females at this time were perceived.   
When females did choose to progress and move towards becoming a detective, it was clear 
that there were differences in the recruitment processes that prospective female detectives had 
to go through compared to their male counterparts.  It was clear from speaking to the female 
detectives that having to prove themselves in policing was an important factor in determining 
whether or not they progressed through the ranks: 
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 “I had to fight hard for my position really” (FD 9) 
Furthermore, SD 18 noted that whilst she had received a mixed reception when she decided 
to become a detective, she had built up a sound reputation as both a good police officer and a 
good investigator, which helped her.  However, it is clear from the comments of SD 25, a 
serving detective who joined the police serving in the early 1990s, that although she was able 
to prove herself and was able to progress to the position of DI that she holds today, she felt 
that she had to work much harder than her male counterparts, but did not receive the same 
recognition for that: 
 “I had to work twice as hard to be half as well respected” (SD 25) 
SD 22 used similar phrasing: 
 “You worked twice as hard to be accepted” (SD 22) 
The poor attitude towards females who progressed through the ranks to become detectives 
and the contrast with their position in modern-day inquiries is clearly evident in the 
experiences of SD 22: 
“When I completed my probation after the first two years I went to see the 
Superintendent, as everyone did because you’d get confirmed, and he said to me 
“well Miss I don’t suppose you’ll be here beyond five years because you’ll leave to 
have babies” and that was it, that was my welcome after two years hard work and I’d 
had commendations, arrested God knows how many people and that was it. And we 
were saying this morning how funny if that Superintendent could see you today as an 
SIO in charge of murder as a girl! I’m a DI as well because previously 
Superintendents would be in charge of murder” (SD 22) 
There have been steps forward for the female detective.  For example, the interviewees 
explained that if inappropriate comments are made then they will be challenged.  However, 
the comments of SD 24, suggest that problems remain.  When asked whether she had faced 
any barriers in progressing through the ranks to become a Detective Inspector SD 24 noted 
that she has not always been able to do what she wanted.  Furthermore, at one time she had 
been enjoying working within one CID office for two and a half years, when she was moved 
to the Family Crime Investigation team so that a male counterpart could try her role: 
“Because it’s set out that actually one of the ‘boys clubs’ that’s got in there, the ‘boys 
club’ is still around… the other fella just wanted a go at my job and it’s like “hang on 
a minute!” (SD 24) 
Interestingly, when speaking to the female interviewees about female detectives it was 
evident that it can be difficult today to accommodate their needs during investigations and 
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that this, in turn, can hinder their career development and progression.  SD 18 explained that 
the flexible working arrangements that are now in place to support those with families could 
make life difficult when allocating roles.  SD 24 in the following comment who also 
acknowledged how she admired those who did manage to juggle both their work and home 
commitments echoed this: 
“I think there’s a struggle across the board but I think with females particularly they 
obviously, generally most females have children, I don’t, but most females have 
children and they can’t stay on, they can’t do the long hours, they have 12 months off 
nowadays which is a huge amount of time, it’s great I presume with your baby, but for 
time away from work if you are going for promotion and want to do this, it’s a long 
time and like I say, when you have to work twice as hard to be half as well respected, 
it can take a toll having kids to people going through, but, you know, for the girls who 
do it I totally admire them because I don’t know how they fit it in” (SD 24) 
Therefore, the hours worked by those women with families could mean that they can only be 
assigned to those roles on an enquiry that can be performed in accordance with the flexible 
working arrangements.   This suggests that whilst there has been something of a cultural shift 
in the attitudes towards females and the opportunities that they now have to progress through 
the ranks, there seems to remain differences between the position of males and females due to 
home commitments.  That being said it was acknowledged that there are males now who have 
the same home commitments as females and so they too may be hindered in their career paths 
if they need to take advantage of flexible working arrangements.  Given the changes that have 
been discussed here and in the preceding chapters, it is perhaps unsurprising that changes to 
detective training emerged.  
The Professionalisation of Detective Training 
 
It became apparent during the interviews that many of the changes to which the investigation 
of homicide has been subject were implemented in a bid to professionalise investigation.  
Indeed, this drive towards professionalisation is reflected within the literature (Stelfox 2009) 
and we have seen examples of it over the last few chapters with the implementation of 
legislation and the proliferation of science and technology.  The participants suggested that 
training is a particular example of professionalisation.   
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Historically, the training of detectives was delivered through a detective training course, a 
programme of continual training that was delivered over a 10-week period (Tong, 2009)31.  
The former detectives, and several long-term serving detectives, spoke of undertaking this 
training.  Although other areas were covered such as, forensic issues and how to present at 
court during which a Barrister attended and spoke to them, some felt that the training did not 
cover other important elements of investigation and was focused on the law.  Since the 
feeling amongst many was that the training focused upon the law and, according to some, did 
not prepare them for the reality of this work the question then arose: how do detectives learn 
to conduct investigations?  The detectives felt strongly that it was learning from others.  FD 2 
explained that this was particularly essential, as he did not undertake the 10-week detective 
training until sometime after joining the CID:  
“People you work with, all of your peers, it’s on the job, simple as.  I joined the CID 
in January 1982 and I did my course May of 83” (FD 2) 
The comment above is particularly telling since he did not consider the training to have been 
helpful, despite the fact that he would have had some experience of investigations before 
attending.  Although no other detectives told of having to wait to attend the course, as was the 
case for FD 2, all reiterated the importance of learning from others.  The following comment 
illustrates the importance that many placed upon this even though on occasion the advice 
being given was not necessarily useful.  This also indicates that the effectiveness of learning 
from others depended on whom they were learning from: 
“Experience is key to it because you will come across things you’ve never dealt with 
before therefore if you’ve got experience of somebody else who’s been there, even if 
what they’re telling you is a load of old rubbish, you still know a little bit about it 
don’t you?” (FD 10) 
Whilst the detectives expressed that learning from colleagues was a fundamental part of 
training in the past, it was not simply the case that they would take on board everything that 
they witnessed or were told, which is perhaps unsurprising in light of the above remark.  
Several interviewees explained that they would take on board some things that they observed 
and disregard others: 
“You worked with lots of different people and you looked at how they operated and 
how they investigated; attending scenes, interviewing people, speaking to witnesses 
and ultimately you take on board the things that you like off people, then you jettison 
                                                          
31 This training period was reduced to six weeks in the 1990s (Tong, 2009).  The interviewees’ that 
discussed training spoke only of the 10-week course. 
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things that you don’t like. And you also look at what works and what doesn’t work” 
(FD 1) 
This comment is interesting in several respects.  As well as again revealing the importance 
that was placed on learning from others, it is also reflective of the craft model (Stelfox, 2009) 
of investigations that was particularly evident in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.   The comments 
of FD 1 also raises the question of how would a junior detective know what was considered 
good and bad practice?  
The approach to the training of detectives was to change considerably in the mid-2000s with 
the introduction of the Professionalising Investigation Programme (PIP), which was to 
provide a standardised and professionalised approach to training and a way of measuring the 
competency of investigators (Stelfox, 2009).  Introduced in September 2005 its establishment 
was described by SD 20 as a significant development in the history of homicide investigation, 
particularly the recognition that certain skills were required to investigate murder, which they 
felt detective training lacked historically: 
“For me the watershed moment would be making sure you’re PIP accredited. The 
distinction I would make between before that time is the understanding that murder 
required an assessment of your skills or portfolio.  To make sure you’re qualified is a 
sea-change to times in the past where you wouldn’t necessarily look on that as a 
necessary component to investigate murder” (SD 20) 
During the fieldwork I attended SIO training.  I observed that PIP appears to have retained 
elements of training from the past.  For example, one of the detectives explained that guest 
speakers would visit them during the training and forensic matters were also discussed. Part 
of the training involved a former Crown Prosecution Service lawyer attending and taking the 
attendees through the process of applying for a warrant for further detention.  This involved a 
role-play format and each attendee went through the application with the lawyer.  Afterwards 
the group were given feedback on their performance and general tips on attendance at court.  
This indicates that the legal aspects of investigation understandably remain an important part 
of the training process and that this is delivered in such a way as to recreate situations that 
might be faced by the officers.  Additionally, a forensic expert spoke to the class.  This 
individual described the history of DNA and discussed other important issues such as 
avoiding the contamination of evidence.  It was evident that the training of detectives today 
involves the simulation of homicide investigations; something the interviewees felt was 
missing in the detective training course.   
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Referring to the training of SIOs, FD 2 explained that the structure today is designed to put 
them under pressure and that this is achieved, suggesting that the conditions of the training 
today are designed to be more reflective of the situations in which they will find themselves.  
This would indicate that the training has addressed the concerns discussed above since the 
practical element now comprises a significant component of modern-day training: 
“You act as an SIO for a week in a training room environment and you lead it and it’s 
a system which has been developed to put you under pressure and test you and you do 
get that” (FD 2) 
PIP also provides a way in which to measure the competency of detectives.  Following the 
training and time that is then spent in the workplace to apply what has been learnt, officers 
are assessed against National Occupational Standards (Stelfox, 2009).  This is something that 
according to the interviewees was not catered for in the past.  The importance and emphasis 
placed upon measuring the competency of detectives today can also be linked to the 
comments of FD 2.  Whilst accepting that the training today is more focussed, FD 2 
explained how the professionalisation and standardisation of training today provides a way 
for the police service to cover themselves if something were to go wrong during an 
investigation: 
“There is an element of, excuse the term, backside covering now.  We’re always open 
to litigation now, so if we get it wrong it’s always in the media so you have to make 
sure that the training has been delivered, that it covers the areas, so that if it ever 
comes to that it goes wrong, there’s inquests or litigation of some sort at least you 
know the officer has received the right level of training” (FD 2)  
Overall, it was apparent that most interviewees deemed the training today to be an 
improvement upon that which was delivered until the mid-2000s.  However, given the 
importance that was placed upon experience ‘on the job’ and learning from others in the past, 
the pertinent question that remained in considering the data on training today was whether it 
is this or classroom learning that is key to preparing detectives for modern-day homicide 
investigation?  It would appear that the answer is that it was experience and learning whilst 
‘on the job’ that was considered to be the most effective form of training, something also 
identified by Smith and Flanagan (2000).  This was a view that was held by all of the 
interviewees: 
 “There is no training like on the job training” (SD 18) 
“Experience is key” (FD 10) 
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SD 14 felt particularly that learning on the job and having a broad experience of homicide 
investigations was key to becoming an effective SIO.  It is worth noting here that at the time 
of the interview SD 14 had yet to take part in the 3-week SIO training course, which might 
explain his views: 
“It’s learning from what you do, from the job and it’s work experience.  If I took a 
layperson off the street, a very intelligent person like yourself, and gave you a 3 or 4 
week SIO course and then sent you to SIO a murder, I would probably do it better – 
through life and work experience rather than sitting down and taking a front loaded 
course” (SD 14) 
SD 14 explained that although he was a relatively junior SIO his 18-year background in 
policing has meant that he has been exposed to, and been involved with, murder 
investigations for some time: 
“I’ve been involved in murder investigations in various roles since, the first one was 
in 1998.  I’ve been on the periphery, the action team, I’ve office managed a murder, 
so I know how the system works.  So it’s a case of you’ve got the experience of 
policing in general to have the capability” (SD 14) 
When asked what it is that is so important about learning on the job and from experience, SD 
14 replied that it was having the opportunity to learn from your mistakes and being able to 
identify the most effective way of doing things.  SD 14 illustrated this by describing a case 
that he was involved in.  SD 14 recounted how the SIO and he discussed the possible options 
in using the CCTV footage that had been obtained during a murder investigation:   
“We start talking about how can we prove that’s our man in the shop? We’ve got 
nothing forensically to put him in the location it happened, so we’ve got to do our best 
to show that it is him in the CCTV.  So for me, as a detective with previous 
experience, I go: “quite easy, we know where the camera is, we know where he’s 
stood, we get someone the same height to stand there and then he’ll be the same 
height at the wall as the other person and you’ll know that person is the same 
height”.  But [names SIO] says, “Don’t do it” so I asked why and he said, “it’ll be 
more trouble than it’s worth”. So the books say “if you want to establish the height of 
someone, put someone in the same place so you know how tall they are”, but it 
doesn’t account for all the variables like are they running? Are they stood? 
Crouched?  From previous experience [names SIO] said “don’t bother it’s a waste of 
time” but if we’d gone by the book, the tick list…so to me that’s where a good SIO 
comes from” (SD 14) 
The data also reveal that the skills required to conduct homicide investigations are extensive.  
Many of the interviewees struggled to answer the question of what skills are necessary for 
detectives today.  Those often cited related to being resilient and dogged, which are traits that 
cannot necessarily be trained or measured formally.  Relatedly, they explained that it is 
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difficult for SIOs today to be involved in the minutiae of homicide investigations, something 
that is largely due to the complex science and technology that features in many modern-day 
investigations.  Consequently, they are reliant on other specialists in their team to feed the 
relevant information to them.  This would also have repercussions for the way in which 
training is developed.  Interestingly, the skills cited by the interviewees in this research 
coincide with the three clusters identified by Smith and Flanagan (2000, p24): management 
skills, investigative ability and knowledge levels. The long list of skills indicate that the role 
of the SIO, and indeed the detective, is an incredibly complex one, more so than it ever was 
in the past due to rapid developments in science and technology.  Thus, it can be argued that 
it would be difficult for formal training alone to provide investigators with the skills that they 
need, highlighting again the importance of gaining experience ‘on the job’. 
It is important to acknowledge the backdrop against which this research was conducted, 
specifically, the substantial budget cuts that the police have faced.  Smith (2016, p179) notes 
that the coalition government’s 2010 spending review “removed a significant amount of 
funding from police forces across the UK”.  Rogers (2014) notes that since 2010 police 
budgets have been reduced by 25%.  It would seem that this has also affected training.  Many 
detectives told of a lack of experienced SIOs and the inability of police services to release 
officers from divisions to the CID so that they can gain experience due to budget and staffing 
issues.  This raises the question of how future detectives will benefit from what virtually all 
interviewees considered to be the most effective way of learning.  SD 8 expressed concern 
that there are not many SIOs working within their police service, which means that 
consequently there is a lack of mentors for new SIOs: 
“Because there aren’t many SIOs in the force and that’s one thing I would say is 
lacking that mentor that you can shadow for some time until you feel confident really 
because every single murder investigation is different and each comes with different 
challenges, so I think that’s the gap for me” (SD 8) 
FD 2 held a similar view.  FD 2 explained that the major crime team that he used to be the 
head of was being reduced in size.  He explained that this was a result of the number of 
murders that they were experiencing diminishing, and so the expenditure cannot be justified: 
“A lot of it is driven by money.  The problem is in my time when I was head of major 
crime, we were averaging anything between 15 and 20 murders a year, it has gone 
down now I think.  I was only speaking to them last week and they’re averaging less 
than 10 sometimes now, so to have a designated team on standby, you just can’t 
afford it, so the team is being shrunk.  So when I was head I had five DCIs and five 
DIs, I think they’re now down to three DCIs and 3 DIs” (FD 2)  
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A similar point was made by FD 27, a former detectives now working in a civilian post and 
based at a different police service to that of SD 8.  He remarked that “there’s more people 
wanting to be SIOs and less murders” indicating again that there will be fewer opportunities 
for less experienced officers to gain experience of murder investigations. Ultimately, if 
learning from others and gaining experience of homicide investigations are considered to be 
central to the training of detectives, the findings presented in this section give potential cause 
for concern for future detectives and approaches to training.  Simply, if there are fewer 
opportunities for newer detectives to gain exposure to investigations then this might impact 
upon their ability to lead investigations when they take the position of SIOs. 
Conclusion 
The findings of the interviews with former and serving detectives show that what it is to be a 
detective today has changed almost beyond all recognition.  More often than not, detectives 
of the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s held a degree of kudos that set them apart from anyone 
else within the police service.  Theirs was a ‘job for life’ and they demonstrated a 
commitment that was not hindered by thoughts of working hours.  The findings suggest that 
detectives of this time ‘worked hard and played hard’ with alcohol playing a significant role 
in their lives, that the majority of interviewees drew comparisons with ‘Life on Mars’ and 
commented that this was an accurate, albeit exaggerated, portrayal of detective work at this 
time is telling.  By comparison, today’s detective does not appear to view their position in the 
same way that their predecessors did and, according to many they do not possess the same 
status.  Questions were raised by the interviewees around the level of commitment sometimes 
demonstrated today and the focus upon working hours and pay.  The data also reveal that 
there are more female detectives working on homicides than was the case in the past, but the 
experiences of one female detective suggest that the position of males is sometimes favoured.  
It has also been shown that both the former and serving homicide detectives believe the 
modern day approach to training to be an improvement on that of the past, which was focused 
on learning legislation with little preparation for the realities of investigation.  However, the 
interviewees considered experience of investigations and learning from their peers to be the 




Part Three  
The Discussion 
 
The preceding four chapters were designed to present the data that this research uncovered.  
These chapters very much aimed to convey the detectives’ perspectives on the changes that 
have shaped the investigation of homicide in England and Wales over the past four decades.  
In Chapters Nine and Ten that follow, I move beyond the detectives’ perspectives, revisiting 
the findings and drawing comparisons with the existing literature.   
Chapter Nine summarises the ways in which homicide investigation was reported to have 
changed since the 1980s, before moving on to the more complicated endeavour of explaining 
why these developments have occurred.  Four main drivers of change are proffered and the 
changes that they are considered responsible for are discussed.  The final chapter in this 
thesis, Chapter Ten, considers the impact of change and how it has shaped investigations for 
the better, but has posed new challenges for today’s homicide detective.  It will become 
apparent that there is evidence to suggest that change has not always resulted in 
improvement.  For example, miscarriages of justice do not seem to have been consigned to 
the past and the homicide detection rate remains relatively static.  I end this chapter, and the 











Explaining Change  
 
Policing, as argued by Rogers and Gravelle (2012, p420), does not operate “in a social, 
political or economic vacuum”.  Therefore, explaining change is a complex undertaking.  
This task has been carried out by scholars in a number of areas of policing and criminal 
investigation (Matassa and Newburn, 2007; Savage, 2007; Stelfox, 2009).  An exploration of 
changes to homicide investigation specifically, however, represents a lacuna in the policing 
literature.  It has been the aim of this research to address this gap.  In this penultimate chapter 
I revisit the first two research questions, namely the particular ways in which homicide 
investigations have changed and the drivers of these changes.  In Chapter Ten the final 
research question is tackled.  In the present chapter I, firstly, provide a synopsis of the 
changes that were identified by the interviewees.  Secondly, whilst acknowledging that 
understanding why change occurs necessitates an appreciation of numerous influences, I 
present four key drivers of change and provide examples of the particular developments that 
are attributed to them.   
A Myriad of Changes 
 
“Britain’s police service is no stranger to change” (James and Mills 2012, p134). 
The literature acknowledges that there has been extensive change to policing in England and 
Wales, as the above quote suggests.  This research has found that homicide investigation is 
no exception.  As outlined in Chapter One, the first research question was to determine the 
changes to which homicide investigation has been subject since the 1980s.  Answering this 
question addresses an obvious gap in the literature since a holistic exploration of the changes 
to which homicide investigation has been subject is lacking.  Therefore, each participant was 
first asked what he or she considered to be a significant change that transpired during his or 
her career.  Four main areas of change were identified.  These were: science and technology; 
legislation, regulation and guidance; investigative practice and; lastly, detective status and 
culture.   
In this first section I remind the reader of the specific changes that sit within these four 
categories.  They include both those cited by the interviewees in response to that question, as 
well as those that I garnered during subsequent discussions and whilst examining the case 
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files and conducting the observations.  The literature that is available regarding change and 
homicide investigation is drawn upon where relevant to demonstrate how the findings of the 
present research compare with what is already known.  Further, the broader policing and 
criminal investigations literature is drawn upon to illustrate how developments here compare 
to those in respect of homicide investigation.   
Firstly, this research has established that changes deriving from science and technology are 
generally agreed to be the most significant.  The participants’ most common unprompted 
responses referred to DNA, the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES), 
mobile phones, CCTV and social media.  This finding is supported by the wider literature.  
As was noted in Chapter Three, Innes (2010, p33) recognises that the role of the homicide 
detective is “increasingly shaped by the use of scientific methods and technologies”, which is 
reflected in the growing importance of the ‘science’ arm of the ‘art, craft and science’ model 
of detective work (Westera et al., 2016).   
Secondly, this research has found that legislation, regulation and guidance pertaining to 
investigations in England and Wales have grown substantially since the 1980s.  The 
detectives identified several important examples.  The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
(PACE) 1984 was said by the majority of detectives to have become an integral part of 
criminal investigations, as was the Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act (CPIA) 1996, 
which regulates criminal investigations and prosecutions.  The Murder Investigation Manual 
(MIM) was also described as an important development, as was the introduction of the 
Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998.  What also became apparent during these discussions was 
that detectives have become increasingly risk averse.  Although this is considered a 
consequence of the increase in legislation, regulation and guidance, the indication that 
detectives are now more risk averse is in itself an important change.  Loftus (2009, p26) notes 
that, “contemporary police officers work in a substantially different legal context than 
previous generations”, the findings of the present research show that this is also the case for 
homicide detectives.  Indeed, writing about the evolution of homicide investigation, Stelfox 
(2015, p95) writes that the high-profile investigative failings of the 1970s led to a “raft of 
legislative and procedural changes”.  The present work supports this position.  
Thirdly, the accounts of the detectives identified a variety of key changes to investigative 
practice.  This is supported by existing research on homicide investigation.  Innes (2003) 
writes that the 1980s signalled a shift from an ‘autocratic’ to a ‘bureaucratic’ model of 
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investigations.  In the present research, the detectives explained that police services now 
retain a core team and so the way in which teams are drawn together is no longer ad-hoc, as it 
was said to be in the past.  A more recent development was reported to be the establishment 
of teams whose sole responsibility it is to investigate major crime.  Unlike those with just a 
core team, these do not have to draft in additional officers from outside.  Furthermore, it has 
been established that the days in which money was ‘thrown at’ an investigation have gone 
and budget is said to now be a priority for Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs).  Resourcing 
in terms of staffing was also said to have changed, with the growing use of civilian 
investigators over the years considered by several participants to be a key development.  The 
research also found that the volume of work that must be conducted has grown.  A further 
change related to the interview process.  It was said that with the introduction of models of 
interviewing, this has become more professional than it was when obtaining a confession was 
the goal.   
It became apparent throughout the research that investigative practice has developed in other 
respects.  Firstly, investigations today are much more complex and SIOs must delegate more 
work to members of the team and draw on outside expertise to assist with an investigation.  
Secondly, learning post-investigation has become an important aspect of homicide 
investigations today.  The use of debriefs to identify good practice lends further support for 
this finding (Brookman and Lloyd-Evans, 2015).  The Domestic Homicide Review is another 
example.  Introduced in 2011, these examine domestic homicides to establish what lessons 
can be learnt from the cases and how responses to domestic violence can be improved 
(Payton et al., 2017). 
Finally, changes to detective status and culture itself have been vast.  Many detectives 
explained that the kudos once associated with being a detective has diminished and it was 
reported that they are no longer seen as ‘something special’.  In terms of culture, the drinking 
and ‘longest hours’ culture that were central elements of detective work in the past, were said 
by the majority of interviewees to have largely disappeared.  Additionally the mind-set of 
investigators has altered.  In the past the approach was reportedly characterised by tunnel 
vision and a ‘we need to get our man’ attitude led by SIOs who were feared.  Conversely, the 
detectives explained that they are now more open-minded, and a key objective is that the 
investigation is properly conducted.  Another significant development that also became 
apparent during these discussions was that there are now more female detectives than there 
were historically, although this was not cited as a key change when that question was asked.  
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Given these changes and the others that have been discussed, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
detective training has changed considerably.  It was said to be more professional and has 
moved away from merely learning legislation and the introduction of the Professionalising 
Investigation Programme (PIP) specifically was reported to be an important change.  
The scant work that has examined detective culture includes that by Maguire and Norris 
(1992).  Albeit dated, they found that detectives were more likely to “sail close to the wind”, 
which they attributed to the nature of detective work being less visible than that of uniformed 
officers (Maguire and Norris 1992, p21).  The findings of the present research indicate that 
this is perhaps no longer the case.  The loss of the drinking, ‘longest hours’ culture and the 
increased presence of female detectives might also indicate that the “machoistic” values that 
Innes (2003, p15) suggested underpin detective work have weakened.  However, there are 
some suggestions that detective culture has perhaps not changed to the extent that my 
research has indicated.  In their study on PIP and professionalisation, James and Mills (2012, 
p138) found that whilst some respondents suggested the culture had changed significantly 
and had become more professional, others indicted that the old culture remained and was 
manifest in the “fit in or f*** off” mentality of some individuals.  Nevertheless, the findings 
of the current research would suggest fairly substantial change. 
It has been shown here that there was little that was controversial in the responses to the 
question of how homicide investigations have changed since the 1980s.  Overall, it is clear 
that there is no aspect of homicide investigation that has escaped some form of adjustment 
across this time period. Further, there is commonality with the existing literature around 
homicide investigations and with the broader policing literature about change.  What the 
present research adds is a comprehensive overview of what homicide detectives consider to 
be the fundamental changes to have shaped these investigations since the 1980s.   
Explaining Changes to the Investigation of Homicide in England and Wales 
 
“The police are like social litmus-paper, reflecting sensitively the unfolding 
exigencies of a society” (Reiner 2005, p676). 
The detectives’ explanations for change mostly centred on capitalisation by the police upon 
developments in science and technology, reactions to ‘problematic’ cases and the widespread 
recognition that detective work was in need of reform.  These explanations are likely to 
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reflect their personal experiences.  The literature around policing and criminal investigation 
reveals other explanations.  
This section is therefore divided into four parts, each dealing with what appear from the 
research and from wider reading to be important drivers of changes to homicide investigation.  
These are: the preoccupation with risk; the changing political economy; reactions to 
miscarriages of justice or problematic investigations; and advances in science and 
technology.   
As revealed in Chapters Two and Three, Stelfox (2009, p33) presented three drivers of 
change in criminal investigation:  
 Changes to the legal framework. 
 Technological and procedural changes. 
 Miscarriages of justice and concern around police effectiveness and their conduct.   
There is evidently some similarity with what this research has found and what Stelfox (2009) 
identified.  However, the findings of the present study extend the work of Stelfox (2009) by 
taking into account the role of risk and the changing political economy. 
Importantly, there are other dynamics to consider that are also relevant to explaining change 
in homicide investigation.  As established in Chapter Two, these include fluctuating crime 
rates, changes that have made it more likely that society will challenge those in authority 
(Bryett, 1999) and the status that homicide holds, which is such that it remains high on the 
agenda of public interest.  The latter is, according to Stelfox (2015), of particular importance 
since it is the public’s fear of this offence, despite its low occurrence, that causes them, 
politicians and other agencies to place significant demands on the police in respect of 
homicide investigation.  These will be alluded to during this discussion.  Fundamentally, as 
with policing more broadly and other organisations, there are a plethora of elements that have 
in some way compelled changes to homicide investigation and the relationship between them 
is by no means linear.  What this also tells us is that whereas the literature regarding homicide 
investigation often cites the Byford Inquiry, which emerged as a result of the Yorkshire 
Ripper investigation, as being the start of significant reform of major crime (Brain, 2010; 
Innes, 2003), the picture is more complicated.  This research suggests that although the 
importance of the case is not in question, caution is perhaps needed when attributing it as the 
watershed moment in major crime investigation.   
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It is not always easy to disentangle the various influences of change, hence there exists much 
overlap throughout the following discussion explaining why change has taken place.  I argue 
that this should not be downplayed for it is necessary to understanding that the changes to 
homicide investigation in England and Wales are complex.  The thoughts of Pettigrew (1990, 
p269) on studying change, reflect the position of this chapter: 
Beware of the myth of the singular theory of social or organisational 
change…Arguments over the true or single source of change, while interesting and 
worthwhile in the sharpening of academic minds and egos, are ultimately pointless.  
For the analyst interested in the theory and practice of changing, the task is to identify 
the variety and mixture of causes of change and to explore through time some of the 
conditions and context under which these mixtures occur. 
With this in mind the remainder of this chapter will consider each driver of change in turn.  I 
discuss why they are deemed responsible for inducing change and some of the developments 
they have influenced, beginning with a preoccupation with risk.  
A Preoccupation with Risk 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two there has been a growing preoccupation with risk in late 
modern society.  Late modernity, from the late 1970s onwards, is “characterised as ‘the end 
of certainty’” (Kemshall 2003, p7).  Its relevance to this research in terms of timing alone is 
clear.  This preoccupation with risk has led to concerted efforts to try and manage it.  We saw 
in Chapter Two how this has influenced changes in policing generally (Bishop, 2015).  This 
research has found the emphasis on risk to also be an important driver of changes to homicide 
investigation in England and Wales.  In particular, it is aversion to risk that has driven many 
changes to homicide investigation.     
Understanding why concern with risk drives change necessitates an appreciation of the status 
of homicide as it is argued that this heightens anxiety around risk.  High-profile homicide 
cases, which Innes (2001, no pagination) refers to as ‘signal crimes’, can become “vehicles 
for popular demands for the introduction of more control and more order” because of the 
concern that society has with managing risk and that these measures of control gradually 
expand in response to new problems in what he calls ‘control creep’32.   
                                                          
32 Innes (2001) explains that ‘control creep’ is derived from ‘surveillance creep’ introduced by Marx 
(1998). 
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Change has often taken place in response to cases in which errors have been made in a bid to 
show that this will not happen again.  This risk aversion has manifested in efforts to formalise 
and regulate homicide investigation, for example, through legislation to govern the practices 
of detectives, the introduction of guidance and the professionalisation of interviewing and 
training.  This, in turn, increases the complexity of investigations as detectives try to ensure 
that the correct boxes are ticked, an issue that will be returned to in Chapter Ten.  Indeed, this 
research identified that the volume of work that must be conducted has grown, which was 
partly attributed to risk aversion on the part of the police service.  Further, as Littlechild 
(2008, p665) argues, efforts to determine and minimise risk have led to an “increasing 
tendency to regulate professionals and their decision-making”.  This has undeniably been the 
case for homicide investigation.  The focus upon risk and its management explains why 
learning has seemingly become so important, something the current research found not to be 
the case in the past.  Reviews of murder investigations are one opportunity for learning to 
take place and Jones et al (2008, p477) note that a key question for these reviews is “could 
this have been prevented?”  That today’s investigators are now concerned with preventing 
homicides has been considered a consequence of the emphasis upon risk management and 
risk minimisation (Brookman and Innes, 2013), reducing and preventing homicide has 
consequently become an important measure of success in investigative work (Brookman and 
Innes, 2013).  
The placement of risk at the start of this exploration of what drives change is quite deliberate.  
This is because its influence will become apparent as we review the other explanations of 
change.  The preoccupation with risk might realistically be considered something of an 
overarching driver of change in homicide investigation. 
The Changing Political Economy 
 
It was established in Chapter Two that matters of ‘law and order’ did not feature strongly in 
political debates until the late 1970s when the Conservative government made it a priority, 
increasing spending on the police in the process (Downes and Morgan, 1997).  It was said 
that the police at this time enjoyed a “relatively privileged status” (Golding and Savage 2008, 
p736).  Consequently, they escaped many of the reforms that other public services were 
undergoing under the rise of ‘new public management’ ideals (James, 2013).  However, the 
relationship between police and governments changed considerably during the 1980s and 
1990s as effectiveness and efficiency became increasingly important, control centralised and 
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the police were no longer free from the public service reform that was materialising as part of 
the New Public Management (NPM) agenda.   
Police reform has thus become an increasingly important aspect of political agendas across 
the last few decades.  Such developments have been referred to as the politicisation of law 
and order and this is considered another explanation for change in homicide investigation.  
Further, the present research has found that change will depend upon which government is in 
place, which is additional evidence of the role that politics plays in encouraging change.  The 
work of Savage (2007) helps us to understand why the politicisation of law and order can be 
deemed responsible for driving change in policing.  Savage (2007, p329) writes that the 
politicisation of law and order has led to the police to be seen as either ‘too hot to handle’ or 
‘too hot to leave alone’ (Savage, 2007).  Here Savage (2007, p328) explains why the police 
service might be considered ‘too hot to handle’:  
Given the pivotal role of the police in the imagery of the politicisation of crime and 
law and order as the frontline in the ‘war on crime’, the police may be courted and 
pandered by government, and as such allowed a privileged status as a public service; 
‘support’ for the police can be paraded as evidence of the determination of 
government to confront law and order.  Even if reform of police is considered 
necessary, the dangers of reform appearing to be ‘antipolice’, an image easily 
exploited by the opposition (and indeed by the police themselves) may prove fatal to 
those beliefs.  Here, the spectre of the police being ‘too hot to handle’ presents itself.  
  
On the other hand, the politicisation of law and order leaves the police vulnerable to blame 
leading governments to consider reform:  
  
While the police may be perceived as potential saviours in the war on crime, they are 
also potentially a target for blame, should crime continue to be seen as a threat.  This 
is the point at which governments may shift their stance on the police from one of 
them being ‘too hot to handle’ to one of being too hot to leave alone.  (Savage 2007, 
p329).  
 
Savage (2007, p329) goes on to argue that the politicisation of law and order has led to an 
“insatiable public demand for ‘more’ law and order”.  Consequently, the police can no 
longer be left alone by the government (Savage, 2007).  When we consider the changes that 
have taken place across the last four decades it would appear that there has been a particular 
shift towards the view that the police are ‘too hot to leave alone’ since the 1980s.  When 
considering homicide investigation specifically it might be argued that this is especially the 
case.  Many of the changes that have occurred have been a consequence of ‘things going 
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wrong’ and the response is often one of ‘this must not happen again’.  Certainly, this research 
has identified that homicide detectives today are acutely aware of the significant 
consequences that would follow any investigative failings.  Given that public expectations of 
the police investigation of homicide is incredibly high, despite the rarity of the offence 
(Stelfox, 2015), it is easy to how any problems will lead to a strong response from 
government and calls for change.  Moreover, stories about crime have featured more 
obviously in the media since the Second World War (Reiner, 2008), another change that is 
likely to have influenced public expectation and how problems are responded to. This is an 
argument that is strengthened when the preoccupation with risk is taken into account, which 
demonstrates the need to consider more than one explanation of change and the pervasive 
nature of risk.  In summary, the last four decades have seen a change in relationship between 
the police and governments and law and order becoming politicised.  This has rendered the 
police more likely to be a target for major reform.   
Also relevant here is the advent of NPM, which as discussed in Chapter Two, was only 
briefly avoided by the police.  The emphasis on managerialist principles is something also 
recognised by Bryett (1999), Savage (2007) and van Dijk et al (2015) as being a driver for 
change in policing generally.  Although James (2013) writes that NPM did not impact upon 
criminal investigation in the manner that it did uniformed departments, it is suggested that 
these principles have, at least indirectly, filtered down to the investigation of homicide.  The 
influence of NPM upon these investigations is supported by Brookman and Innes (2013) who 
argue that the emphasis on procedure now evident in investigations can be attributed both to 
growing concerns with criminal investigations during the 1980s, and the drives towards 
improving efficiency and effectiveness that are linked to NPM.   
The role of NPM in driving change is also evident in the increase in the numbers of civilian 
investigators working on homicide investigations.  The use of civilians in policing and 
investigations is not new (HMIC, 2004), but numbers have steadily increased.  In the early 
1980s civilianisation “was seen as a by-word for police economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness” (HMIC 2004, p39) and was an important part of the value for money agenda 
(Savage, 2007).  However, in a further indication that one explanation for change is 
insufficient and of the overlap in explanations, the growth of civilian staff can also be 
explained by the increasing complexity of investigations that has come as a consequence of 
scientific and technological advances.  Consequently, civilianisation has grown further since 
the 2000s in response to the recognition that more specialist skills are required in policing 
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(Fleming, 2009).  This is also further evidence that the view of the police as sacred or special 
has diminished (Savage, 2007), which allows us to again explain the weakening detective 
status as identified in the present research.   
Unsurprisingly, such explanations also enable us to understand why there have been 
substantial changes reported in respect of budget, as it has become more closely monitored as 
part of the focus on efficiency.  In addition to this, broader changes to the economy over the 
years have meant that police budgets have been affected by the current government’s 
austerity measures.  This demonstrates once more that there are other influences that play a 
part in driving change, in this case, global economic issues.  This has led to spending on the 
police falling by 20% between 2011 and 2015 (HMIC, 2014).  This has, in turn, led to a 
reduction in the numbers of police officers, with them falling by 14% or 20,000 officers 
between 2009 and 2016 (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2017).  It is possible to understand why 
those running Basic Command Units (BCUs) struggle to release officers to assist on 
investigations as found by the present research.  A recent HMIC report on police 
effectiveness recognised that because of cuts “forces have to make difficult decisions about 
where best to allocate their resources” (HMIC 2017, p10).  In a further example of the 
connection between explanations for change, Innes (2014) suggests that the disinvestment in 
policing is a consequence of efforts to reduce public service spending and because of falling 
crime rates.  However, he also links this to a “moral disinvestment” in the police, which he 
argues is the result of scandal (Innes 2014, p64).  Conversely, Terpstra and Trommel (2009) 
suggest that the advent of managerialisation in The Netherlands was an attempt to restore 
legitimacy.  It is also likely that this aim played some part in justifying the extension of 
managerialist principles in England and Wales in the 1980s, given the concerns around rising 
crime rates and the occurrence of miscarriages of justice at this time.   
Heslop (2011) suggests that the advent of NPM can help to explain the increase in 
bureaucracy in policing that has been widely recognised, both within the literature and the 
current research.  Heslop (2011, p318) draws on the work of Ritzer (2004) in arguing that 
NPM has led to the police becoming “McDonaldised”.  McDonaldisation is “the process by 
which the principles of the fast-food restaurants are coming to dominate more and more 
sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world” (Ritzer 2015, p1). 
There are four key principles that underpin this theory: efficiency, calculability, predictability 
and control (Ritzer 2015, pp. 14 -16).  Heslop (2011, p316) argues how these can be applied 
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to policing resulting in what he terms “McPolicing”.  Although Heslop (2011) does not refer 
to the investigation of homicide, there are parallels when we consider the notion of 
predictability.  Ritzer (2015) explains that in the context of fast food, predictability refers to 
the customer receiving the same product at whatever McDonalds’ restaurant they visit.  In the 
context of policing Heslop (2011, p317) argues that over many years the police have aimed to 
achieve predictability, in their unpredictable world, through the standardisation of 
“procedures, services and administrative techniques”.  Heslop (2011) suggests that this has 
led to the police service becoming increasingly bureaucratic and risk averse.  The present 
research has found this to also be the case with homicide investigation and is an issue that we 
will return to in the next chapter.   
It has been demonstrated that the relationship between police and governments has shifted 
considerably over the last few decades and consequently the police have become liable to 
externally imposed change as law and order became politicised.  It has also been argued that 
high public expectations of police investigations of homicide and the preoccupation with risk 
also help us to understand why police are now more likely to be subject to political pressure 
for change.  This also explains why the police only avoided the drive towards NPM for a 
short period of time.  This is important because the focus upon efficiency and effectiveness 
that are linked to NPM can be considered responsible for driving many of the changes in 
homicide investigation in respect of budget particularly.  However, issues with the economy 
have also influenced this. 
Reactions to Miscarriages of Justice and Problematic Investigations  
 
The role of miscarriages of justice and other problematic investigations in influencing change 
has been established by the present research and is widely documented in the literature 
(Savage, 2008; Savage et al., 2007; Stelfox, 2009).  It was also shown in Chapter Two that 
organisations in general could be driven to change as a consequence of failings (Sendrea, 
2017; Weick and Quinn, 1999).  As outlined earlier many of the detectives I interviewed 
attributed change primarily to the occurrence of miscarriages of justice and other problematic 
investigations.   
It is argued that the role of particular cases in prompting change can simply be attributed to 
the fact that homicide is viewed as one of the most shocking crimes.  As discussed earlier, it 
holds a special status in the public imagination (Innes, 2003) and “consistently elicits stronger 
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condemnation” than other offences (Cooney 2017, p54).  Therefore, the status of homicide is 
such that it increases the likelihood that change will take place.  It is this status that seemingly 
sets homicide apart from other areas of policing and, of course, other organisations.  Innes et 
al (2010, p31) found that “a poor police response [to a homicide] is more likely to have a 
negative impact, than a good response has a positive one”.  Therefore, any deficiencies in the 
way in which a homicide investigation is conducted will often lead to significant media 
attention and calls for assurances that this will not happen again.  Mawby (2012) explains that 
miscarriages of justice are especially damaging to the image of the police and their 
legitimacy, so efforts to change become an important step in repairing that damage and 
restoring lost legitimacy.  As mentioned earlier, this can also be understood within the 
context of increasing concern with risk.  Furthermore, these cases put the police in a position 
whereby they are ‘too hot to be left alone’ by the government (Savage, 2007) as failings 
make them a target for blame and, therefore, a target for change. 
Again, the picture is more complex and we need to take account of other factors that heighten 
the stimulus for reform.  Brain (2010) notes that towards the end of the 1970s, and so at the 
time that the consequences of the Confait case were being felt, rising crime rates were 
causing concern about criminal investigations and the criminal justice system more generally.  
Reiner (1992, p763) supports this position explaining that there was a “veritable haemorrhage 
of public confidence” in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  This helps us to understand change 
at this particular time.  These explanations can further be understood by taking into account 
broader societal shifts, which are also relevant to the discussions throughout this chapter.  In 
particular, Bryett (1999) argues that improved education, living standards and access to 
information mean that individuals now have higher expectations of those in authority and are 
also more likely to question them.  Additionally, the escalating media coverage of crime and 
the growth in social media throughout the 2000s provides the public with a readily available 
platform to publicly voice any dissent.  This shows that whilst miscarriages of justice and 
other problematic cases might act as a catalyst for change, there are a number of other issues 
bubbling beneath the surface, which help to turn an event into driver of change.  In other 
words, the foundations of change appear to be falling into place over time.  Kingdon’s (1984) 
‘windows of opportunity’ theory, outlined in Chapter Two, might assist our understanding of 
why problematic cases lead to reform: 
1. The problem stream: The occurrence of a miscarriage of justice or otherwise 
problematic case.  
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2. The policy stream: The implementation of legislation. 
3. The politics stream: A motivation to change driven by the need to reassure the 
public and ensure that problems are not repeated. 
The politics stream in the case of policing and change is noteworthy since, as described 
earlier and in Chapter Two, the police once enjoyed a privileged status.  Signs of change 
emerged in the 1980s.  This perhaps also explains why it is since this time that there has been 
such considerable change – the third stream, the political will for change, has become 
stronger. 
Many of the changes that this research has identified can be traced back to particular cases.  
These are changes that can be deemed responsible for the increased volume of work that 
modern-day investigations generate and the more complex nature of them.  Miscarriages of 
justice and problematic cases have been responsible for the introduction of various pieces of 
legislation, regulation and guidance.  The investigation into the 1972 murder of Maxwell 
Confait was a miscarriage of justice that proved fundamental to the establishment of the 
landmark PACE.  The introduction of the CPIA is further evidence of the role that 
miscarriages of justice have played in encouraging change.  It was the failings in the 
disclosure of evidence in the Kiszko case that led to the implementation of this Act (Stelfox, 
2009), which sets out how the disclosure of evidence should be managed.  Such cases do not 
just lead to legislative change.  As outlined in Chapter Two, although much attention was 
focused upon the police and racism, the quality of the investigation into the 1993 murder of 
Stephen Lawrence led to changes that have shaped the investigative process, including, the 
introduction of the MIM. 
These cases can also be considered responsible for changes to the way in which investigative 
teams are brought together, which the current study found to be an important development.  
Innes (2003) describes how the autocratic model featured the SIO at the centre who would 
hold all the information about a case with less senior officers having little idea as to the 
details.  Innes (2003) explains that the risk of ‘tunnel vision’ was substantial, which is 
reflected in the findings of my research, and that the first signs of change around the 
organisation of homicide teams thus became apparent in the 1980s when there was a shift to a 
bureaucratic system.  This was a decade in which a large number of miscarriages of justice 
came to light, which led to calls for more standardisation of procedures.  The importance of 
standardisation was first highlighted in the Byford Report that followed the Peter Sutcliffe 
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case.  Byford (1981, p154) urged the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)33 to 
“consider the standardisation of Major Incident Room documents and procedures”.  This 
triggered a series of changes in the organisation of investigations and in how teams operated.   
The problems that have plagued major crime investigations have also led to the adoption of 
new techniques to try and avoid similar problems occurring in the future.  As was discussed 
in Chapter Two, the inquiry following the investigation into the crimes of the Yorkshire 
Ripper led to the introduction of HOLMES, such were the difficulties that were experienced 
in managing the masses of information using paper systems.  Relatedly, Barclay (2009) 
argues that many miscarriages of justice of the 1980s were due to investigative teams 
pursuing suspects specifically selected by the SIO, something mentioned by the participants 
of the current study.  Barclay (2009) explains that consequently scientific evidence became 
an important tool in helping to correctly identify and eliminate suspects.   
The “confession culture” (Savage and Milne 2007, p614) approach to interviewing of the past 
led to oppressive questioning and is recognised as being responsible for many miscarriages of 
justice.  This is supported by the findings of the present research as reference was made to 
flawed cases in which there were substantial issues with the way in which interviews were 
conducted historically.  However, at first change in this area was quite slow.  Whilst PACE 
was an important step forward in regards to interviewing, for example it stipulated that 
interviews be contemporaneously recorded, it was still some years before there were further 
efforts to formalise interview training and the interview process.  Griffiths and Milne (2006, 
p169) explain that the changes that were brought about by PACE, such as the recording of 
interviews, provided researchers with a “window into the interview room” leading to further 
concerns being raised.  The subsequent introduction of the PEACE model of interviewing is 
an example of attempts to address such concerns.  This tells us that whilst a miscarriage of 
justice shone an initial light on the problems with interviewing and led to changes being 
made, those changes in themselves paved the way for further reform.  
The importance that this research found to now be placed upon learning from all 
investigations, as opposed to those where something fundamental has gone wrong could also 
be said to originate from instances in which investigations have failed in some way.  
Miscarriages of justice and other cases that have been criticised often prompt calls for the 
problems to be addressed and assurances that this will not happen again – ‘lessons will be 
                                                          
33 In 2015 ACPO was replaced with the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC).  
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learned’ is a common phrase at such times.  Indeed, the Macpherson Report recommended 
that Codes of Practice were devised to direct reviews of investigations.  However, such is the 
importance that is placed on learning it is no longer just a response to things ‘going wrong’ 
and it now forms an important part of the investigative process.  Brookman and Lloyd-Evans 
(2015) highlighted the importance of learning during their research into structured and hot 
homicide debriefs, whereby the importance of identifying good practice and areas for 
improvement from each investigation was evident. 
The occurrence of miscarriages of justice or other problematic investigations also help to 
explain some of the changes discovered here to the detectives’ mind-set, changes that were 
discussed by the interviewees in the context of the shifting culture of detective work.  
Specifically, some of those interviewed for this research suggested that the mind-set of 
investigators has changed.  The approach of ‘we need to get our man whatever the cost’ has 
reportedly shifted to one in which the aim is to achieve the right outcome and conducting an 
investigation that can withstand scrutiny.  This finding is supported by the work of Brookman 
and Innes (2013).  In their research exploring what constitutes a successful homicide 
investigation, they found that ‘procedural success’, or “maintaining the integrity of the 
investigation” has become increasingly important (Brookman and Innes 2013, p300).  
Relatedly, the aforementioned CPIA stipulates that all lines of enquiry must be pursued 
showing that there is now no place legally for the ‘tunnel vision’ mind-set that was evident in 
the past.  In addition, the MIM, which aimed to provide a blueprint for investigations, states 
that “it is not an admission of personal failure to change investigative direction in the light of 
new material” (ACPO 2006, p57), which is illustrative of the importance now placed on 
investigative directions being based on evidence as opposed to suspects chosen by the SIO.   
Finally, the media and fictional representations of the detective often portray them very much 
in a way that is representative of the ‘craft’ model of detective work.  Although such 
representations endure, miscarriages of justice and other problematic investigations have 
brought the police under further scrutiny by the media and the public are now intensely aware 
of the failings of the police, since they are constantly under the watchful eye of an 
“unforgiving media” (Beckley and Birkinshaw 2009, p7).  Certainly, this research has found 
that homicide detectives were conscious of the media and the widespread negative coverage 
that problems with investigations would generate.  Therefore, the combination of these cases 
and the closer scrutiny of the media might also help to explain why the kudos associated with 
detective work has reportedly diminished.   
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This section has shown why our reactions to miscarriages of justice and other problematic 
cases are such that they have become a driver of change in homicide investigation.  It has 
been shown that this can be linked to the public’s perception of homicide, but that 
improvements to education have made it more likely that those in authority are challenged, 
demonstrating the influence of societal shifts (Bryett, 1999) as discussed in Chapter Two.  
Advances in Science and Technology 
 
Both the literature and the participants in this research report that the police service, as like 
many other organisations, have simply capitalised upon scientific and technological advances 
over the past few decades as part of modernisation (Senior et al., 2007).  As Bayerl et al 
(2013, p794) state “there is little doubt that technological innovations have a direct impact on 
organisations”.  Similarly, Stelfox (2009) argues that developments in science and technology 
act as a driver for change.  In Chapter Three I described the many scientific and technological 
tools that have been developed for use by the police.  These have become standard major 
lines of enquiry in investigations.  Thus, changes that occur outside of the world of criminal 
investigations can, in turn, change investigations providing investigators with new tools to 
assist during the course of an investigation.  
However, research conducted by Bayerl et al (2013) suggests that the picture is more 
complex.  In their article exploring the complexity of organisational change that is driven by 
technology, they looked at the adoption of social media by various police forces across 
Europe, including the UK, to see what factors at a macro level led these technologies to being 
adopted or not (Bayerl et al., 2013).  Bayerl et al (2013) found that the implementation of 
social media varied across Europe.  Police in the UK utilised it to engage with the public on a 
more regular basis than France and Italy, with officers there deeming its use to be 
“incongruous” with their role, suggesting that how the police perceive their role influences 
whether changes are adopted (Bayerl et al 2013, p801).  Additionally, the authors suggest 
that economic challenges in the UK might also explain why they have embraced social media 
since it offers a cheaper way of communicating with the public and gathering information 
(Bayerl et al., 2013).  They also posited that those forces that adopted social media were 
demonstrating their willingness to make errors “in the eyes of a critical public” (Bayerl et al 
2013, p801).  Again, this research refers to police officers, but there is some alignment with 
the findings of my research as I have also found that the police service has become more 
accountable and open about homicide investigations over the years.  As a further example, 
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the website for Avon and Somerset police carries a video of the Major Crime Team officers 
talking about their work investigating cold cases (Avon and Somerset Constabulary, 2017).  
The work of Bayerl et al (2013) supports the position of the current research that explaining 
change in homicide investigation demands a broad perspective.   
A further explanation for the proliferation of science and technology in homicide 
investigations is that it is linked to the drive towards professionalisation.  The notion of 
professionalisation of the police is not new (Matassa and Newburn, 2007), but it has 
undoubtedly gained pace in recent years.  As James (2013, p13) writes, “in the recent history 
of British policing, a consistent theme has been the effort to professionalise what traditionally 
was craft”.  As we saw in Chapter Three, the ‘craft’ view of detective work suggests that it is 
“developed through natural instinct and experience” (Innes 2003, p9) and is associated with 
traditional views of detective work (Tong and Bowling, 2006).  Manning (1977) argues that 
technology is one example of a number of presentation strategies that the police adopt to 
appear professional.  Taking a different perspective, Green and Gates (2014, p85) argue that 
as well as these advances helping investigations to become more professional, technology 
acts as a motivator for professionalisation as it has “increased the level of accountability of 
the police, with ‘citizen journalists’ monitoring police operations and posting on YouTube to 
go global in an instant”.  According to this view technology places the police under further 
scrutiny, which can lead to increased efforts to present a professional image, something that 
is also heightened when we take into account the high expectations that the public have of the 
police, especially with homicide (Stelfox, 2015).  The present research has found that 
detectives are under more scrutiny and the prevalence of mobile phones and the public using 
phones to film them was one example of this scrutiny.  However, it is arguably more likely 
that police officers’ interactions with the public might be filmed given the frontline nature of 
their work.  The fact that homicide detectives also discussed this is perhaps indicative of the 
intensity of the scrutiny that the police service as a whole feel that they are under.   
Advances in science and technology are undoubtedly responsible for many changes to the 
investigation of homicide in England and Wales.  Clearly, they have led to investigations to 
becoming more complex and have generated more work to be completed because of the lines 
of enquiry that they offer.  Scientific and technological advances have also led to the 
introduction of legislation, regulation and guidance to ensure that these tools are used 
correctly during investigations, such as RIPA to regulate covert operations that involve 
technological tools. 
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This research has identified that detective work today is perhaps more a ‘science’ than an 
‘art’ or ‘craft’.  This was also found to be a consequence of scientific and technological 
change.  Therefore, advances in this area might also be deemed responsible for the apparent 
weakening of the detective status, as it is now necessary for them to draw on outside 
expertise and delegate more so than they did in the past.  In addition, such changes can be 
considered responsible for the increase in civilian investigators, as more specialist skills have 
been required.  This finding is supported by Tong and Bowling (2006, p2) who write that 
“detective work as a science arguably removed some of the mythical and cultural barriers to 
leaning and practising detective work”.  Conversely, this research has also found that the PIP 
training was seen to be an improvement on previous models of training, but that the 
importance of learning on the job remained.  Therefore, although it is argued that changes in 
respect of science and technology have shifted detective work to being seen very much as a 
‘science’, the detectives continue to place importance upon the ‘craft’ of their work.   
Although a seemingly straightforward endeavour at first glance, it has been shown here that 
explaining why developments in science and technology act as a driver change in homicide 
investigation requires a broader focus than just accepting that the police service have taken 
advantage of innovation.  Their adoption is driven by other factors at both an organisational 
and societal level.   
The drivers of changes to homicide investigation in England and Wales and the changes that 
they have driven are presented in Table Two.  It is important to restate here, however, that 
whilst this table is designed to give the reader a concise overview, there exists much overlap 
between the drivers of change that have been identified and they should not be viewed in 








Table Two:  Homicide Investigation in England and Wales – Drivers and Changes 
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Changes to the culture and status of detective work34 
Conclusion  
This chapter has reminded the reader of the many ways in which homicide investigation in 
England and Wales has changed since the 1980s.  It is clear that virtually no area of these 
                                                          
34 Changes to the culture and status of detective work are considered to have been influenced by all 
four drivers of change, hence its placement here. 
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investigations has been untouched.  Four key drivers of change were also presented.  These 
emanated from the present study and the wider literature.  However, the influence of 
homicide itself and other societal shifts have also played an important role in compelling 


















Chapter Ten  
The Impact of Four Decades of Change: Opportunities and Challenges 
 
In the preceding chapter the many changes to which homicide investigation in England and 
Wales has been subject to since the 1980s were outlined and drivers for these changes were 
presented.  In doing so the first two research questions were addressed.  In this final chapter 
the third research question is attended to as the impact of change is examined.  These are the 
challenge of managing the masses of information that modern-day investigations generate, 
the increasingly risk averse detective and the diminishing status of the detective role.  I then 
consider the evidence, which suggests that the status of homicide itself is changing as other 
crimes receive increased attention.  Next, the broader outcomes of change are discussed as I 
contemplate whether it has had any bearing upon the homicide detection rate and the 
likelihood of future miscarriages of justice.  I begin this chapter by reflecting upon some of 
the opportunities that change has offered. 
Opportunities 
 
Put rather simply, the detectives that were interviewed for this research were of the view that 
homicide investigation is better than it was in the past.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the reasons 
for this were often associated with advances in science and technology.  According to the 
findings of the current study, developments in respect of science and technology have 
provided investigators with more lines of enquiry to pursue and allowed them to plot an 
individual’s movements and create a clearer picture of what happened.  For example, in one 
case the prosecution were able to show a jury the footage of a murder that had been captured 
on a mobile phone, prompting the defendant in the case to plead guilty.  More generally, it 
was said that changes in science and technology have made investigations ‘quicker and 
easier’.  The benefits of changes in this regard are undeniable.  As Stelfox (2009, p35) writes, 
these developments “provide investigators with sources of material that their predecessors 
could only dream of”.  The findings of the current study support this view. 
This research also identified that detectives investigating homicide today are far more 
accountable than they were in the past, something that was largely attributed to the increased 
scrutiny that they are under from the media and the public, as well as the growth in 
legislation, regulation and guidance pertaining to their work.  This was said to be a far cry 
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from the 1980s when they were, in the words of one detective, “nigh on out of control”.  This 
increased accountability might also be considered responsible for another advantage of such 
change, that homicide convictions today are likely to be safer.  It was suggested by those that 
I interviewed that we are unlikely to witness again the miscarriages of justice that came to 
light in the 1970s and 1980s.  Similarly, Lewis (2009) argues that the various measures that 
are now in place to increase accountability have improved the likelihood that corruption or 
abuse of police powers will be avoided or uncovered.  This study has shown that this might 
also be attributed to the shift in mind-set of detectives, which was reported to be such that 
getting the correct outcome is the aim, as opposed to merely arresting someone.  It has also 
been found that safer convictions are a consequence of scientific and technological change, 
which has strengthened evidence, whereas reliance on confessions dominated historic 
investigations and in some cases led to miscarriages of justice (Poyser and Milne, 2011).  As 
shown in the example on the previous page, developments in technology can sometimes show 
conclusively what transpired during a homicide.  Cooper and Mason (2009) have also 
recognised the strength of such evidence, as pointed out in Chapter Three35.  Although the 
findings of the present study suggest that miscarriages of justice are less likely, there is 
evidence that they do in fact remain a possibility, but in a different guise.  As we will see 
later in this chapter, a report from the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) indicates 
that disclosure is responsible for most cases that they have received.   
This study has also found that the changes that have emerged since the 1980s have, more 
broadly, made the investigation of homicide more professional than it was in the past.  
Stelfox (2009, pp640 – 641) writes that there is little agreement about what this term means, 
but explains that within the police service it is “shorthand for improved training and 
development”.  This corresponds with the way in which the term was used during the present 
research and, in particular, it was said that the interview process and training of detectives 
had become increasingly professional.     
Challenges 
Despite the positive picture that is presented above, there was ambiguity in the findings.  
Accordingly, I will now discuss some of the challenges that face today’s homicide detectives.  
                                                          
35 However, at the time of writing 10,000 cases were being reviewed after it emerged that data at a 
forensic laboratory had been manipulated, showing that science remains fallible (Devlin and Dodd, 
2017). 
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I begin by assessing the issue of managing information, a problem that was evident in the 
1980s, but does not seem to have been solved.     
A Past and Present Problem: Information Overload36 
 
Williams and Weetman (2013) highlight the lack of academic focus on the role that science 
and technology play in police investigations, noting that attention tends to be upon volume 
crime.  The literature that is available, which was presented in Chapter Three, indicates that 
there is some disparity on this issue.  For example, Roycroft (2007) suggested that forensic 
material contributed to the solution in 38% of homicide cases.  On the other hand, Brown and 
Keppel (2012) found that whilst such evidence was important, it was not as important as 
other factors such as the victim-offender relationship, to solving the case.  Further, Brookman 
et al (forthcoming) found that the mere availability of such evidence does not lead to the 
resolution of a case, but it is whether it is used effectively that is key.  Clearly, there are 
mixed perspectives about the role of science and technology, so it is difficult to fully establish 
the role that science and technology play in homicide investigations and in resolving them.  
The present research has, however, helped to shed some light on this matter in finding that 
such advances do play a substantial role in investigations.  This research has found that when 
cases do not produce any scientific or technological evidence they may flounder, such is the 
role that this evidence plays.  
Although, as was discussed in the previous section, this research found that developments in 
science and technology have made investigations ‘quicker and easier’, a contradiction 
became apparent as it was also said to have made their work complex.  One of the ways in 
which science and technology was said to have complicated investigations was in the 
management of information that an investigation will now generate.  This is a view reflected 
in the literature and is referred to by Innes (2003, p246) as “information overload”.  Vast 
amounts of information must now be processed and its validity and relevance determined.   
There is recent evidence to suggest this concern is not unfounded and Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) raised it in a recent report.  In the previous year they 
found there to be delays in retrieving and examining data from digital devices (HMIC, 2017).  
Steps have been taken to improve this and police forces are looking to ensure that only 
relevant equipment is retrieved from a crime scene to avoid backlogs (HMIC, 2017).  Whilst 
                                                          
36 Information overload was originally coined by Innes (2003). 
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the report does not mention whether this is the case with homicide investigations, it is 
indicative of the challenges that are being faced as a consequence of technological advances.  
It is also further evidence that today’s detectives have to make difficult decisions around the 
testing of exhibits, which corresponds with the findings of the current research.  Information 
management is not a new concern.  This was a fundamental issue identified in the Yorkshire 
Ripper investigation over 30 years ago.  However, it has been identified as a recurrent 
problem both by this research and public inquiries (HMIC, 2017; Roycroft, 2008).  This 
matter becomes increasingly pertinent as technology continues to change and develop, and is 
heightened when we consider the finding of the present research that the police service is 
struggling to keep up with its developments.   
The Loss of Traditional Detective Skills 
 
The relationship between detective skills and the prevalence of scientific and technological 
techniques also warrants further consideration.  As discussed in Chapter Three there is 
discrepancy within the literature on this issue (Allsop, 2012; McCartney, 2006).  
Furthermore, Brookman et al (forthcoming) explored what factors lead to homicide cases 
being solved in the UK and the US.  The detectives in their study also reported that there was 
an over-reliance on science and a diminishing of other skills as a result (Brookman et al., 
forthcoming).  Additionally, in Chapter Three it was noted that the growth in the numbers of 
individuals that own a mobile phone has been significant and social networking has grown at 
an unprecedented rate.  Therefore, the way in which detectives communicate has had to 
change because the way in which society communicates has changed dramatically across just 
the last 10 years as a consequence of social change (Brady and King, 2017).   
The findings of the current research also indicate that there is some inconsistency on this 
matter, but it was widely believed that traditional skills have diminished.  However, although 
my participants reported that today’s detectives are not as good at speaking to people as they 
were historically, the loss of skills was discussed more generally and often in respect of the 
growing influence of science and technology.  In particular, the findings show that the 
retrieval of DNA from a crime scene often helps to ensure a fairly early resolution to an 
investigation, whereas in the past this type of evidence was not available to detectives and so 
they would have to utilise other investigative methods.  These methods might include house-
to-house and speaking to witnesses.  In addition, this study found that SIOs can be focussed 
upon lines of enquiry pertaining to science and technology at the cost of other avenues.  For 
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example, in Chapter Seven one detective described a case in which the SIO was certain the 
resolution for a particularly violent homicide would come from scientific evidence and 
focused primarily on this, but it did yield any useful results.  This corresponds with the 
findings of McCartney (2006).  This tunnel vision was evident in historic investigations, 
including the Yorkshire Ripper case, and changes have been made to avoid such approaches.  
The CPIA 1996, for example, stipulates that investigators must pursue all lines of enquiry.   
There is research to suggest that the majority of homicide cases are resolved quickly and 
because of information that is provided to the police as opposed to investigative work 
(Brodeur and Dupont, 2006).  This would suggest that any diminishing of detectives’ 
communication skills would not be wholly detrimental to investigations.  However, the role 
of communication skills is surely still vital in elucidating that information and feeding it into 
the investigation.  Indeed, several interviewees commented that house-to-house remains as 
important today as it did in the past.  Therefore, any loss of these skills will potentially hinder 
investigations.  Further, Brodeur and Dupont (2006) argue that in cases where the suspect is 
not swiftly identified investigations will often flounder.  Arguably then the loss of 
communication skills could prove detrimental to protracted investigations.  
It was noted in Chapter Two that there has been a lack of academic research on detective 
skills.  The current research provides additional evidence that this needs to be addressed.  If 
the skills required to be an effective detective are not fully appreciated, the implications that 
might derive from a loss of skills cannot be fully understood. 
The Risk Averse Detective 
 
The consequences of the focus on risk and the efforts to manage it have been found by this 
research to be significant and risk aversion became a prominent theme.  The issue of risk 
aversion became apparent when the interviewees discussed what they perceived to be an 
increase in bureaucracy.  They explained that this has led to feelings of risk aversion, such are 
the consequences when ‘something goes wrong’ during an investigation and a reluctance to 
think creatively.  This can be further understood when we take into account the view that the 
scrutiny that comes with a preoccupation with risk “carries with it the spectre of blame” 
(Kemshall 2003, p12) and the need to hold someone to account when something goes wrong.   
It is important here to consider what bureaucracy means.  In the context of this research 
bureaucracy refers to the processes and procedures that now make up a significant part of the 
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investigative process and which appear to be an added source of pressure and additional 
work.  Although there are certainly positive aspects to bureaucracy, the detectives often 
spoke of it with negative connotations attached and in ways that indicated that it was a burden 
to them.  For example, they described the layers of bureaucracy involved when they need to 
examine a suspect’s phone, which could take a considerable amount of time. A similar 
perspective is evident in the research of Westera et al (2016) in their study exploring the 
challenges to detectives being effective in the future.  Based on research conducted in 
Australia and New Zealand, they also found that detectives were concerned about increasing 
bureaucratic processes that have been implemented in a bid to ensure accountability, avoid 
risk and to measure performance (Westera et al., 2016).  There are clear similarities between 
these findings and those of the present research.  
As we saw in Chapter Two, issues of risk and bureaucracy were identified in 2008 when a 
review of policing was requested by the then Home Secretary in response to concerns that 
policing had become overly bureaucratic.  Led by Sir Ronnie Flanagan it “identified risk 
aversion as a primary cause of bureaucratic processes” (Heaton 2011, p79).  The report 
identified two triggers that impact upon the way in which processes have been designed: 
1.  Internally – a ‘just in case’ mentality, which leads to every process being designed 
to the worst case scenario without regard to how it will be handled by thousands of 
officers on a day to day basis. 
2.  Externally – a public approach, vocalised by the media and politicians that this 
‘must never happen again’ – which results in the same outcome.  (Home Office 2008, 
p52). 
This suggests that risk aversion across the police service leads to the implementation of top-
down bureaucratic procedures.  However, the detectives in the current study explained that 
these bureaucratic procedures have made them increasingly risk averse and spoke of being 
nervous of stepping away from the processes.  Thus, it seems that the response to the police 
service’s aversion to risk has created risk aversion amongst those directly affected by new 
procedures.  In a further indication of the prevalence of risk, the report also states: “over 
recent years we have started to see an even more insidious extension: the expectation that the 
service should have anticipated events and incidents that are well beyond their control” 
(Home Office 2008, p52). 
Turnell et al (2013, p200) write of similar responses to the deaths of children who were 
known to social services with the phrase “lessons will be learned” often dominating 
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discussions.  With scant literature concerning these issues in respect of the investigation of 
homicide, it is useful here to briefly consider what the literature around responses to child 
deaths can tell us.  Munro (2010, p1146) draws on the work of Hood et al (2001) in arguing 
how one response to reducing risk in child protection is that of “introducing more and more 
detailed formal procedures setting out the ‘correct’ way to deal with a case in steps that can 
be readily performed and measured”. 
This is reminiscent of the steps that have been taken towards professionalising investigations 
and in response to miscarriages of justice, such as the introduction of the MIM.  Further, 
Munro (2010, p1146) writes that the purpose of such an approach allows the “defence of ‘due 
diligence’ if a tragic outcome occurs.  Senior management can demonstrate how their staff 
followed all correct procedures in working with the case and therefore cannot be blamed”. 
This stance is reflected in the findings from my research, which illustrated that detectives will 
make reference to documents such as the MIM within homicide case files to support 
decisions that were made.  This arguably links to the concept of defensible decision-making.  
Carson (1996) as cited by Kemshall (2009, p333) defined defensible decisions as those “that 
will withstand the harsh scrutiny of hindsight bias in the event of risk failure”.  The notion of 
defensible decision-making during homicide investigations is evident in earlier research.  
Maguire and Norris (1992, p66) revealed that detectives had been sceptical about the 
introduction of the Policy Book, fearing that it would be used to “hammer them into the 
ground when the inquiry went wrong”.  However, despite this initial scepticism they came to 
see the positives of its introduction as it “made the SIOs think more carefully about their 
decisions and the justifications for them.  If the decisions turned out to be wrong, as long as 
the justification was rational there was no cause for recriminations” (Maguire and Norris 
1992, p66). 
More than 20 years after this research was carried out it is clear that whilst documenting 
decisions remains useful for SIOs, the point that a strong rationale will mean that there are no 
recriminations should errors be made is no longer certain, since it is these elements of an 
investigation that might be the focus of the defence: 
Adherence to procedural requirements and justification of policy decisions are usually 
what an SIO gets cross-examined on in court proceedings (i.e. also known as ‘trial by 
policy decision’), whereas historically cross-examination used to focus upon the 
honesty and integrity of detectives’ activities and behaviour. (Cook and Tattersall 
2010, p18). 
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This is something that was reported by the detectives in this research.  However, the QC that 
was interviewed reported that in his experience it was unlikely that this would be a major 
focus of the defence, but that he had also found that this is something that detectives are 
particularly nervous about.  
Munro (2010, p1147) also argues that the defence of due diligence, whilst helpful for the 
individual as it is their ‘cover’, will lead them to “opt for the safer route of following 
procedures, however inappropriate they may seem in a particular case”.  This brings us to the 
delicate balance between detectives using individual skills and initiative whilst ensuring that 
they are working in accordance with the relevant legislation and guidance.  The findings of 
the literature outlined above mirror the detectives’ views that bureaucracy will lead risk 
averse detectives to take the path of least resistance.  This raises the question of whether the 
tendencies of some detectives to rigidly follow processes might impact upon their ability to 
successfully investigate hard to solve homicides, or what Innes (2003) terms ‘whodunits’, 
where detective skills are seen to be particularly crucial.  
Kemshall (2003) writes that the use of systems and audits in controlling risk replaces trust in 
professionals.  This somewhat corresponds with the Home Office research on increased 
bureaucracy in policing that was mentioned earlier, which found that new processes are often 
implemented because of a ‘just in case’ mentality (Home Office, 2008).  It is perhaps 
unsurprising that the findings of the current study illustrate a reluctance by individuals to step 
outside of those processes because of the resulting risk aversion.  This is despite the fact that 
the SIO Handbook stresses that “creativity and innovations” should be encouraged and that 
“finding legal solutions to legal problems is a key skill for an SIO” (Cook and Tattersall 
2010, p12).  It could therefore be argued that there exists a tension between using creativity 
and following processes that is potentially exacerbated by aversion to risk.  There is, 
however, evidence to the contrary.  As presented in Chapter Three, Innes (2003) found that 
although homicide detectives placed a significant degree of importance upon scientific and 
technological tools, the art and craft elements of detective work were apparent when they 
were investigating more complex cases.  On these occasions they would adopt innovative and 
creative approaches.  This suggests some disparity between the current research and others 
examining detective work.  Clearly the role that science and technology plays in 
investigations requires further exploration.     
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The disparity in the findings of the present research and that of Innes (2003) might be 
attributed to the 14 year gap between them, as the concerns mentioned by the former and 
serving detectives in the current research are evident in more recent work.  Examining the 
role of flair in major crime investigation, Fox (2014, p13) also found that some detectives 
viewed the MIM as providing a “prescriptive list of activities” that had to be followed.  
Further, he found that “several respondents held the view that the existence of national police 
guidance might create a ‘tick box’ mentality or even risk averse mentality amongst police 
investigators” (Fox 2014, p13).  Fox (2014) acknowledges that this was not the intention of 
such guidance, but that these findings resonate with those uncovered in the current study 
suggests this is the message that investigators today are receiving.  Arguably, changes of this 
kind have disempowered the homicide detective and as such they feel that they should closely 
follow guidance, rather than use it as just that – guidance.   
The matters discussed here might be linked with what Brookman and Innes (2013, p2) term 
‘procedural accountability’, whereby “detectives can demonstrate to others (both inside and 
outside the police) their compliance with official guidance”.  Their work exploring what 
constitutes a successful homicide investigation identified four definitions of success, 
including ‘procedural success’.  Their findings are reminiscent of what has been found within 
my research as they explained that conducting a proper investigation is a key objective: 
“compliance with legal procedures and official guidance was a prominent feature of detective 
talk and the ways in which they explained and justified many of the decisions they took” 
(Brookman and Innes 2013, p9). 
Explorations of organisational behaviour suggest that history has an impact upon the way in 
which decisions are made, which may help to explain some of the ways in which decisions 
are now made during an investigation since the police service have been heavily criticised 
over the years for the way in which numerous homicides were investigated: “decisions aren’t 
made in a vacuum; they have a context.  Individual decisions are points in a stream of choice, 
those made in the past are like ghosts that haunt and constrain current choices” (Robbins and 
Judge 2008, p121). 
Risk aversion might be a consequence of detectives being aware of times in the past when 
things have gone wrong, leading to inquiries and major change.  This might be making them 
overly cautious in their conduct, lest they make a mistake and become the subject of a future 
inquiry and the focus of the significant media attention that would undoubtedly follow.  
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Indeed, it is telling that many of those interviewed in the present research stressed that despite 
the increased regulation of investigative work, it would never fully eradicate human error.  
Relatedly, they felt that it is important to maintain perspective when errors are made and in 
ensuring that any subsequent change is approached with caution.  The introduction of 
increased legislation and guidance has in many respects been helpful to those investigating 
homicide in England and Wales.  However, responses to high profile and highly criticised 
cases clearly warrant review for they raise questions around the proportionality of responses. 
This has been considered in respect of major accidents.  Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock (1990) 
found that major accidents generate significant changes whilst more routine errors are often 
overlooked.  Similarly, Innes (2003) explains that actions that could be deemed ‘compliance 
drift’ are often overlooked with focus being upon major failings in criminal investigations.  
The findings of this research have revealed that increased bureaucracy is continuing to create 
pressure for detectives and it might be argued that this could lead to the bypassing of 
procedures that could, in turn, culminate in an increase in serious failings in major crime 
investigations.  
An additional perspective should also be recalled at this stage, which is the view that 
although there has certainly been an influx of legislation since the 1980s, there are examples 
of safeguards established by PACE being “diluted” and police powers enhanced (Reiner 
2010, p27).  Therefore, change is not one-way and whilst certain changes have endeavoured 
to improve accountability, subsequent changes have seemingly lessened its impact.  
Nevertheless, the findings of this research show that changes in this area created a tangible 
feeling of risk aversion amongst the homicide detectives that were interviewed. 
The Diminishing Status of the Detective 
 
The status of the detective and detective culture has seemingly changed significantly over the 
last four decades.  The findings of this research suggest that the prestige once associated with 
the position has diminished and it no longer holds the kudos that it did in the past.  It has also 
been said that today’s detective is more concerned with achieving a work-life balance than 
being seen to work the longest hours before going to the pub.  Perhaps tellingly, it is now 
seen to be ‘just a job’ not a ‘job for life’.  What might be considered the more positive 
changes in this area are the changes to the SIOs mind-set, the fact that they are no longer 
feared and the increase in female detectives.  Given the extent of the developments that 
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homicide investigation, and policing more broadly, has been subject to it is perhaps 
unsurprising that this has led to changes in the detective culture and status.   
The current study has found that the repercussions of changes to detective culture and status 
are signified in the difficulties that many police forces are experiencing with recruiting 
detectives.  Although they did not look at homicide detectives specifically, James and Mills 
(2012) also found that this to be an issue for detectives.  The recent findings of the HMIC are 
further evidence.  Their 2017 report highlights that there is a “national crisis in the service in 
the severe shortage of investigators, such as detectives” and that some forces do not have 
enough qualified investigators with “little, if any, capacity for forces to assist one another 
through the temporary loan of detectives of other investigators where this is necessary” 
(HMIC 2017, p12).  More recently, the Metropolitan Police wrote to retired detectives to ask 
if they should return to help address the shortage while the aftermath of recent terrorist 
attacks and the Grenfell Tower fire disaster is managed (Brunt, 2017).  This corresponds with 
the findings of my research.  The participants of several forces in both England and Wales 
reported difficulties with the recruitment of detectives.   
Although the HMIC report does stress that the performance of police forces in England and 
Wales is ‘good’ overall, the possible ramifications of a lack of detectives for the investigation 
of homicide is clear.  This is compounded when we consider the finding that SIOs will now 
spend several days negotiating for staff to come and assist on a murder investigation due to 
shortages.  It is common practice for smaller forces to use ‘mutual aid’ if they do not have the 
necessary resources to investigate a major incident or event, anticipated or otherwise 
(National Police Chiefs’ Council, 2016).  This was used in the investigation into the 
disappearance of April Jones in Machynlleth.  The investigation was significant, particularly 
for a smaller force such as Dyfed Powys, and so other forces were called upon to assist under 
mutual aid agreements.  Shortages in the numbers of detectives might make this a difficult 
task in the future.   
There is clearly evidence that police services across England and Wales are struggling to 
recruit detectives.  Although it is difficult to definitively say why this is happening, it seems 
that the way in which the role itself has changed has played a part.  The interviewees 
discussed the struggle with detective recruitment as a consequence of the loss of status 
associated with the role, alongside other factors.  This has also been raised by the HMIC.  
The HMIC (2017) put forward a number of reasons for the shortage, which included 
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problems with work schedules, pay, a lack of mentor support and the pressure that they 
would come under should an investigative failure occur.  Indeed, several serving detectives in 
the present research questioned why someone would want to become a detective when they 
could be a uniformed officer who is paid overtime and not subject to the pressures that face 
detectives. James and Mills (2012) found that the role of the detective is now unattractive 
when compared to other positions in the police service, where a work/life balance can be 
achieved.  Further, their participants also believed that the pressure that comes with being a 
detective makes it an unattractive prospect.  The findings of my research suggest that this is 
also the case for homicide detectives. 
Ironically, one of the ways in which the police service are attempting to tackle the issue of 
detective recruitment could diminish the detective status further, for it involves the 
introduction of direct entry for detectives.  In 2016 the Metropolitan Police Service allowed 
volunteer officers who had 6 months service the opportunity to apply to become detectives 
(Weinfass, 2016).  In 2017 this was extended as civilians with degree qualifications, in any 
subject, became eligible to apply and the Metropolitan Police hope to recruit 160 individuals 
(Weinfass, 2017).  Moreover, Thames Valley Police and Suffolk Constabulary have 
introduced direct entry (Weinfass, 2017b).  The findings of this research were that exposure 
to investigations was key to becoming an efficient detective, despite the improvements that 
have been made with the introduction of PIP (see also Smith and Flanagan, 2000).  
According to those interviewed, it is not possible to train someone to quickly become a 
detective and that the two-year probation period that civilians will be required to undergo will 
be insufficient (Weinfass, 2017).  Similarly, Brookman et al (forthcoming) also found that 
experience was an important factor in being able to solve a homicide.  The findings of the 
present research that many detectives were unsure about the use civilian investigators would 
also suggest that direct entry is not appropriate.  Ensuring exposure to investigations, 
alongside formal training, would therefore need to be a key aspect of training direct entry 
detectives, particularly as recruitment has now moved beyond the police service.  It is 
increasingly likely that the future detective will look quite different to even current detectives 
and, indeed, markedly different from those of the 1980s.  
Diminishing Resources and New Priorities 
 
Earlier in this chapter it was acknowledged that we are living in times of austerity and 
significant cuts to public services, including the police, have taken place in recent years.  It is 
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therefore important to recognise that concerns around resourcing of the police and other 
emergency services37 are gaining traction at the time of writing and to consider the possible 
consequences for homicide investigation.   
These concerns have grown after several terrorist attacks occurred in London and Manchester 
across a short space of time.  There are reports that the government is considering changing 
the police funding formula, which would have affected larger forces with more money going 
to smaller forces.  This potential change is connected to the terrorist attacks and in response 
to warnings from the Metropolitan Police Commissioner that they cannot endure further cuts 
(Toner, 2017).  It is possible that responses to growing concern about terrorist attacks might 
in reality prove detrimental to the funding of homicide investigations as terrorism moves 
higher up the agenda of the government, police and public.  For the detectives that I spoke to, 
investigating homicide was seen as the ‘ultimate’ and we have seen here that it holds a 
particular status amongst the public.  However, as apprehension grows about terrorism it is 
possible that the status of other forms of homicide might shift.  Indeed, several detectives 
remarked on the growing importance of other crimes when discussing changes to the 
resourcing of homicide.  It is not just concerns about terrorism that might lead to a change in 
the status of homicide, there are other crimes that come to the fore and demand resources.  
For example, one police service has moved detectives from working on homicide to working 
on cases of historic child abuse, another crime that has been at the centre of significant public 
attention and concern (Police Service Communication).  Additionally, in June 2017 a teenage 
girl was murdered in what the police described as incredibly rare circumstances.  Although 
the details are as yet unknown this type of homicide would usually receive quite significant 
media attention. However, this was not the case.  This might be the result of the London 
Bridge attacks on 3rd June 2017 and the Grenfell tower fire on 14th June 2017.  Although 
anecdotal this might be a further example of the changing status of some forms of homicide 
as other crimes move higher up political and public agendas.   
The preceding sections have considered the impact of change on the frontline - on 
investigative practice and the detective.  It is useful to now take a step back and consider the 
impact of change from a broader perspective.  Whilst there is not the scope to fully explore 
this, it would amount to a glaring omission of the present research to explore change and its 
impact, without at least briefly speculating as to whether it has had any bearing upon the 
                                                          
37 In particular, concerns around the resourcing of the fire service have been raised following the 
Grenfell fire disaster in London in June 2017.   
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homicide detection rate or the likelihood of future investigative errors and miscarriages of 
justice.   
The Obstinate Detection Rate 
 
Although it can be argued that merely looking at the detection rate provides an inadequate 
measure of the efficiency and effectiveness of homicide investigations, it is an important 
consideration in light of the very high expectations that the public have of the police when 
they are investigating homicide (Stelfox, 2015).  This is also one of the ways in which the 
police themselves measure performance in this area (Brookman and Innes, 2013).  The 
numbers of homicides committed in England and Wales are amongst the lowest in the world 
(Brookman et al., 2017b).  In the year ending March 2016 there were 571 cases of homicide 
recorded in England and Wales (Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2017).  A frequently 
used figure quoted by the participants regarding the numbers of homicides that are solved in 
England and Wales was ‘around 90%’.  A review of the literature supports this.  Brookman et 
al (forthcoming) found that the homicide detection rate has been around 90% since the 2000s.  
However, the detection rate has declined from an average of 94% during the 1960s 
(Brookman et al., forthcoming)38.  A detection rate of ‘around 90%’ is high, which is 
possibly why it has not been subject to much discussion.  In addition, the majority of 
homicides are classed as ‘self-solvers’ (Innes, 2003) where the perpetrator is quickly 
identified (see Broduer and Dupont, 2006 for similar results in Quebec), which might also 
explain the lack of critical attention to the detection rate.   
However, the question that arises is: why, despite all the developments that have occurred, 
which have aimed to improve effectiveness and that have, according to the data, generally 
been positive in their impact, have we not seen an improvement in the detection rate?  The 
findings of this research might provide some explanation.  It has been established that risk 
aversion is such that some detectives feel unsure of using intuition or creativity, which 
presents the possibility that difficult cases, which might require such an approach to move 
them forward, might be compromised.  It has also been also found that advances in science 
and technology have led to the weakening of what are considered traditional detective skills 
and science and technology sometimes relied upon to the exclusion of other avenues.  It was 
also said that consequently when cases do not feature some aspect of scientific or 
                                                          
38 Interestingly, the homicide rate in the USA has declined significantly and is around 65% 
(Brookman et al, forthcoming). 
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technological evidence, it can be difficult to progress them.  It is possible that this might help 
us to explain the detection rate, particularly since several cases in which these problems were 
present were cited in this research and which remain unsolved.  These issues are arguably 
compounded by the concerns that were raised around detective training.  Although it was 
agreed that training had improved in many respects, it was believed that exposure to 
investigations remains the most important part of detective training.  However, it was also 
reported that budget cuts have meant that opportunities to release officers from BCUs to 
experience major crime investigations have been reduced.  There has been little evaluation of 
PIP (James and Mills, 2012; Tong, 2009) and so the findings of this research are further 
indication that this should be addressed for the identified shortcomings in training are 
potentially influencing the detection rate.  Additionally, the shortage of detectives has been 
identified by both existing literature and the current research, and it is possible that this is 
having a detrimental impact upon whether or not investigations are progressed.  
It is difficult to definitively say why the detection rate has remained rather static and there are 
undoubtedly other factors that will affect it, but it is reasonable to surmise that the challenges 
that have been identified in the current study are playing at least some part in encumbering 
the detection rate.  Ultimately, although the detection rate is certainly high, the findings of 
this research suggest that there is no room for complacency and that we might well see 
improvement if the concerns that have been raised here are tackled. 
Have Lessons Been Learned? 
 
If, as the detectives and the literature suggest, investigative errors or miscarriages of justice 
are often an important root of change, it is necessary to consider the extent to which such 
change has reduced the likelihood of these problems arising again.  The general view of the 
participants was that we are unlikely to see the level of occurrence of miscarriages of justice 
that we witnessed in the past because of the changes that have been made.  For example, the 
changes that have taken place have increased accountability, which will have reduced the 
chances of such occurrences.  However, there is also evidence to the contrary and it would be 
remiss to not consider this.   
Investigative errors continue to be made.  At the end of 2016 the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission (IPCC) began an investigation into the police handling of the 
murders of four men in London.  Although Stephen Port was ultimately convicted, concerns 
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were raised about failures to identify the deaths as homicides and link them.  It has been 
suggested that institutional homophobia was a factor in the shortcomings of this 
investigation, raising questions about how far mind-sets have changed (Tatchell, 2016).  
Although investigative errors can be distinguished from miscarriages of justice, the two are 
undoubtedly interlinked since errors can lead to miscarriages of justice.  
The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) Annual Report for 2015/16 states that over 
the year they had seen a “steady stream of miscarriages of justice” (CCRC 2016, p11) and 
that over the last three years they had seen an increase of approximately 50% in the number 
of applications that they received. 22% of these referrals were for homicide convictions.  
Although the CCRC does not provide much detail about the cases that they have dealt with, 
what they do report shows that the cases that have been referred to the appeal courts are 
relatively recent; for example, two homicide cases were from 2000 and 2006.  The grounds 
for referral for both include concerns around disclosure of evidence.  That these cases were 
subject to modern-day investigative processes suggests that they are by no means infallible.  
The findings of the current research also suggest that disclosure in homicide investigations 
demands further attention.  It was described by one detective as a “new battleground” and 
concerns arose about the way in which this is managed. Additionally, as was outlined in 
Chapter Two, Roycroft (2008), in a review of 40 years of public inquiries into murder 
investigations, found that the same problems arise repeatedly, including issues around 
leadership, the skills of the SIO and information management.  This too raises questions as to 
how far the police, despite changes being made, learn from such cases and, pertinently, about 
the efficacy of the changes that have been made over the last four decades. 
The Research Questions Revisited and Future Research 
 
Since the 1980s the investigation of homicide in England and Wales has changed 
significantly.  The extent of change has been such that almost every facet of investigation has 
been transformed and there have been significant developments in respect of the scientific 
and technological tools that are available, the legislation, regulation and guidance governing 
investigations and investigators, the way in which investigations are run on a day-to-day 
basis, as well as changes to the culture and status of the homicide detective and detective 
work. 
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Explaining why these changes have occurred is difficult for the present study has shown that 
the police are vulnerable to numerous influences, at a societal and organisational level, which 
have played some part in shaping homicide investigation.  Although my interest in examining 
changes from the 1980s was prompted by the view within the literature that the Yorkshire 
Ripper case and Byford Inquiry marked the start of significant reform (Brain, 2010; Innes, 
2003), the picture is more complex and attributing change to one case does not reveal the full 
story.  This research has identified that changes to the investigation of homicide have been 
driven by a preoccupation with risk, the changing political economy, reactions to 
miscarriages of justice and problematic cases and advances in science and technology.  This 
corresponds with what the literature reveals to drive changes in policing more broadly and in 
other organisations.  However, it has also been acknowledged that the status of homicide is 
such that the public hold high expectations of the police in terms of how these crimes are 
investigated, which is also responsible for propelling change forward.  It is therefore 
proffered that explaining change necessitates an integrated approach.  Ultimately, the greatest 
challenge for the police perhaps lies in achieving a balance between moving along with 
society, pacifying calls for action when something goes wrong to reassure the public and 
restore legitimacy, and maintaining perspective and proportionality when deciding what 
course of action to take.   
This research has found that whilst there has been significant progress, change has brought 
new challenges and, perhaps most importantly, not led to an increase in the detection rate or 
the end of miscarriages of justice.  Furthermore, a shortage of detectives has been identified, 
which has been reflected in other literature and recent media accounts.  The implications for 
the future of homicide investigation are significant.  Further research is needed, firstly, to 
fully understand why becoming a detective appears to be a less appealing prospect than in the 
past.  Direct entry has been introduced partly in response to this shortage, but the widespread 
belief amongst detectives in this study was that a background in investigations in a policing 
capacity is important to being able to work on homicide investigations.  Therefore, direct 
entry might not be the solution that is needed.  Secondly, this research and the wider literature 
reveal continued concerns around the level of bureaucracy in homicide investigation and 
policing generally.  The resultant risk aversion has also been recognised.  Indeed, this is 
considered one explanation for the aforementioned shortage of detectives.  It is suggested that 
a review of the processes and procedures is necessary to identify whether there exists 
‘burdensome bureaucracy’.  The detectives in this research were not always specific about 
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which processes and procedures were onerous, so a closer look at what exactly is considered 
to be problematic and unnecessary during the course of a homicide investigation is needed.  
Thirdly, this study has shown that the way in which teams are brought together has changed, 
but that there exists considerable variation across the police service.  It has been revealed that 
there are concerns about drafting in officers to assist core teams, the use of civilian 
investigators and concerns that some are being reduced in size because of budget cuts.  
Although there is a general model by which homicide investigation teams are set-up and run, 
the current issues with budget and the disparity render the make-up of homicide investigation 
teams in need of further attention.  This would help to identify and understand the challenges 
being faced.  
An End Note 
 
The central aim of the present research was to explore change and the detectives sometimes 
demonstrated differing views on the subject of change.  I end this thesis by revisiting the one 
question on which there was resounding agreement.  That question was: what was/is the most 
rewarding part of being a detective working on homicide investigations? 
“It’s dealing with families of murder victims, it is such a privilege” (FD 9)  
“I do draw an awful lot of satisfaction from engaging with families…what I can do is 
bring the case to a conclusion where they are happy that that’s the right conclusion 
and justice has been done” (SD 13) 
Clearly for detectives, past and present, helping the families who have lost a loved one to 
murder and bringing the offender to justice remains the most rewarding part of investigating 
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Pilot Interview Schedule 
 
Background 
Could you please tell me about when you first joined up as a police officer, when this 
was and a little bit about your career? (Length of service, how long did you spend as a 
detective, how long did you spend investigating homicide/other major crimes?)  
Approximately how many homicide investigations were you involved with? 
In what capacity were you involved with these investigations? 
How was homicide investigated during your career? (What were the main lines of 
enquiry? How were the teams/staff that were involved organised? What ‘rules’ guided 
you? What was the perception of ‘rules’? Were ‘rules’ followed strictly? Did 
particular ‘rules’ have different levels of adherence?  What worked well in 
investigations? What did not work well in investigations?  What were the major 
challenges in investigations?) 
 
Change and investigations 
During your career what changes occurred in the investigation of homicide and when 
did these occur? 
Why did these changes occur? 
Did these changes happen quickly or over time? 
What impact do you think these changes had? (Upon investigations generally, upon 
the officers involved etc) 
Have the changes to the investigation of homicide impacted differently on different 
types of murder investigations?  How? 
 
Change and training 
What has been the impact of changes to homicide investigation upon the training of 
officers? 
Did you ever read the Murder Investigation Manual and any other key documents 
pertaining to the investigation of homicide?  (If not, why not?  Were they any good? 
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Did they assist you?  Are such documents/guidance readily available to those 
involved in homicide investigations?  Are they widely used?) 
Do you think the training now reflects the changes that have occurred to the 
investigation of homicide when we consider the advancements in forensics and 
technology, and any other changes?   
 
Change and the Detective 
Do you think that there are certain ‘key skills’ that you must possess in order to be a 
detective?  (What are they?  Why these?) 
Tell me about the best detective you ever worked with and why he or she was so 
good? 
Tell me about the worst detectives you ever worked with and why he or she was so 
good? 
How do you see detective work in the future?  
Thinking about all the changes that have occurred to the investigation of homicide, do 
you think the process that is in place now is better than it was before the changes 
came into place?  (How?  Why?) 
Is there anything else that you would like to add that you think I should know? 
 
Pilot Interview Feedback 
Are there any questions that you think I could add to this schedule? 







Appendix Two  
Research Overview  
 
I am a second year PhD student at the University of South Wales being supervised by Profs 
Fiona Brookman and Mike Maguire. I am completing a PhD in homicide investigation and 
my research is centred upon charting the process of homicide investigation and looking at 
how/why it has changed over the years and the impacts of these changes.  To move forward 
with my research, I am hoping to conduct interviews with both former and serving detectives 
about their experiences of homicide investigation in order to explore these ideas further.  I am 
particularly interested in the process of homicide investigation and the changes to it, I will not 
be asking participants to divulge specific case details and outcomes.  I am hoping to record 
these interviews, but can take handwritten notes if that is preferred.  Confidentiality is of 
course assured.  If you think you might be interested in taking part, please email me and I can 














Interview Schedule for Former Detectives 
 
1. Background 
Can you tell me a little bit about your background and how and why you became a 
detective? (When did you join the police? Why? When did you become a detective? 
Why?) 
How did you spend as a detective?  
Approximately how many homicides have you investigated?   
In what capacity were you involved in these investigations?  
 
2. The key moment of change during your career 
What would you consider to be the key moment of change to the investigation of 
homicide investigation that occurred during your career?  (Why this? What prompted 
this change? Did this change occur quickly or over time? What was your initial 
reaction? What impact did it have? What do you think now? Has this change made 
the investigation of homicide more effective? How?) 
 
3. Homicide investigation during your career 
Could you tell me about the first and last homicide investigation that you were 
involved with?  (When were they? What were the key differences? What worked well? 
What did not work well? What were the main lines of enquiry? How were the 
teams/staff that were involved organised? What ‘rules’ guided the investigations? 
What was the perception of ‘rules’ during the investigations? Were they followed 
strictly? Did particular ‘rules’ have different levels of adherence in these 
investigations?) 
Did you ever read the MIM (if applicable) or any other documents pertaining to the 
investigation of homicide?  (Were they useful?  Were such documents/guidance 
readily available during investigations?) 
Did you ever call upon experts outside of the police service for assistance in 
investigations? (Who? Why? What were the difficulties? What were the benefits?) 
What were the pressures that you experienced during investigations? (Media, 
financial, staffing) 
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What worked well during homicide investigations? (Why?) 
What did not work well during homicide investigations? (Why?) 
 
4. Change and training 
How do you learn to be a detective?  
How was experience and knowledge shared during your career? 
Did you ever undertake any specific training for homicide investigation? (What did 
this entail? How effective was it? How? Why? In what way would you have changed 
it?) 
What was the impact of change upon the training of detectives? (Did the training 
itself changed? How? Did training become a more regular occurrence over time?) 
With the availability now of degree courses focused on policing, do you think this sort 
of educational background is important for a new detective?  (Why?) 
What impact do you think this will have on the type of detectives we will see in the 
future and on investigation?  (How? Why?) 
 
5. Change as reaction 
When changes have occurred as a result of failed investigations and resulting public 
inquires (e.g. Byford and Macpherson) how do such changes filter down? 
What is your opinion of change that occurs as a reaction to such cases /inquiries? 
Why do you think change is the response?  
When change occurs as a result of investigations into complex cases (or 
‘whodunnits’) does this effect that way in other homicides, domestic cases for 
example, are investigated?  (How?  Why?)     
 
6. Change, science and technology 
What were the major advancements in science and technology that occurred during 
your career? 
Did the role that science and technology play change during your career?  (How? Did 
it become more prevalent? Were certain techniques used more often?) 
In what ways does the use of technology and science aid/hinder the investigation of 
homicide?  (How?) 
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What is the ‘relationship’ between the use of science and technology and what might 
be considered ‘traditional’ detective skills?  (Do they complement each other? How? 
Why? Do they clash? How? Why?) 
 
7. Change and the detective 
Do you think that there are certain key skills and attributes that you must possess as a 
detective?  (What are they?  Why these?) 
Do you think that the key skills and attributes required of a detective today differ to 
those required in the past?  (How?  Why?)  
Some academics talk about the ‘art craft and science’ of detective work.  In your 
experience, which would you say represented detective work as it was during your 
career? (Would you say that this is the same for detective work today?  Would you 
categorise detective work in an alternative way?) 
In Swindon in 2011, an SIO breached PACE when a murder suspect offered to lead 
police to the body of another victim.  Whilst the second body was recovered, the 
suspect was not charged with that murder due to the actions of the SIO.  The judge 
accused the SIO of returning to a 1970s style of policing.  What do you think about 
this case?  (What do you think of the judge’s comments?  Despite his actions, do you 
think the SIO achieved a successful outcome?)  
Tell me about the best/worst detective you ever worked with and why he or she was 
so good/bad 
What did you like most/least about being a detective? (Why?) 
What did you find the most rewarding part of being a detective? (Why?) 
If you were a police officer today, would you still want to become a detective? (Why? 
Why not?) 
What would your words of advice be to a new detective starting out today? 
 
8. Finally… 
Thinking about the changes that have occurred during your career, do you think that 
ultimately the investigation of homicide is now better than it was before? (How? 
Why? Why not?) 
Is there anything else that you feel would be useful to this interview that has not 
already been mentioned? 
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Would you be able to recommend any other former detectives who might be willing 
to be interviewed as part of this research? 
Would you be able to recommend any other materials/documents that you think might 




















Interview Schedule for Serving Detectives 
 
1. Background 
Can you tell me a little bit about your background and how and why you became a 
detective?  (When did you join the police? Why? When did you become a detective? 
Why?) 
Approximately how many homicides have you investigated?   
 
2. The key moment of change during your career 
What would you consider to be the key moment of change to the investigation of 
homicide investigation that occurred during your career and why?  (Why this? What 
prompted this change? Did this change occur quickly or over time? What was your 
initial reaction? What impact did it have? What do you think now? Has this change 
made the investigation of homicide more effective? How?) 
 
3. Homicide investigation during your career 
How are the teams brought together for a homicide investigation? (How well does this 
work? What are the strengths/limitations to this approach?) 
What role do documents such as the MIM/MIRSAP play during the investigation of 
homicide?  (Are they useful?  Are such documents/guidance readily available during 
investigations? Are there any other ways in which you can get information/help 
during an investigation?) 
How are experts outside of the police service used during the investigation of 
homicide? (Who? Why? What are the benefits and limitations of using outside 
expertise?) 
How does the SIO keep a grasp on all the information that a homicide investigation 
generates?  (What are the strengths and limitations of this?) 
What are the main pressures that you experience during a homicide investigation and 
what impact do these have? (Media, financial, staffing) 
What works well during homicide investigations today? (Why? Has this changed 
during your career?) 
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What does not work well during homicide investigations today? (Why? Has this 
changed during your career?) 
 
4. Budget and the investigation of homicide  
How is the budget of a homicide investigation managed? (Has this changed during 
your career? Why?) 
What, if any, are the difficulties that surround budget management of homicide 
investigations? 
Is there are a particular area of homicide investigation that requires the most budget?  
(Why?) 
Do you think homicide investigations are becoming more expensive?  (Why? Why 
not?) 
How much of the policing budget is allocated to the investigation of homicide?  Do 
you think this has changed during the course of your career? 
Is homicide investigation still seen as a priority within policing today?  (Has it been 
superseded by other crimes?) 
 
5.  Civilians and homicide investigation 
What role do civilians play in homicide investigation today?  Is this something that 
you have seen change during your career? 
What are the strengths and limitations of employing civilians in the investigation of 
homicide? 
 
6. Change as reaction 
Change often occurs as a result of failed investigations into complex and protracted 
cases and their resulting inquiries (e.g. Yorkshire Ripper, Stephen Lawrence).  What 
is your opinion of change that occurs as a result of such cases /inquiries? 
Why do you think change is the response?  
 
7. Change, science and technology 
What major advancements in science and technology that are relevant to homicide 
investigation, have occurred during your career? (What impact has this had on 
investigation?) 
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 What role does science and technology play during homicide investigations today? 
(Are certain techniques used more often than others? Why these?) 
In what ways does the use of technology and science aid/hinder the investigation of 
homicide?  (How?) 
What is the ‘relationship’ between the use of science and technology and what might 
be considered ‘traditional’ detective skills?  (Do they complement each other? How? 
Why? Do they clash? How? Why?) 
Some of the detectives that I have spoken to to date suggested that the increased use 
of science and technology in homicide investigations has led to a ‘deskilling’ of 
detectives.  Would you agree with this? (If so, in what way have they been 
‘deskilled’? If not, why not?) 
 
8. Change and training 
How do you learn to be a detective? (Would you say it’s on the job experience or 
classroom learning?) 
How was experience and knowledge shared during your career? 
What training have you undertaken in regards to homicide investigation? (What did 
this entail? How effective was it? How? Why? In what way would you have changed 
it?) 
 
9. Change and detective skills 
Do you think that there are certain key skills and attributes that you must in order to 
be an effective detective/SIO?  (What are they? Why these?) 
Do you think that the key skills and attributes required of a detective/SIO have 
changed over the course of your career?  (How? Why?)  
Tell me about the best/worst detective/SIO you ever worked with and why he or she 
was so good/bad 
Some of the former detectives that I have spoken to have suggested that detectives 
communication skills are not as good as they were years ago; they say that detectives 
are not as good at speaking to people today.  Would you agree with this?  (If so, why 
do you think communication skills are not as good today? What impact does this have 




10. Change and the SIO 
In Swindon in 2011, an SIO breached PACE when a murder suspect offered to lead 
police to the body of another victim.  Whilst the second body was recovered, the 
suspect was not charged with that murder due to the actions of the SIO.  The judge 
accused the SIO of returning to a 1970s style of policing.  What do you think about 
this case?  (What do you think of the judge’s comments?  Despite his actions, do you 
think the SIO achieved a successful outcome?)  
SIOs of the 1970s and 1980s have been described by some of the former detectives 
that I have spoken to as ‘the dons’ or ‘the Gods’.  How would you describe SIOs 
today? (Why?) 
 
11. Homicide investigation and the past 
When you hear about the way in which homicide investigations were conducted in the 
1970s and 1980s what do you think about the practices? 
Do you think that there are things that are done today that we will be concerned by in 
20 years’ time? 
Do you think the police today are more risk averse than they might have been 20 
years ago? (Why?) 
a. Thinking about the changes that have occurred during your career, do you think that 
ultimately the investigation of homicide is now better than it was before? (How? 
Why? Why not?) 
 
12. Your career 
What do you like most/least about being a detective? (Why?) 
What do you find the most rewarding part of being a detective? (Why?) 
   
13.  Finally… 
Is there anything else that you feel would be useful to this interview that has not 
already been mentioned? 
Would you be able to recommend any other serving or former detectives who might 
be willing to be interviewed as part of this research? 
Would you be able to recommend any other materials/documents that you think might 








Can you tell me a little bit about your background? 
Approximately how many homicides have you been involved with and in what 
capacity? (i.e. prosecution, defence, Judge) 
 
2. Homicide trials 
Is a homicide trial different today to how it used to be? (What are the main 
similarities/differences?) 
What are the challenges of defending in homicide trials? (Has this changed? How?) 
What are the challenges of prosecuting in homicide trials? (Has this changed? How?) 
What are the most common challenges to homicide cases that seem to be watertight? 
(i.e. before it was the untaped interview) 
Could you tell me a little bit about Barristers’ conferences? (Purpose? What is 
involved? Who is involved? Have they become more technical?) 
 
3. Police investigations 
Has the quality of police investigations changed? (In what way? Why? How does this 
affect a trial?) 
What do the police do particularly well? (Has this changed?) 
 
4. Relationship with the police 
Has your relationship with the police changed? (How? Why? How does this affect a 
trial?) 
 
5. The Crown Prosecution Service 
The CPS has not come up during the interviews that have been held to date.  What is 






Could you tell me a little bit about disclosure? (Provision of the defence case 
statement, volume of work created as a result of defence requests for disclosure of 
emails, minutes of meetings etc, ‘fear’ leading to everything being handed over – your 
view on this?) 
 
7. Science and technology 
Could you tell me a little bit about how advances in science and technology have 
influenced homicide trials? (Now there are challenges to SIO decision-making and 
challenges to the investigative process – your view on this?) 
 
8. Pushing the boundaries and breaking the law 
In Swindon in 2011, an SIO breached PACE when a murder suspect offered to lead 
police to the body of another victim.  Whilst the second body was recovered, the 
suspect was not charged with that murder due to the actions of the SIO.  The Judge 
accused the SIO of returning to a 1970s style of policing.  What is your view of this 
case?  What should the SIO have done? 
 
9. Finally 
Is there anything that you feel would be useful to this interview that has not already 
been mentioned? 
Would you be able to recommend any other individuals who it might be helpful for 












I am a final year PhD research student at the University of South Wales being supervised by 
Professors Fiona Brookman and Mike Maguire.  My PhD research is exploring how the 
investigation of homicide in England and Wales has changed since the 1980s and what the 
impact of change has meant for modern day homicide investigations and detectives.  I was 
given your name by **** who has kindly provided me with some assistance with this 
research and who thought your input would be helpful.  I hope you don’t mind me getting in 
touch.  
I have spent 18 months interviewing retired and serving detectives, examining homicide 
cases files from the last few decades and observing different aspects of investigations and 
detective training.  I would now like to obtain some insight into the way in which homicide 
trials have changed in this time and would be interested to receive your thoughts on the 
questions below, if you would be happy to do so? 
I understand that you are very busy, so please do feel free to write or bullet point as much or 
as little as you wish.  Confidentiality is of course assured and you will not be identified 
within the research, as has been the case for all participants within my research.  If you are 
able to include particular examples from cases that you have worked on that would be 
especially helpful, and these too will be anonymised.   
1.    When did you first take part in a homicide trial?  Is your experience in working on 
such trials acting for the prosecution, defence or both? 
2.    In your experience has the quality of homicide investigations changed over time?  If 
so, how?   
3.    In what ways have the kinds of evidence that are used against homicide suspects 
changed since the 1980s?  
4.    What kinds of issues do the police and/or prosecution tend to be challenged on at trial 
today?  How does this differ from your early experiences?  
5.    Do you think that there are more homicide suspects that plead guilty today?  If so, 
why do you think this is? 
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6.    For those cases that go to trial, are more resulting in a guilty verdict?  Why? 
7.    Overall, do you believe that homicide convictions today are safer than they were in 
the 1980s?  Why? 
8.    Is there anything else that you would like to add that you feel is pertinent to this 
topic? 
I hope that the information that I have provided here is sufficient and you are happy to 
respond, but please let me know if you have any questions.  
I look forward to hearing from you.  Your insights will be invaluable to the research. 
Best wishes,  
Sophie 
  
  
 
